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Thanne is it wysdom, as it thynketh me,

To maken vertu of necessitee,

And take it weel that we may nat eschue,

And namely that to us alle is due. . . .

The contrarie of al this is wilfulnesse.
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I. "What May I Conclude?": Introduction 
Geoffrey Chaucer left many of his poems unfinished. 
The House of Fame breaks off shortly before its end; the 
Legend of Good Women has two prologues and stops 
immediately before the narrator gives us the conclusion 
to the Legend of Hypermnestra. The Canterbury Tales is 
a work of fragments; within these fragments the tales 
by the Cook, the Squire, the Monk, and the Pilgrim Chaucer are 
incomplete. The incompleteness of these works becomes particularly 
interesting when we consider that Chaucer's completed narratives fas­
cinate most by their inconclusiveness. The Book of the Duchess solves a 
problem different from the one its beginning raises; the Parliament of 
Fowls raises several questions about value but does not answer them. 
Troilus and Criseyde, on the other hand, insists on answers that I, with 
many other readers of medieval literature, feel the body of the work 
neither requests nor requires. And the Canterbury Tales, by its frag­
mentary structure, by its alternating points of view, and its way of 
entertaining debate without adjudicating, refuses to be conclusive. 
Although readers frequently have noticed these characteristics of 
Chaucer's works, no one yet has tried to understand their relationship 
to the development of Chaucer's narrative forms. I propose to do just 
that. I shall explain the complex nature of Chaucer's inconclusiveness 
as it is revealed within and throughout the development of his poetry, 
suggest some historical reasons for it, and examine how it both creates 
and affects meaning in his work. I read each work as Chaucer's attempt 
to represent the complex and conflicting relationship between antino­
mies such as experience and authority, belief and proof, freedom and 
necessity, truth and opinion. I take the incomplete and inconclusive 
state of his poetry to indicate that he was not always satisfied with how 
well his inherited narrative forms embodied human experience. I see 
the shape of Chaucer's literary career as a search for an appropriate 
form able to accommodate the inconclusiveness that these antinomies 
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create. My goal is ultimately to explain how the inconclusiveness that 
prevails throughout Chaucer's literary career leads him to discover in 
the Canterbury Tales a kind of narrative unique for the Middle Ages, a 
form that provides an early model for modern fiction. 
Before discussing the inconclusive nature of the forms of Chaucer's 
fiction, however, it is necessary to define both inconclusive and form, 
and to distinguish between incompleteness, the state of a text, and 
inconclusiveness, the nature of the meaning a form expresses. In­
conclusiveness is a quality of not shutting together, of not bringing to a 
close or end, of not deciding, or determining, or coming to an agree­
ment about something. It is an attribute of literary form as skepticism 
is a character of thought and ambivalence a trait of feeling. Form is a 
more complex term to define. I understand it to mean the intrinsic 
character of a literary work, its combination of qualities, its nature, or 
way of being. I take it to represent at once the writer's initial concept of 
the whole work and the design by which he arranges his content. I 
necessarily understand the design through my own perception of the 
content, its shape, and the effect of its shape on my feelings as the work 
proceeds. In an important essay on Chaucer, J. V. Cunningham has 
succinctly defined form in a way that reflects my understanding of the 
term and suits well my purpose in this study. 
A literary form is not simply an external principle of classification of 
literary works . . . , nor is it an Idea. It is rather a principle operative 
in the production of works. It is a scheme of experience recognized in 
the tradition. It is, moreover, a scheme that directs the discovery of 
material and detail and that orders the disposition of the whole. If a 
literary form is an Idea, it is an idea that the writer and reader have of 
the form.1 
A conclusive literary form satisfies an author's and an audience's 
expectations either by answering in some way the questions the content 
implies or by resolving comfortably the affective tensions the content 
creates.2 An inconclusive literary form either fails to answer the ques­
tions the work raises or offers answers that do not sit comfortably with 
the reading experience. Although an incomplete work may indicate 
that a poet does not wish to be decisive, final, conclusive about mean­
ing, it does not necessarily indicate inconclusiveness. A poet may leave 
his work unfinished for several reasons, he may lose interest in his 
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subject, his patronage may change or dry up, or he may die. There is 
nothing in the records of Chaucer's public life to tell us why he did not 
finish so many of his poems. But there is ample evidence in his poetry 
not only to suggest why he was inconclusive but to imply a relationship 
between the incompleteness of his texts and the inconclusiveness of his 
poetry. 
Chaucer's narratives repeatedly express conflicting perceptions and 
beliefs that are left unresolved. His much-admired ironic technique3 
indicates one major way in which he controlled these conflicts, for an 
ironic technique postpones resolution of a problem by creating instead 
a kind of stasis between opposing possibilities that need not be re­
solved.4 Irony clouds, rather than clears, the air. It indicates an atti­
tude torn between at least two possible options. If it settles anything at 
all, an ironic technique settles the irresolvability of the options, imply­
ing that the poet feels ambivalent about the matter at hand. Ambiva­
lence is to emotion what inconclusiveness is to form.5 
In this study I shall examine Chaucer's narrative poems, which 
range in length from the very brief Anelida and Arcite to the enormous 
Canterbury Tales, itself comprising discreet and various narrative 
forms. I shall maintain that some of these forms are complete and 
conclusive, like the Miller's Tale or the Second Nuns Tale, and that 
some are complete and inconclusive, like the Parliament of Fowls and 
the Nun's Priest's Tale. I shall also argue that some of Chaucer's nar­
ratives are incomplete and inconclusive, like the House of Fame, the 
Canterbury Tales, or for that matter, each fragment of the Canterbury 
Tales, and that some are incomplete but conclusive, like the Legend of 
Good Women and the Monk's Tale. Although I shall confront the in­
completeness of some of these texts, I shall be chiefly concerned with 
the inconclusiveness of the form, since I believe that inconclusiveness 
characterizes more exactly than incompleteness the nature of Chaucer's 
forms and the nature of his mind. 
The earliest narratives of Chaucer's career are dream visions whose 
concerns are quite different from each other yet whose forms are 
inconclusive for similar reasons. The Book of the Duchess, the House of 
Fame, and the Parliament of Fowls are similar in the way they avoid 
directing a reader's attention either to a clearly announced subject or to 
a developing theme. In this way they differ from the Consolation of 
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Philosophy, possibly the prototype for dream-vision form in the Mid­
dle Ages; also, they differ from the cosmological allegories of the 
twelfth-century "Chartrians," which direct their philosophical in­
vestigations toward an affirmation of an appropriately ordered hierar­
chy; they even differ from Le Roman de la Rose, which became the 
model for the French dits amoreux and in turn for these very dream 
visions. Chaucer's poems stick neither to one central problem nor to 
several related problems. Rather they are splayed. Their contents seem 
structured by a process of associations, neither reaching a main subject 
until the end nor subordinating less important elements to more impor­
tant ones. John Manly observed some time ago that the Book of the 
Duchess follows "long and tortuous corridors"6 before it arrives at its 
central intention—the confessional interchange between persona and 
Black Knight that epitomizes the dead Duchess as an ideal courtly lady. 
Similarly the House of Fame meanders through more than six hundred 
and fifty lines before the eagle mentions explicitly that the purpose of 
the experience is to bring the persona to the House of Fame. He does 
not arrive there, however, until five hundred lines later, and he never 
learns the tiding the eagle has announced as the purpose for the jour­
ney. Not until the very last episode of the Parliament of Fowls, more­
over, does the persona encounter the altercation between the birds that 
is the poem's subject. Until these very late points, the purpose for each 
of the poems remains unknown. Along the way to the ultimate presen­
tation of each subject, Chaucer incorporates so many related and un­
related issues that the apparent subjects of the poems constitute only one 
part of the meaning of each, and the organization of narrative units 
seems random and frequently mysterious. 
Critics have praised the mysterious and undirected structure of 
Chaucer's early dream visions as convincing imitations of the dream 
work we all experience.7 Anyone interested in understanding how a 
narrative form embodies meaning, however, encounters frustration as 
the possibility for conclusive meaning dissolves from scene to scene in 
these fluidly structured works. No sooner does the persona raise a 
problematic issue, such as the cause of insomnia, the value of literary 
representation, or the relation of love to the common weal, than he 
shifts to other issues without resolving the first. The elements of struc­
ture within each poem are so loosely coordinated, the narrative direc­
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tion so unexplicit, that a reader rarely feels secure grounding in one or 
even in several related subjects and themes. By the end of the poem, if 
indeed the poem reaches an end, whatever conclusion the poet presents 
about the experience, if indeed he presents a conclusion, seems in­
sufficient to all the issues the poem has handled. 
The shifting structures of these poems would not in themselves be 
unsettling were the persona, "oure aller hoste," less discomfited by his 
experience. His confusion, ambivalence, and fear continually affect 
our understanding of the dream-vision conventions the poems express. 
His responses to his experience cause us to doubt the purpose of the 
experience and the function of the conventions—many of them familiar 
to Chaucer's audience from the dits amoreux. The persona's reticent and 
skeptical responses to most elements of his dreams and the poems' 
peculiar principles of structure create forms in which meaning be­
comes less than certain. In fact, once we become accustomed to the 
patterns of uncertainty in each of the poems, the elusiveness of meaning 
appears to be a part of their design, and we follow, more comfortably 
than at the beginning, the persona through his surprising and fre­
quently worrisome journeys, fascinated both by his wonder and by his 
self-consciousness in relation to the elements of his experience. 
The self-consciousness of Chaucer the persona is quite unusual, for, 
especially after the Book of the Duchess, it continually suggests Chaucer 
the poet's interest in the problem of meaning in poetry, in the kind of 
truth a poem can express, and in the relation of subjective experience to 
the expression of objective truth through poetry. Later, I shall con­
front directly Chaucer's interest in the relation of individual perception 
to the representation of truth in narrative form, and I shall discuss 
some ways in which this interest contributes to inconclusiveness. Now, 
I wish merely to suggest that Chaucer's ambivalent attraction to the 
problem leads him to construct dream visions that address themselves 
to traditional though various subjects but express a relatively un­
conventional attitude toward the nature of poetic truth and the function 
of poetry.8 Inconclusiveness in the forms of the dream visions derives 
directly from the persona's ambivalent self-consciousness in response to 
the elements of subject and theme that the poems examine, express, 
and, when possible, resolve. 
When Chaucer turns from the dream-vision form to write legendary 
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narratives in what is commonly thought of as his middle period, his 
mode of narrative changes but his narrator's concerns remain the same 
as the persona's were.9 Because many of the poems of this period have 
been incorporated into the large form of the Canterbury Tales, where 
they exist as stories told by a character other than Chaucer, it is impos­
sible to consider them as independent fictions exhibiting a direct 
relationship between Chaucer the narrator and his materials. A second 
level of fictionalizing has intervened, and any argument about con­
clusiveness or inconclusiveness in the forms of works like the Knight's 
Tale and the Monk's Tale, probably written during this period of 
Chaucer's career, must take into account the characters of the Knight 
and the Monk as tellers. However, the form of a narrative like Troilus, 
which Chaucer never attached to the Canterbury Tales, is also in­
conclusive, although inconclusiveness is not created by a peculiar struc­
ture, as it was in the dream visions. Indeed, the plot and structure of 
Troilus are clear. We are never confused about its direction or its 
themes. Rather, inconclusiveness in its form derives from the nar­
rator's involvement with the materials of others, which he claims to be 
rendering for his own time. The narrator's frequently ambivalent 
responses to the content affects, and at times obscures, the meaning and 
conclusiveness that the narrative expresses. For example, the narrator 
repeatedly claims he has no power over the content, yet he controls the 
form and our responses to it by his ironic technique, by his decision to 
moralize certain elements of content as opposed to others, and by his 
rhetoric, which causes us to respond or not to respond, as he sees fit, to 
the content of his "auctor." Even in a fragment as brief as Anelida and 
Arcite, this control has the effect of undercutting whatever conclusive­
ness his received material possesses, for it interferes with the moral 
implications of the content. 
Just as the forms of Chaucer's early dream visions appear in­
conclusive because the persona skeptically questions both meaning and 
value in many aspects of his experience, so the forms of the legendary 
narratives of the middle period appear inconclusive because the nar­
rator continually qualifies authority, telling us what to think and what 
not to think about his characters and their actions. In fact, the narrator 
involves himself so dynamically with the content of Troilus that the 
relationship between narrator and narrative becomes as significant an 
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element of meaning in the poem's form as the love between Troilus and 
Criseyde, as Pandarus' relationship with the lovers, and as the history 
itself of the war at Troy. This involvement creates an inconclusiveness 
in the form that suggests Chaucer's continuing interest in how a nar­
rator affects meaning in traditional literary materials, how he changes 
the truth value that resides in those materials. It also indicates that the 
problems with certainty apparent everywhere through the dream 
visions may not be attributed merely to inexperience in writing poetry, 
a charge that might otherwise by leveled against Chaucer's dream 
visions, his "juvenilia." It indicates a continuing quality of mind that 
leads him to impose the subjective perceptions of his narrator on liter­
ary meaning even when the narrative mode is not subjective. 
The Legend of Good Women marks a new development in Chaucer's 
creation of narrative form and thus may be said to belong to another, 
later, period. By attaching a set of legendary narratives to a dream 
vision prologue, Chaucer creates in the Legend of Good Women a com­
posite form that combines the two modes of narrative in which he had 
previously written. This new form exhibits even more strongly than 
the form of Troilus Chaucer's growing tendency to absorb legendary 
materials into the consciousness of a narrator, making the otherwise 
objective nature of the third-person legendary narratives appear to be a 
part of a subjective experience. Put in another way, the form of the 
Legend of Good Women allows Chaucer to establish a character in a 
dream-vision prologue who then projects a set of venerable narratives 
the purpose of which is not to render the legends authoritatively, as it 
was in Anelida and Troilus, but to sustain a fictive identity of repentent 
sinner that the god of love assigns to him. In consequence, meaning in 
the legends as they exist elsewhere becomes significant only insofar as it 
is appropriate to the teller of them. Having created this new form, 
Chaucer frees himself from the problem of authority, which seems to 
have concerned him from the beginning of his career, and from the 
problem of what truth poetry can demonstrate. He has also discovered, 
as I shall later argue more fully, that a poet can create narratives that 
need not claim to represent truth and whose values need not be his own. 
It is precisely this discovery that enabled Chaucer to create the 
Canterbury Tales, his most complex and extensive experiment in nar­
rative form. The Canterbury Tales is a composite form like the Legend 
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of Good Women, and it is encyclopedic like the Decameron or the 
Confessio Amantis, to name but two of the many sets of stories, often 
framed by a fictive action, that the Middle Ages enjoyed. Yet the 
presence in the Canterbury Tales of many characters who tell tales 
makes it a more complex form than the Legend of Good Women; 
moreover, the high level of integration between the characters of the 
pilgrims and the nature of the tales they tell—even of the genres in 
which they tell their stories—makes it a more mimetic form than the 
Decameron, and less concerned with a univocal didacticism than the 
Confessio Amantis. Using lessons learned from his earlier works about 
the limits of poetry to express truth, Chaucer creates in the Canterbury 
Tales characters whose individual psychologies and motives influence, 
even determine, the nature of meaning in poetry. Chaucer uses many 
voices, personalities, or consciousnesses to describe individual and at 
times contradictory opinions about the world and its values. No one 
opinion represents the truth of any matter, yet each is, generally speak­
ing, valid in light of what we know about the respondent. As a whole, 
the Canterbury Tales is not only a set of stories but a cornucopia of 
opinions, of convictions, of attitudes, whose form suggests a sense of 
pluralistic reality. 
Unlike Chaucer's earlier works, whose forms are not necessarily 
inconclusive by intention, the Canterbury Tales is a purposely in­
conclusive form from which it is impossible to ascertain a univocal 
truth, for knowledge is embedded in opinion and opinion is presented 
through fiction, at times through hearsay, as opposed to dream or 
historical work. But the uncertainty that this kind of inconclusive form 
offers represents in the Canterbury Tales a strength not a weakness, a 
virtue not a fault. In later chapters I shall argue that inconclusiveness 
was potential in the original conception of the Canterbury Tales, that 
Chaucer found it useful for expressing a sense of a pluralistic reality in 
which certainty was no longer a problem for the form, though it 
remained an issue in the content, that it led to the creation of a work 
whose effect strikes us as uniquely modern. Here, however, I want to 
suggest that the form of the Canterbury Tales moves in the direction of 
more extreme inconclusiveness as Chaucer develops it. The introduc­
tion of the Canon and the Canon's Yeoman into the Canterbury Tales 
offers a clear indication that Chaucer was experimenting with his 
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already inconclusive form by making it yet more inconclusive. Let us 
look specifically at what changes in the form the introduction of these 
characters causes. 
In the General Prologue, Chaucer tells us that there were thirty 
pilgrims, twenty-six of whom he describes, "preestes three," a nun, 
and himself.10 Harry Bailly originally stipulates that each pilgrim will 
tell two tales going and two coming. The complete Canterbury Tales, 
then, will comprise one hundred and twenty stories (or more if the 
count of pilgrims were to come to thirty-one) that a pilgrimage frame 
will enclose and effect.11 It will be a large but not unprecedented 
encyclopedic work, the complex lines of whose structure the first frag­
ment begins to work out. After fragment one breaks off, however, we 
can no longer be certain of the order or the structure of the remainder 
of the Canterbury Tales, although the appearance of Chaucer's retrac­
tion at the end of the Parson's Tale makes certain that fragment ten will 
be the last. Despite the incomplete state of the Canterbury Tales, then, 
and despite a changed intention expressed in fragment ten that the 
parson should end the tale-telling as the pilgrim's approach Canterbury 
at the end of the day, Chaucer must at one time have conceived of the 
form of the Canterbury Tales as closed and "completable." But when 
the Canon and his Yeoman ride up to the pilgrims in fragment seven, 
composed late in the order of the fragments, Chaucer is substantially 
altering the form of the Canterbury Tales, for he is opening a form that 
had been closed until that point. Although this is the only place in the 
Canterbury Tales where Chaucer intrudes characters from outside the 
fictive realm he has established in the General Prologue, it is signifi­
cant, for the intrusion changes our ultimate expectations of the shape 
and "completability" of the work. Theoretically, Chaucer can now 
continue to expand his form indefinitely, despite its clearly intended 
completion point. He can insert new characters who could plausibly 
join the pilgrimage anywhere along the route from Southwerk to Can­
terbury even as he decides not to use original characters like the 
Knight's Yeoman, the Guildsmen, or the Plowman. 
It might, of course, be argued that Chaucer ultimately would have 
placed the Canon's Yeoman among the original pilgrims, an argument 
like the one already advanced about the Manciple.12 But such an 
argument would have to speculate that Chaucer would have canceled 
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the stunning dramatic interplay between the Canon, his Yeoman, and 
Harry Bailly, a speculation I find distasteful in light of the excellence 
of the material. Moreover, appearing where it does after the Second 
Nun's Tale, having essentially the same message about belief and the 
nature of belief, although different in form and style from the Nun's 
tale, the Canon's Yeoman's Tale would lose much of its powerful driv­
ing force if the Yeoman had been present to hear the legend of Saint 
Cecilia.13 It is equally likely that Chaucer incorporated his earlier tale 
of Saint Cecilia into the form of the Canterbury Tales because he 
recognized the possibility of its effect before the Canon's Yeoman, 
describing his situation, warns us in his tale not to "multiplye" and not 
to seek the meaning of the philosopher's stone.14 The presence of 
fragment seven indicates that at the height of his constructional powers, 
Chaucer conceived a way to open a form that had been closed until 
then. It suggests, further, that Chaucer preferred ultimately to work 
with an open literary form and that whatever motivated him to create 
inconclusive narrative forms earlier in his career continued to motivate 
him late in his career.15 
I have no doubt that some will greet my argument about in­
conclusiveness and narrative form in Chaucer's poetry as unhistorical 
since I have been using the term form as we think of it, not as Chaucer 
thought of it, and since conclusiveness is a problem of particular 
relevance to our time. Yet the fragmentary nature of much poetry of 
the late Middle Ages, the formal and self-conscious interest in dis­
covering what poetry can tell about reality in the works, say, of Mar­
tianus Capella and Alanus de Insulis, and the often painful confusion of 
meaning in the versions of Piers Plowman that Chaucer's contemporary 
left us, convince me that this modern problem, mutatis mutandis, was 
also relevant to Chaucer and that it is not historically inaccurate to view 
Chaucer's career as a series of experiments in narrative form, as I have 
defined the term, culminating in the creation of a form like the Canter­
bury Tales that offers a sense of pluralistic meaning comfortably in 
place of a sense of certainty. The historical likelihood of this conviction 
can be demonstrated by examining some shifting patterns of thought in 
the late Middle Ages and their epistemological consequences. 
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II 
Until the twelfth century, Saint Augustine's Neoplatonic premises, 
epistemology, and method of reasoning prevailed throughout Christian 
Europe with little challenge. Like all Platonic philosophy, Au­
gustinianism locates the Real ultimately in the Ideal Mind, Nous, God, 
the divine principle. Reasoning begins with the notion of a first cause 
outside human consciousness, from which there are traceable effects 
such as the world and the individual within it. 
During the twelfth century, however, a developing interest in the 
individual consciousness produced an alternative epistemology that 
offered a changed direction of reasoning.16 Some writers grew in­
terested in reasoning not only from God to man, as the Augustinians 
had been doing, but also from man and his effects to God. For in­
stance, as a first step in understanding the universe outside himself, 
and ultimately of understanding God, Richard of Saint Victor began by 
looking inward: 
Frusta cordis oculum erigit ad videndum Deum, qui nondum idoneus 
est ad videndum seipsum. Prius discat homo cognoscere invisibilia sua, 
quam praesumat posse apprehendere invisibilia divina. Prius est ut 
cognoscere invisibilia spiritus tui, quam possis esse idoneus ad cognos­
cendum invisibilia Dei. Alioquin si non potes cognoscere te, qua fronte 
praesumis apprendere ea quae sunt suprate?17 
[In vain man raises his heart's eye to see God, if he is not yet fit to see 
himself. First let man come to know the invisible things of himself 
before he presume to grasp divine invisibilia. You must first un­
derstand your own spirit before you can be fit to understand the 
invisible things of God. In general, if you are not able to understand 
yourself, how can you presume to grasp those things which are above 
you?] 
Richard was neither alone in this procedure nor the first. Eadmer, 
the biographer of Saint Anselm, tells us that the ontological proof for 
the existence of God that Anselm proposed occurred because Anselm 
began with the individual mind, his own, at the center of thought and 
excluded everything from it but the word "God."18 Saint Bernard of 
Clairvaux, though less interested than Anselm in logic or analysis, 
more interested rather in spiritual growth, outlined his program for 
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Cistercian mysticism by beginning with man's love for himself as the 
first step in his search for God. In his Liber de Diligendo Deo, Bernard 
describes love, which arises first from "amor carnalis quo ante omnia 
homo diligit seipsum propter seipsum" [love of the flesh by which 
man loves himself before everything on account of himself] and ar­
rives at the spiritual level "cum nee seipsum diligit homo nisi propter 
Deum" [whenever man does not love himself except on account of 
God]. 
This alternative epistemology also manifests itself in both the writ­
ings on friendship of Aelred de Rivaulx20 and the writings on preach­
ing of Guibert de Nogent. Here is Guibert: 
Nulla enim praedicatio salubrior mihi videtur quam ilia quae hominem 
sibimet ostendat, et foras extra se sparsum in interiori suo, hoc est in 
mente, restituat atque eum coarquens quodammodo depictum ante 
faciem suam statuat.21 
[Truly no preaching seems to me more beneficial than that which 
displays a man to himself, replaces in his inner self, that is in his mind, 
what is extended outside of himself, and which in a certain way places 
him conclusively represented before his own eyes.] 
Although this epistemology pervades the thinking of many significant 
writers of the twelfth century, like Peter Damiani, William of Saint 
Thierry, and John of Salisbury, it finds its most famous proponent in 
Peter Abelard, for whom it substantiated as famous a series of actions 
as works. The headnote of Abelard's Ethics reads: "Incipit Liber 
Magistri Petri Abelardi Qui Dicitur Scito Te Ipsum." Moreover, 
whatever may have been the doctrinal or moral reasons for writing 
Historia Calamitatum, in it Abelard offers a method of discovering 
meaning and purpose in life by the analytic scrutiny of one's own 
actions.22 
The emphasis on self that this epistemology at once enabled and 
produced appeared no less strongly in the realm of vernacular writing 
than it did in the realm of Latin. The first generation of writers of 
chivalric romance in the twelfth century explored a world centered 
upon the individual in which the subjective interpretation of reality 
was the norm, although "a reaction against the individual centered 
world-view of the twelfth century literature" seems to have taken place 
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in the prose cycles that developed early in the thirteenth century.23 
Nonetheless, philosophers of the thirteenth century continued to devel­
op the alternative epistemological method that begins with the self and 
the senses. In consequence, they separated themselves increasingly 
from theologians, to whom the metaphysical premise of God as a first 
cause remained the prior consideration. Their attempts at systematiz­
ing this alternative epistemological method were sustained by newly 
translated commentaries on Aristotle, which reached the Christian 
West from Spain. 
It is well known that the "new" Aristotle generated an enormous 
amount of philosophical activity in the thirteenth century. Like Au­
gustinianism, the new Aristotelianism was interested in metaphysics. 
Unlike Augustinianism, however, it emphasized the sensible world 
and our awareness of it. Saint Thomas Aquinas's famous axiom en­
capsulates the matter succintly: "Nihil in intellectu, nisi prius fuerit in 
sensu" [Nothing is in the intellect unless it was first in the senses]. 
Since the senses give us our first awareness, the system of reality that 
the mind constructs from experience must first rest on sensory 
apprehension of the world. Whereas Augustinianism, like all Platonic 
epistemology, begins with the metaphysical assumption that the 
Creator reveals or illumines us with the truth of his existence, i.e., his 
Essence, the Aristotelian epistemology that philosophers like Aquinas 
investigate accents the prior importance of the senses to all knowledge 
and the process of existence and its fulfillment (haeceity) as the mind 
reasons itself toward that same metaphysical understanding.24 
Actually, Aquinas never intended to abandon the Augustinian epis­
temological method in favor of the Aristotelian. In fact, his Summa 
Contra Gentiles (1258) in large measure attacks the implications of 
certain of Averroes' Aristotelian principles that, if accepted, threatened 
the validity of Augustinian theology.25 Rather, much of Averroes' 
writing attempts to undo this threat by trying to align the role of 
reason, which the philosopher explored, and the role of revelation, 
which the theologian explored, for the ultimate and same metaphysical 
end of knowing God.26 
Other philosophers, however, like Siger of Brabant and Boetius of 
Dacia, known as the "radical Aristotelians," sought to defend Aver-
roes' doctrines by developing the concept of the double truth. Accord­
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ing to the concept of the double truth, when a conclusion in philosophy 
is logically reached but contradicts the conclusion of theology, the 
truths of both conclusions may stand as long as they are kept catego­
rically separate, the one true for philosophy, the other true for theolo­
gy. Historians of philosophy find the idea of the double truth signifi­
cant because it means the separation of theology from philosophy. I 
find the idea interesting because it suggests that as early as the thir­
teenth century people understood truth to exist in kinds and to reside in 
alternatives; moreover philosophers were willing to allow contradiction 
to remain unresolved. The idea of the double truth thus provides an 
early philosophical analogue for the skepticism of certainty that Chauc­
er, among other writers of the late Middle Ages, expresses in his 
poetry.27 
The official church consistently condemned such a possibility as a 
double truth. Yet the notion enjoyed wide consideration in the univer­
sities throughout the last decades of the thirteenth century and created 
vigorous intellectual controversies.28 For the most part, these con­
troversies, like the double truth itself, result from the competition 
between Augustinian and Aristotelian methods for understanding real­
ity. Assuming that metaphysics was possible and demonstrable, Aris­
totelians emphasized deduction through the evidence of the senses. The 
direction of their reasoning thus changed the process by which the will 
moved to an understanding of God. Opposed to these thinkers were 
Augustinians, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham the most famous 
of them, who believed that this method of reasoning ultimately de­
termined God's motives by making them susceptible to man's reason­
ing power. They sought to insure the freedom of the will of both God 
and man by denying that commonly held theological conclusions, like 
God's existence, His free will, and man's understanding of it, could be 
rationally demonstrated. Rather they argued that such truths could only 
be known in the light of revelation.29 
William of Ockham's ideas are most significant for us not only 
because they won widest favor in the English universities of Chaucer's 
day but because they are pivotal in the development of our modern way 
of understanding reality. According to Ockham intuitive knowledge, 
what the mind knows only by experience, is the only knowledge that 
represents reality existing outside one's mind. Ockham tells us: "Nihil 
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potest naturaliter cognosci in se nisi cognoscat intuitive" [Nothing can 
be known naturally in itself unless it is known intuitively] .30 Abstrac­
tion, the process by which the mind systematizes and universalizes 
particulars—a kind of knowledge since it involves a mental process—is 
actually a reflection that the mind makes, not necessarily a part of the 
object the mind perceives: "Abstractiva autem est ista virtute cuius de 
re contingenti non potest sciri evidenter utrum sit vel non sit" [Ab­
stractive ability, moreover, is that by whose power concerning a con­
tingent matter there can be no evident knowledge of whether it exists or 
does not exist].31 Since abstract knowledge derives from the perceiv­
ing mind and not from the object that the senses experience, universals 
exist only within the mind. Value, which inheres in the universal and 
from which ethics derives, cannot reside in experiential reality. It is 
rather a mental construct, intrinsic in the mind and having reference to 
systems within the mind. 
Ockham's philosophy not only isolates intuitive from abstract 
knowledge in a way that had not been done before; in effect it denies an 
intrinsic, independent reality to anything that the senses do not per­
ceive. Particulars are intrinsically real, but they are not ethically 
charged in themselves. Universals and the things pertaining to them, 
like ethical principles, are purely mental concepts, deriving from an 
authority that ranges from the wisdom of the ancient teachers like 
Aristotle and Augustine to the incontrovertible and free will of God 
revealed by grace, as in the Ten Commandments. Universals have no 
existence within the bounds of sense experience. 
Although Ockham's ideas enjoyed widespread popularity in the uni­
versities throughout the fourteenth century, there is no indication of 
how many people actually believed with the philosophers of the via 
moderna, those who followed Ockham, that reality could be known 
from within the mind and intentionally by means of authority or 
conceptualization and from outside the mind by the experience of sense 
data. There is an indication that theologians like Bishop Bradwardine 
and John Wycliff attacked the principles and attitudes of the via mod­
erna, particularly the skepticism about knowledge that these Ockhamist 
principles implied.32 The vehemence of the attacks suggests first that 
there was something profoundly threatening to Christian tradition in 
what these philosophers were saying and, second, that the subversive 
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tendencies that they were manifesting were significant. The threaten­
ing quality lay in the separation of physics from metaphysics and of 
particulars from universals. The subversive significance lay in the fact 
that one had a fragmented knowledge and was consequently unable to 
make a total statement about the meaning and purpose of God's entire 
creation on the basis of experiential knowledge. It was not that the 
universe became, thus, purposeless; it was rather that its purpose was 
unknowable. As a further and perhaps more significant consequence, 
God's will became more distant than had heretofore been felt, and 
man's will and its freedom were not clearly aligned with that of God. 
The followers of the via moderna in the fourteenth century were led 
by their reasoning to establish a new epistemological category of 
possibility, which the philosophers themselves called neutrality. Until 
that time a proposition had been considered either true or false. But 
motivated by the premise of the absolute freedom and limitlessness of 
God's will, and accepting Ockham's distinction between experiential 
and conceptual, or mental, knowledge, these philosophers argued that 
future contingency was neither true nor false until the will of God had 
been made manifest. Hence propositions dealing with contingency, 
formerly considered true or false, now could be possible. Gordon Leff 
explains the matter thus: 
Once it is conceded that an object need not be A to the exclusion of B it 
follows that either is possible. It is by this means that the skeptics 
discussed God and His ways, allowing that it was possible for Him to 
follow any course of action. This in turn led to indeterminacy: the lack 
of any certain order to which possibility gives rise. Thus when one 
course is as likely for God as another (neutrality), any is possible 
(possibility), and there is no means of determining the outcome (in­
determinacy).33 
In their original zeal to protect God's omniscience, these thinkers were 
led to doubt the ability of the individual mind to know His plans. If we 
cannot know God's plans by experience, then the meaning of experi­
ence becomes uncertain. 
Ockham and his followers had argued that the mind could not know 
universality in an experiential way. Reality thus could be known from 
within the mind and intentionally by means of conceptualization or 
authority, and it could be known from outside the mind by the experi­
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ence of sense data. This notion of cognitive indeterminacy provides a 
philosophical analogue to what I am calling inconclusiveness in Chau­
cer's poetry: a frequent inability on the part of the Chaucerian "voice" 
to derive universal or certain meaning from the elements of his experi­
ence, an inclination to avoid drawing conclusions. As we shall see, 
inconclusiveness has epistemological and psychological correlatives 
within Chaucer's poetry in the skepticism and ambivalence that the 
Chaucerian "voice" continually manifests. 
I l l 
Despite the information that social and philosophical historians have 
provided, most attempts to place Chaucer in a historical context that is 
not Augustinian have been based on the idea of a Gothic style of 
architecture that flourished roughly from the twelfth through the first 
half of the fourteenth centuries in Western Europe. Insofar as the style 
and structure of a Gothic cathedral expresses through stone and glass a 
perceived idea of reality, the analogy with literature of the time is apt, 
and literary criticism must be grateful to art history for the paradigm 
of the Gothic vision of reality. Chaucerians such as Muscatine, Robert­
son, Payne, Jordan, and Howard, different as they are in their in­
terpretations of Chaucer, assume and use this architectural analogy of a 
poised balance, a spatially harmonized synthesis of disparate parts. Yet 
the zeal with which Chaucerians have undertaken to establish a "Goth­
ic" Chaucer has had two limiting effects: it has imposed upon Chau­
cer's verbal medium of representation a terminology from a plastic 
medium; and, perhaps in consequence of this imposition, it has made 
Chaucer's poetry appear to represent a reality far more monolithic, 
secure, and static than I think it actually represents. 
Long ago Lessing argued in his Laocoon for the distinction in criti­
cism between the spatial and the temporal arts, a distinction that "Goth­
ic" criticism must of necessity minimize. The eye perceives the total 
form of a spatial structure. Only afterward does the mind analyze the 
dimension, the particular diversity and variety of its form. The ear/ 
eye perceives the total form of a narrative temporally, especially in the 
Middle Ages, when silent reading was unusual. The mind expects 
wholeness from a narrative, but that expectation is not fulfilled until 
the reader has experienced all its parts piecemeal in a flow of patterns. 
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Meaning develops in narrative periodically as the mind relates part to 
part and eventually part to whole. Medieval rhetoricians lavished 
attention on beginnings and transitions because they provide audiences 
with conventional directional signals and create expectations that may 
or may not be fulfilled as the work unfolds through time. Even grant­
ing that Gothic art's spatial paradigm represents a functional concept of 
reality in a temporal medium like a Chaucerian narrative, the tenor of 
thought that the model offers, although sustained at times by an op­
timistic sense that all might be ordered, was never as monolithic in the 
centuries during which it developed and flourished as the architectural 
analogy implies. 
The energy and optimism of the twelfth century produced a series of 
cohesive and eloquent structures, spatial and temporal, artistic and 
intellectual, that glorified God and God's creation by delighting in 
man and the creativity of his mind. Structures like a Gothic cathedral 
or a scholastic summa indicate a commitment well into the thirteenth 
century to understanding a transcendent reality in God by analyzing 
parts of the whole. Although their ordering principle is different from 
our own, the diverse parts of both cathedral and summa express an idea 
of totality. Whether or not they have been completed, they indicate a 
belief in attaining wholeness by attention to parts. They understand 
totality, the physical and metaphysical, to be contained within the 
particular. People of the first half of the thirteenth century were able to 
see heaven in a grain of sand. 
But attitudes changed as the thirteenth century moved toward its 
close. Skepticism of the possibility of achieving wholeness increased, 
and thought grew disillusioned with the idea of totality it had earlier 
entertained. By the end of the thirteenth century and through the early 
decades of the fourteenth, as we have seen, philosophers were challeng­
ing the notion of wholeness, even delighting in the mind's ability to 
extend its completest knowledge to the part. Historians of art are 
generally aware of this changing attitude toward the idea of totality 
during the period they call Gothic. Chaucerians notice the fact but tend 
not to let it interfere with their paradigm of Gothic by which they 
interpret Chaucer.34 In consequence, the notion of the Gothic Chaucer 
is limiting because it freezes meaning, suggesting a unified sense of 
reality, when in fact Chaucer's poetry offers a fluid and by no means 
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harmonious sense of reality, especially when examined from the point 
of view of its development. 
A corollary to what I am calling the limiting notion of a Gothic 
Chaucer is the equally unsatisfying concept of the moral Chaucer 
whose didactic purpose is clear. If criticism seeks to explain meaning in 
a work of art, morally based interpretations are indeed useful. Yet 
every reader of Chaucer knows that the didactic nature of his poetry is 
neither simple nor always clear. Chaucer's abiding interest in the value 
of experience and authority and in the extent and limits of earthly love 
and human power rarely reveal a consistent or conclusive morality. 
More often than not, they suggest how difficult it is to evaluate human 
behavior and human goals in light of traditional ethical doctrines. 
Because Chaucer composes in narrative forms that are either subjective 
and interior, like his dream visions, or heavily mediated by a sub­
jective consciousness with particular rather than universal desires and 
claims, like Troilus and the Canterbury Tales, and because Chaucer is 
the master of a complicated ironic technique, his didacticism is hard to 
define. In fact, it seems closer to the experience of Chaucer's works to 
say that he is more interested in exploring what poetry can say about 
reality than he is in evaluating human behavior for a didactic purpose. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on Chaucer's didactic concerns, I shall 
examine how his poetry expresses epistemological concerns. 
My reasons for doing so are three. First, what is unclear or in­
conclusive about the moral nature of Chaucer's work can be better 
explained by examining his epistemology, for the moral nature of the 
poetry depends on the poet's interest in the ways in which one can 
know, in what kind of knowledge is certain and what merely possible, 
in the perceptual relationship of subject and object in the act of know­
ing, and in the end of knowing, especially by means of poetry. In 
short, Chaucer wants to know how a poet can understand and articulate 
his world and human behavior in it. Second, emphasizing epistemol­
ogy in Chaucer's poetry will help us recognize why and in what ways 
the poetry is inconclusive, for the inconclusiveness of many of the 
narratives has its source in epistemological problems of certainty that 
Chaucer repeatedly confronts. Finally, this shift in critical focus will 
explain how Chaucer's inconclusiveness accounts for his experiments 
with narrative form throughout his career that culminate in the discov­
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ery of the unique form of the Canterbury Tales. Such an examination 
should not be thought of as inimical to didactic or thematic in­
terpretations, but rather as related to them in its attempt to get at 
meaning and expression in Chaucer. Ethics and epistemology, like 
content and form, may be discreet categories of thought, but they are 
neither mutually exclusive nor independent of each other.35 
II. "I Have Gret Wonder": Inconclusiveness and 
the Book of the Duchess 
Any examination of the development of Chaucer's nar­
rative poetry must begin with the dream visions. 
Chaucer wrote them first and developed in them an 
unusual persona whose "voice" pervades all his later 
works.l Like all visionary literature, the dream vision 
is a complexly subjective form. The poet takes a ver­
sion of self, generally in a benighted state, and provides him with 
experiences, generally in the allegorical mode, intended to lead to some 
kind of understanding. The audience identifies with the persona's 
heightened state of emotion, yet the sympathy is condescending because 
the persona is naive, obtuse, limited. He does not always achieve 
understanding by the end, but the audience usually experiences some 
relevant moral enlightenment or emotional satisfaction.2 
Chaucer's dream visions are considerably different from most 
visionary literature and create considerably different effects. Although 
each poem uses allegorization, its mode is not allegorical. Conse­
quently the persona is not an element of self, like VAmant or Will, 
encountering other aspects of self, like Reson or Imaginatif. In Chau­
cer's dream visions, the persona is always a whole character, and we 
feel as whole the other characters he meets, like the Black Knight, the 
Eagle, the anonymous "frend" of the House of Fame. To ensure that we 
experience the persona within the dream as a complete personality, 
Chaucer takes pains to have him describe his activities and feelings 
before the dream, and periodically within the dream to refer to his 
waking self and its particular history. 
Chaucer's persona in the dream visions is a consistent character. He 
is an anxiety-ridden, muddleheaded but well-intentioned, shy, sen­
timental, bedazzled poet, seeking knowledge and experience for his 
poetry, and continually amazed by the complexity of the world around 
him. He is insecure about his ability to articulate clearly and justly the 
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meaning of all he sees, reads, and dreams, yet he is determined to try, 
while asking the indulgence of his audience for his own tentativeness. 
Chaucer's persona is essentially a bookish personality, less comfortable 
even in dreams with grand flights above the earth than with sitting in 
his study reading. There is no particular order to his reading, no 
particular subject he pursues. He reads for the sake of reading. Some­
times his books are classical poems, like those of Vergil and Ovid (or 
versions of Vergil and Ovid); sometimes they are dream allegories; 
sometimes they are works about love; and sometimes they are moral 
and philosophical treatises. More important than any order to his 
reading is his insatiable appetite for books, the frequent listings of 
which direct our attention to his serious epistemological concerns. 
Geffrey is not, however, only a poet and a voracious reader. He was 
once a lover, he has a wife and a job, he likes to eat, he is acquainted 
with the night, and apparently he has trouble getting up in the morn­
ing. The objects of Chaucer's dream visions change, but the persona 
remains a consistently presented subject who matures but never loses 
his charmingly inept nature.3 
Without the allegorical mode common to visionary literature, this 
remarkable subject takes on mimetic complexity, and his narratives 
become highly specialized fictions in which he seeks personal meaning 
from experience and generally does not find it. Other authors who 
choose the visionary form generally know what they want to say about 
an issue. Chaucer chooses the form, rather, to explore what of signifi­
cance he can say. He offers not a guided vision but only a first person 
who mediates all he encounters through the prism of his own un­
certainty. An apparent connection rarely exists between the persona's 
serious concerns and the didactic information that the figures in the 
dream offer him. In fact, a frequent lack of connection between the 
persona's concerns and the phenomena of his experience produces a 
sense of incongruity in which meaning remains tentative. As we read, 
our continuing uncertainty keeps us wondering about what the enig­
matic phenomena signify—a whelp, waves of petitioning spirits, a gate 
with contradictory signs. Chaucer's early dream visions concern the 
ways in which the mind tries to make sense of the hubbub of experi­
ence. But they do not make that sense for us. 
Just as the philosophers of the fourteenth century investigated and 
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developed an epistemology that offered as an end in itself the notion of 
possibility, or neutrality, Chaucer's early dream visions investigate and 
develop indeterminate, possible meaning as an end of the literary 
enterprise. Chaucer develops a narrative form in which meaning is 
either incongruous or indeterminate. Questions the persona asks do not 
get answered, confused issues and concepts do not get cleared up, 
experiences are not generally illuminating. The ambivalence of the 
persona provides a psychological corollary to indeterminacy. As early 
as the Book of the Duchess, we experience a world not only mediated 
through a persona's experience, as in all dream visions, but a world in 
which the persona's ambivalence charges the atmosphere of the poems 
with ambivalence. 
In the House of Fame, Chaucer illustrates why indeterminacy of 
meaning may have to serve as an end in itself in literature. Late in book 
three, the persona notices "a lesynge and a sad soth" (2089) brought 
together "of aventure" in an attempt to get out the window of the 
whirling House of Rumor. Neither of them can leave through the 
window, presumably to fly to earth via Fame's house, because one is 
"achekked" by the other. In order to expedite the matter, the two make 
a pact to merge, to become one so that what is true and what is false in 
the rumor will never again be separable: 
"Lat me go first!" "Nay, but let me! 
And her I wol ensuren the 
Wyth the nones that thou wolt do so, 
That I shal never fro the go, 
But be thyn owne sworen brother! 
We wil medle us ech with other, 
That no man, be they never so wrothe, 
Shal han on [of us] two, but bothe 
At ones, al besyde his leve, 
Come we a-morwe or on eve, 
Be we cried or stille yrouned." 
Thus saugh I fals and soth compouned 
Togeder fie for oo tydynge. 
[2097-2107] 
Chaucer may have found the admixture of truth and falsehood in 
Metamorphoses 12. 54—55; however, he invented the dramatic state­
ment, the bargaining, the language with its metaphor of sworn 
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brotherhood. These lines show how rumor is a compounding of in­
imical polarities, how each must sacrifice the clear outline of its identi­
ty to ensure that it will reach its destination. 
The combination of truth and falsehood that constitutes rumor may 
also be said to constitute reputation and, by extension, the varied, 
authoritative, and famous documents from which the Chaucerian per­
sona, and presumably the poet himself, seeks knowledge and answers 
to his many questions. It underlies the skepticism about knowing with 
certainty nonexperiential truths that appear throughout the dream 
visions. Because Chaucer is a poet and not a philosopher, however, he 
expresses this epistemological theme not logically but imaginatively, 
using the subjective dream experience as the denominator of value in 
his quest for answers. 
Let us look specifically at each of Chaucer's early dream visions. 
Although they are traditionally placed together because they were writ­
ten during the first segment of Chaucer's career, I shall treat the Book 
of the Duchess separately in this chapter, holding until the next my 
examination of the House of Fame and the Parliament of Fowls. Where­
as the two later poems deal squarely with epistemological issues, the 
Book of the Duchess, more heavily dependent on the French dits 
amoreux,
4
 has an affective concern—how to alleviate grief. Despite its 
difference, however, the Book of the Duchess is important for our 
consideration because it exhibits problems with conclusiveness that its 
structural indirection and a complicated use of the persona create. 
II 
The subject of the Book of the Duchess is grief, its theme how to use 
grief constructively to face the fact of death. Continued critical interest 
in the poem suggests that although the meaning of its content is by and 
large clear, its form expresses that meaning unusually.5 About one-
third through the poem, the Black Knight's grief becomes the poem's 
subject as his voice assumes proportions of greater significance than the 
persona's. Only then do its conventions begin to feel consequent, does 
its direction begin to grow clear, its meaning begin to cohere. From 
the beginning until this point, however—more than four hundred and 
fifty lines—the subject of the Book of the Duchess is never clear. Con­
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ventions appear and disappear in a sequence of such subtle indirection 
that first readers, without memory of a coherent last part, grow con­
fused. 
The first thirty lines thrust us immediately into an intense dramatic 
situation with no explanation for its cause. A persona suffers from 
insomnia, which creates affectlessness in him—"for I have felynge in 
nothynge" (11). The first nine lines are a translation of Froissart's 
Paradys d?Amours. The next twenty lines amplify the material in the 
first nine, assimilating elements from poems by Machaut.6 The loss of 
"quiykness," of "al lustyhede" (20) described in the opening is a 
familiar enough convention of the dits amoreux. It leads us to believe 
that this will be a poem about love in which a persona, probably a 
lover, will eventually fall asleep and dream either about the nature of 
love or the nature of his beloved. The conventionality of the opening 
leads us to expect that the persona's insomnia and his "sorwfull ymagy­
nacioun" (14) derive from love-longing. Some lines later the persona 
explicitly directs our attention to the cause of his state when he voices 
the question that the opening lines have raised: 
But men myght axe me why soo 
I may not sleepe, and what me is. 
[30-31] 
But to our surprise he tells us that he does not know—"Myselven can 
not telle why / the sothe" (34—35). He refers to an eight-year illness 
and to an unavailable physician, but he refuses to give the details of the 
situation, "passe we over untill eft."7 Instead he returns to "our first 
mater" (43). 
The persona's refusal does not function like a standard occupation 
abbreviating the presentation of content by telling us in a clause or two 
what it claims not to be doing. It leads us rather to puzzle about the 
illness and the unavailable physician, a rhetorical commonplace for the 
mistress of courtly tradition:8 
For there is phisicien but oon

That may me hele; but that is don.

Passe we over untill eft;

That wil not be mot nede be left.

[39-42] 
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The finality in the persona's tone is unusual. When a troubadour, or 
a minnesinger, or any courtly poet complains about rejection by his 
lady, the poet's tone is generally different. It either remains op­
timistically faithful despite bleak prospects, or it turns bitter and di­
rects an ego-saving satire at the previously wonderful qualities of the 
beloved. Wyatt's famous concluding question, "Pray what hath she 
deserved?", indicates the bitter mood as it came to be expressed in 
English. In the Book of the Duchess, however, the lover accepts the end 
of the relationship. Despite his statement that he will return to this 
problem later, which he never specifically does, there is a nonjudg­
mental finality in the proverb, suggesting that the persona is trying to 
come to terms with his problem, even if his desperate insomnia in­
dicates that he is not as successful as he would like to be. 
Returning to the first matter of his insomnia, then, the persona leads 
us away from the answer to the question that the opening poses, leaving 
us only with our earlier expectations that this work might after all be a 
dream vision in the standard sense. Since the persona wants to fall 
asleep and decides to read "a romaunce" that will "drive the night 
away" (49) if he cannot, we expect the kind of dream poem in which a 
persona will fall asleep while reading a book. But instead of falling 
asleep, this persona gets involved with the significance of reading 
itself—a topos Chaucer will use again in the Legend of Good Women. 
"Clerkes" and "other poets," he tells us, put stories in rhyme 
To rede, and for to be in minde, 
While men loved the lawe of kinde, 
This bok ne spak but of such thinges, 
Of quenes lives, and of kinges, 
And many other thinges smale. 
[55-59] 
To understand human nature from the exemplary conduct of kings and 
queens is a common moralitas, but the persona lightens the seriousness 
of the issue when he tells us that his manuscript contains less serious 
matters as well, "other thinges smale." He then directs our attention to 
one specific story, the tale of Ceyx and Alcyone, which he finds "a 
wonder thing" (61) and decides to retell. 
So far we have covered only sixty lines, which can probably be read 
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or heard in less time than it has taken to read these pages about them. 
Chaucer's opening, however, has not given us any particular sense of 
direction. Rather, it has undercut whatever sense of direction the stan­
dard conventions would otherwise suggest. If we have not begun to 
doubt by this time that the poem will be a dream vision, we certainly 
begin to doubt the matter over the course of the next two hundred 
lines, which reiterate Ovid's story with Chaucer's own long additions. 
Like the opening, these lines generally concern grief, death, and sleep, 
but not in any way that appears an assertive move in a particular 
direction. From the beginning of the poem through the point where 
the persona actually does fall asleep, he has been circling around 
points, implying, suggesting, but never stating or showing the subject 
of his poem. What has opened as a poem about a persona's experience, 
suggesting by its conventions that the experience will be related to love 
in the form of a dream, has turned into a poem recounting an Ovidian 
tale at which an audience familiar with the story would have been 
surprised when Chaucer humorously interpolated the incident in the 
cave of sleep. However, the serious nature of this story suggests a 
relationship between the persona's insomnia and a grave loss, recogni­
tion of which leads us to reconsider the tenor of the persona's metaphor 
about the skilled physician and the implications of the proverb that 
follows it. From the Ovidian tale, we have intuited a model that might 
represent the cause of the persona's condition. But the humorous in­
terpolation of the cave of sleep that follows avoids articulating the cause 
by returning us to the persona's condition, his insomnia. We follow his 
interest in the "goddes of slepyng," (230) his protestation that he "ne 
knew never god but oon" (237) and his offer of a featherbed covered 
with imported silk and gold for the gift of sleep. As if these gods accept 
his offer, he immediately falls asleep and has a dream "so wonderful" 
that he offers us a catalogue of the finest interpreters of dreams who 
would not be able to interpret his dream properly (275—90). 
Actually, the challenge to interpret the upcoming dream should not 
be surprising, since the persona has thrown out several possible hints 
on what the dream might be about. Consequently, the audience cannot 
understand where the poem is heading, what its subject will be, or for 
what purpose the persona is telling us his tale. After nearly three 
hundred lines of meanderings, startings and stoppings, significances 
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implied but never asserted, conventions that do not cohere according 
even to standard medieval expectations, the most that can be asserted 
about the disorder of the opening of the Book of the Duchess is that the 
persona suffers from lack of sleep. The convention of the sleepless 
lover that Froissart had used as a springboard to his poem has been 
extended beyond its function as an introductory commonplace. It has 
been made the poem's subject, to which the persona has continually 
returned after sundry excursions into other matters. Even the story of 
Ceyx and Alcyone has functioned, to this point at least, only to in­
troduce the persona to Morpheus. The metamorphosis of Ceyx and 
Alcyone into seabirds who maintain their conjugal condition could 
have provided a splendid emblem of love and Christian salvation, but 
it has been dropped. 
The only consistent response that the audience has been invited to 
feel about the many elements of the first three hundred lines of the 
Book of the Duchess is wonder. From the opening line, in which the 
persona tells us he has "gret wonder" that he cannot sleep, through the 
story of Ceyx and Alcyone, which he tells us "me thoughte a wonder 
thing" (61), through Alcyone's "wonder that the king ne com / horn" 
(78-79), through the persona's "wonder" that there might be gods who 
grant sleep (233—36), and finally to the dream itself, which was "so 
wonderful" (276) that no expert could interpret it, Chaucer has pre­
sented us with a persona in wonderland, where all things are strange, 
marvelous, and apparently make little sense. As our guide in this 
wonderland, the persona leaves us with the same sense of bemused 
wonder that he himself feels about all aspects of his experience. Nor 
does this wonder stop within the dream. 
The elements of the dream that the persona experiences before he 
meets the Black Knight are as wondrous as those elements before the 
dream. They also lack a specific sense of direction. The aviary choirs, 
the stained glass windows with scenes of various historical romances 
that greet the persona as he wakes into his dream, have the unspecific 
conventionality that we expect from the genre. The images are noisy, 
glorious, potentially signifying. To these images Chaucer adds, either 
by sloppy technique or by intention, the not-so-conventional image of 
the naked persona (293) responding to hunting horns by leaving his 
chamber with a horse who also resides in the chamber. In any case, 
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these elements have about them the effect of a real dream work.9 When 
the persona meets the hunter, we learn of a hart-hunting expedition 
under the auspices of Emperor Octavian. The conventional im­
plications of the hunt and the symbolic implications of the emperor's 
name suggest that the dream might concern some possibly occasional 
matter about love.10 But Chaucer neither develops the symbolic im­
plications nor suggests any relationship between the hunt and the first 
part of the poem. He does not even develop the incident. Instead a 
whelp guides the persona away from the activity into the peaceable 
kingdom of the forest where he overhears the Black Knight at his song. 
The Knight's lyric, in a complicated rhyme scheme that modern 
editions tend to obscure, marks the core of meaning in the poem's form 
and begins the narrative section concerned with the process of con­
solation: l ] 
I have of sorwe so gret won

That joye get I never non,

Now that I see my lady bryght,

Which I have loved with al my myght,

Is fro me ded and ys agoon.

Alias, deth, what ayleth the, 
That thou noldest have taken me, 
Whan thou toke my lady swete, 
That was so fair, so fresh, so fre, 
So good, that men may wel se 
Of al goodnesse she had no mete! 
[475-86] 
The attentive reader might associate the content and mood of the 
Knight's song with the story of Ceyx and Alcyone. But the association 
would remain tentative, especially since the persona disregards what 
the lyric says.12 Because courtly love lyrics represent emotional states 
through conventional metaphors, the lyric appears less a statement of 
truth or fact at the time of its utterance than a "making," one more 
wondrous, unconnected element in the narrative. 
Because we have been following the persona through his experi­
ences, we do not recognize that the lyric represents the poem's central 
concern. This recognition occurs much later. More than three hundred 
lines after the lyric, the Black Knight remarks at being misunderstood: 
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Thou wost ful lytel what thou menest; 
I have lost more than thow wenest. 
[743-44] 
Four hundred lines later, the exasperated knight reiterates the charge; 
then two hundred lines later, just before the end of the poem, he says it 
again. The repitition becomes a widely spaced refrain of frustration 
that directs the conversation between persona and Black Knight toward 
a resolution.13 Until this late point in the poem, however, when we 
recognize the statement as a refrain, the interchange between the 
Knight and persona has appeared incongruous, like all the elements 
that preceded it. The problem has been one of mixed modes of com­
munication, the Knight speaking about personal loss in conventional 
tropes, the persona taking the tropes to be expressing actuality. For 
instance, the Knight has represented the loss of his beloved through the 
extended metaphor of a chess game with Fortune: 
For fals Fortune hath pleyd a game 
Atte ches with me, alias the while! 
With hir false draughtes dyvers 
She staal on me, and tok my fers. 
[618-55] 
To which the persona has literalistically responded: 
But ther is no man alyve her 
Wolde for a fers make this woo! 
[740-41] 
By the end of the conversation, we have recognized how the persona's 
responses have frustrated the Knight, forcing him to peel off the 
metaphorical layers with which he has been smothering the plain fact 
that his mistress is dead. During the exchange, however, we have been 
primarily aware of the incongruous mixture of humor with pathos that 
the indirection earlier in the poem at once prepared us to experience 
and reinforced. 
The Book of the Duchess is Chaucer's first testing ground for what 
poetry can and cannot do, what it can and cannot tell about the nature of 
reality, in this case emotional reality. The conclusive elements in the 
poem occur precisely because Chaucer retains in the section containing 
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the Black Knight's complaint the objectifying conventionalism of the 
tradition.14 This section, for which Chaucer ostensibly wrote the entire 
poem, feels more conclusive than all the parts leading to it because 
Chaucer has used the Black Kight as a courtly lover and poet. The 
Knight's diction and his point of view represent a literal phenomenon 
metaphorically. Ironically, the metaphor, not the phenomenon, keeps 
this section of the poem squarely in the tradition of internalized dream 
vision and makes it identifiable and understood. In fact, the con­
ventionalism of the dream vision always functions as an objectifying 
force in an essentially subjective form. From the Black Knight, for 
example, we learn the courtly way of expressing perception. It is a 
universalizing way, painting the lady with a long series of conventional 
attributes of goodness and beauty and himself as the equally con­
ventional lover who flourishes in her grace (759-1297). 
On the other hand, the inconclusive elements within the poem's 
form occur because of the energy and intensity with which Chaucer 
uses the naive and literal-minded persona. The Book of the Duchess is 
the first of Chaucer's narrative works taking the self as a character 
whose experiences in a dream do not produce the enlightenment the 
character seeks. The persona begins his discourse as a lover unable to 
sleep and ends up a poet who has experienced a manifold and confusing 
set of wonders. 
Thys ys so queynt a sweven 
That I wol, be processe of tyme, 
Fonde to put this sweven in ryme 
As I kan best, and that anoon. 
[1330-33] 
The dream has had a salubrious effect on his insomnia, but it has not 
satisfied his literalistic and quite dogged curiosity, a curiosity he will 
express even more clearly in the dream visions following this one. 
In the persona of the Book of the Duchess, we see Chaucer's first 
creation of a character who functions in a psychologically plausible 
way, whose needs shape the forms of the first-person narratives Chau­
cer writes, but whose experiences within the narratives are so different 
from the needs that appear to have produced them that we do not feel 
strongly the enlightenment we expect from visionary poetry. The more 
Chaucer emphasizes himself as a character with particular questions 
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and needs, the more the form of his poetry grows inconclusive. The 
less this character provides a didactic, exemplary quality, the less the 
form provides the conclusive values that other poems in the tradition 
do. 
The House of Fame and the Parliament of Fowls develop more fully 
than the Book of the Duchess this character of the self as an individual 
with a complicated emotional life. Despite the persona's earnest at­
tempts to establish certainty in them, he responds with considerable 
ambivalence to the conventional characters and objectifying elements 
he encounters. He is, moreover, ambivalent about the certainty of 
physical and metaphysical facts, of literal and metaphorical per­
ceptions, and of particular and general judgments. As a result he is 
unable to conclude the issues that motivate his reading, his searching, 
his desire to be able to express the truth about reality in poetry. The 
difference between the two dream-vision experiments that follow the 
Book of the Duchess is that one is an uncomfortably inconclusive nar­
rative form and the other is comfortably inconclusive. 
III.	 "Betwixen Adamauntes Two": Conceptual In­
conclusiveness in the House of Fame and the 
Parliament of Fowls 
Because the House of Fame breaks off near what is 
clearly its end, the incomplete state of the text seems to 
bear	 on the commonly felt inconclusiveness of its 
form.l Critical debate about the man who "seemed for 
to be / A man of gret auctoritee" (2157—58) suggests 
that identifying him or his function would reveal the 
ocassion for the poem, or in some way help us understand better its 
illusive meaning so that we would not need to accept inconclusiveness 
as a poetic condition in Chaucer.2 However, since poems like Gott­
fried's Tristan and Spenser's Faerie Queene remind us that incomplete 
works are not necessarily inconclusive, the incompleteness of the House 
of Fame may not be responsible for the inconclusiveness of its form. 
Rather inconclusiveness may account for its incompleteness. 
Like the other dream visions of Chaucer's early period, the House of 
Fame presents a shifting and unresolved sense of what it is about.3 
Each of its books concerns different conceptual problems, the logical 
contingencies of which are not fully apparent. The first book deals 
chiefly with literary transmission; the second is about the poet as stu­
dent and the physics of sound; and the third examines the nature of 
fame and its relationship to rumor. As in the other dream visions, 
Chaucer filters these shifting concerns through the anxious persona, 
who responds with ambivalence and skepticism to most of what he sees 
and hears.4 
Fear creates the persona's anxiety from the beginning: "God turne us 
every drem to goode" (1). Between a wish and a prayer, this utterance 
asks a simple effect—good is simple—from an obscurely understood 
set of causes about to be enumerated. Chaucer takes the posture of a 
simple, perhaps too simple, believer who, after a breathless catalogue 
about the etiology of dreams (2—51), cannot even form an opinion: 
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But why the cause is, noght wot I. 
Wei worthe, of this thyng, grete clerkys, 
That trete of this and other werkes; 
Nor I of noon opinion 
Nyl as now make mensyon, 
But oonly that the holy roode 
Turne us every drem to goode! 
[52-58] 
This rhetorical dubitatio humorously establishes a skeptical persona, 
drawn to seek answers, yet ambivalent about their value because the 
complexity of the issue leaves him mystified, anxious.5 
Anxiety can be functional. After the proem it motivates an invoca­
tion, "at my gynnynge" (66), to the God of sleep "my sweven for to 
telle aryght" (79), which reveals both the persona's concern for de­
corum and his skepticism of the invocation's efficacy—"Yf every drem 
stonde in his myght" (80). It produces a defensive prayer for the 
poem's reception: to eternal God (81-82) the persona prays for the 
reward of "joye" (83) for all "that take hit wel and skorne hyt noght" 
(91), and to "Jesus God" (97) he prays, curiously, that those who 
"mysdeme hyt" (97) receive "every harm that any man / Hath had, 
syth the world began" (99-100)—"I am no bet in charyte!" (108). 
This anxiety, moreover, reappears early in book one where we learn 
that the persona falls asleep in exhaustion like a pilgrim who goes to the 
shrine of Saint Leonard "to make lythe of that was hard" (118).6 We 
do not yet know what is hard, but once asleep the persona undertakes to 
tell what he saw in the "temple ymad of glas" (120), Venus's temple 
(130), especially to tell the story whose beginning he sees "writen on a 
table of bras" (142): 
I wol now singen, yif I kan 
The armes, and also the man 
That first cam, thurgh his destinee, 
Fugityf of Troy contree, 
In Itayle, with ful moche pyne 
Unto the strondes of Lavyne. 
[143-48] 
Here in octosyllabic couplets we find the first translation in English of 
the opening of Vergil's Aeneid. To the translation the persona has added 
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a delight-producing clause of personal intention that reveals anxiety 
about his ability as a translator. This is, after all, a famous work whose 
opening, at least, every schoolboy knows. 
Once we understand that the anxiety relates to the poetic enterprise, 
we retrospectively understand the persona's confusion about the etiol­
ogy of dreams, for dreams are the prototype of the form of poetry 
Chaucer composes. Some kinds, like the visio, offer themselves as 
appropriate models for visionary literature; but others, like this 
"drem" (62), may be ambiguous—may, in fact, be deceptive or un­
true. If dreams are ambiguous or deceptive, Chaucer may have 
thought, what then is the relationship between dream-vision poetry and 
truth? More to the point of this dream vision, how does a poet de­
termine what in a source should be directly translated, like the op­
ening; what may be telescoped and varied by paraphrase, like the 
description of the remaining events of book one of the Aeneid (198— 
225); what may be abridged or summarized, like the last six books of 
Vergil's poem (429—65); and what may be so fundamental to the trans­
lator's purpose that it bears rhetorical amplification, like the betrayal 
and subsequent bereavement of Dido (240-46)? The anxiety of book 
one of the House of Fame, then, is one about a poet's control, his 
responsibility as a "makir." 
The central activity of book one, occupying 327 of the book's 396 
lines, is the persona's telling of the legend of Aeneis as images 
represent it in the Temple of Glass. But what is the purpose of this 
activity? If it were simply to tell the story of Aeneis, the undertaking is 
a colossal failure, for the story that book one presents carries little 
emotional force and less narrative interest. Sheila Delany claims that its 
purpose is to suggest the dualizing effect on this famous legend created 
by intertwining elements of Ovid's sentimental version with Vergil's.7 
But then why does the persona go out of his way to claim as his own 
Dido's moving complaint, which appropriates Ovid's pathetic tonality? 
In suche wordes gan to pleyne 
Dydo of hir grete peyne, 
As me mette redely; 
Non other auctour allege I. 
[311-14] 
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Actually, the purpose of the activity appears not to be related specifical­
ly to the content of the legend. Rather it describes the relationship 
between a storyteller and the medium through which he tells his story. 
Repeatedly the persona reminds us that we are hearing (reading) his 
perception of images representing a story, not a story itself—"next that 
sawgh I" (162), "and I saugh next" (174), "ther sawgh I graven" 
(193).8 Instead of responding to events in the content, we watch the 
persona respond to them. He says "alias" (157) after telling us that he 
saw Troy destroyed; he comments that he saw 
How Creusa was ylost, alias! 
That ded, not I how, she was; 
How he [Aeneis] hir soughte, and how hir gost 
Bad hym to flee the Grekes host. 
[183-86] 
Instead of representing Aeneis's turbulent journey to Carthage, he 
reminds us of the emotive power of the images representing the action 
to him; 
There saugh I such tempeste aryse, 
That every herte myght agryse 
To see hyt peynted on the wal. 
[209-11] 
These persistent intrusions not only distance us from the legendary 
content, they make the problem of telling interfere with our natural 
desire to hear a story by creating involvement with the persona and his 
interests. 
The persona's interest in the story is the tragic effect on Dido of 
believing in the false appearance and false promise of Aeneis (296— 
374). It is the only part of the story that he chooses to exemplify. The 
tension between teller and tale, which has accompanied the recitation 
throughout, dissolves during Dido's lyrical complaint of suffering and 
remorse. The intrusive persona becomes an unobtrusive narrator: "I 
saugh" becomes "quod she," and we are enchanted into the fictional 
plane. This is, of course, the section of the story that the persona calls 
his own, the significance of which he seeks to verify by the amplified 
catalogue of tragic lovers who suffered from broken promises (384— 
426). Except for this section, however, the skeletal telling of the story 
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of Aeneis is an exercise in recitation, not the telling of a story but the 
enumerating of the images representing a story. 
When the recitation ends, we may wonder why the persona's method 
changed from telling to showing when he reached the point where 
Dido confronts her betrayal, her shame, her loss of good reputation.9 
A reasonable inference is that the poem is, or will be, in some way 
about loss of fame when a mistress is betrayed, Dido being a symbolic 
example. But Chaucer turns out not to deal with this theme until the 
Legend of Good Women. In book one of the House of Fame, the theme is 
nascent but undeveloped, implying relevance, never revealing it. 
When the anxiety that opened the poem returns toward the end of book 
one, the issue of deception in artistic representation replaces the issue of 
deception in human relationships, which has disappeared. The persona 
has been impressed by the "noblesse" (471) of the images he has seen in 
the temple of glass, wondering who "did hem wirche" (474) and "what 
contree" (475) the temple is in. His discovery, however, that this 
workshop for his imagination is in a desert where lives "no maner 
creature / That ys yformed be Nature" (489—90) suggests both an 
uncertain value to the images and an uncertain value to the experience. 
Understandably the persona reacts in fear: 
"O Crist!" thoughte I, "that art in blysse,

Fro fantome and illusion

Me save!"

[492-94] 
As Delany has shown, fantome and illusion are terms expressing the 
medieval sense of the imagination's power to deceive and mislead.10 
But the appearance of an abstract golden form in the sky, which turns 
out to be Jove's eagle, provides a note of hope to the anxiety-producing 
experience. 
In book one Chaucer raises questions about the nature and value of 
poetic appropriation and implies a relationship between the deceptive 
nature of human communication and the possibly deceptive nature of 
artistic representation, which is also a form of communication. But he 
neither provides answers nor draws conclusions. The hopeful appear­
ance of the eagle makes the inconclusiveness of the first part of the 
poem immaterial, however, because it promises a development of pre­
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sumably relevant issues. But what follows does not develop the issues of 
the first part of the poem. In fact, the eagle flies off on a tangent 
because none of the answers about the universe and sound that he 
happily provides relate directly to the questions about truth in love-
promises and truth in poetic appropriation from images. Moreover, 
the relationship of these issues to those presented once the persona 
reaches the Houses of Fame and Rumor is moot. 
The flight to the House of Fame is at once the most intense and most 
humorous section of the poem. Despite the eagle's reassurances that the 
flight is meant for his "lore" and "prow" (579), the persona is con­
tinually frightened, hardly overcoming his shock at being swept off his 
feet: 
For so astonyed and asweved 
Was every vertu in my heved, 
What with his sours and with my drede, 
That al my felynge gan to dede; 
For-whi hit was to gret affray. 
[549-53] 
His giddy fear manifests itself in worry about the meaning of the 
action: 
Shal I noon other weyes dye? 
Wher Joves wol me stellyfye, 
Or what thing may this signifye? 
[585-87] 
It also shows in his negative responses to the eagle's pedagogical offers: 
. . . quod he . . .

"Wilt thou lere of sterres aught?"

"Nay, certeynly," quod y, "ryght naught."

"And why?" "For y am now to old."

[992-95] 
This humorous negativity occurs because of the persona's frank fear of 
flying, and of falling. The eagle, after all, has tried to explain the 
doctrine of the locus proprius of every natural object while flying high 
above the earth with the portly Geffrey, "noyous for to carye" (574), in 
his talons. 
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Yet there is also a remarkable sense of wonder in this part of the 
dream. Anxious questions about the reliability of dreams and of art as a 
source of knowledge give way to a sense that what some books teach is 
true to personal experience, hence worth believing: 
For more clere entendement 
Nas me never yit ysent. 
And than thoughte y on Marcian, 
And eke on Anteclaudian, 
That sooth was her descripsion 
Of alle the hevenes region, 
As fer as that y sey the preve; 
Therefore y kan hem now beleve. 
[983-90] 
Later, this new ability to believe in authority gives him the excuse to 
decline to experience more than he cares to. When the eagle offers to 
show him firsthand the constellations, the coward in the persona 
asserts: 
"No fors," quod y, "hyt is no nede. 
I leve as wel, so God me spede, 
Hem that write of this matere, 
As though I knew her places here." 
[1011-14] 
This belief in the truth of literary representation stands in direct 
contrast to the fear expressed earlier in the poem. The contrast between 
prior skepticism and current belief suggests a distinction of literary 
kinds that creates the different responses. Earlier the persona observed 
representations derived from poetry about legendary history. Here 
personal experience verifies the observations of scientific and philo­
sophical poets. Science and philosophy (synonymous in the fourteenth 
century) concern the truth of actuality, what can be proved by reason 
and the senses—the "sooth" of a thing. Legendary history, on the other 
hand, concerns the actions of human beings and the moral and psycho­
logical elements of human nature that poets report—the "trouthe" of a 
thing. The persona's experiences at the House of Fame reveal that his 
fears about "trouthe" in the Temple of Glass were indeed well-
founded, for all communication that is not firsthand, like tidings and 
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legends, must come through Fame, whose Greek cognate, pheme, 
means utterance or report and whose nature to Chaucer is morally 
ambiguous. 
To us "Fame" is an attractive phenomenon. To make it connote 
negatively, we must attach a pejorative adjective (/'// fame). To Ovid, 
whose Fama provides Chaucer with elements of both Fame and 
Rumor, the concept simply meant Rumor, which "veris addere falsa I 
gaudet."u Chaucer distinguishes between the Latin concept of Fama, 
calling it Rumor (2088-2105), and "Fame," which, closer to our 
notion, is synonymous with renown: 
Heryed be thou and thy name, 
Goddesse of Renoun or of Fame! 
[1405-6] 
Rumor resembles a kind of inchoate noise or sound that has no verifica­
tion. Its house is a very large dwelling built with "tymber of no 
strengthe" (1980). Its ceaseless turning, its axis with no foundation, 
and its numberless windows suggest randomness, lack of value. About 
the potential of the House of Rumor to endure, the persona tells us: 
Yet hit is founded to endure 
while that hit lyst to Aventure, 
That is the moder of tydynges 
As the see of welles and of sprynges. 
[1981-84] 
As wells and springs flow from the sea (a curious perception),12 so 
Rumor derives from Chance—a principle of absurdity or a principle 
of "non-principledness." 
Fame, on the other hand, represents a stage of this inchoate noise 
considerably more advanced. She differs from Rumor in that she has a 
personified form and dwells in a highly ornate castle with towers, 
halls, bowers, "babewynnes and pynacles" (1189), tabernacles and 
"habitacles" (1194), and she has the power to judge. By judging she 
confers a kind of authentication on the objects of her judgment even 
though the foundation of her house is a "roche of yse, and not of stel" 
(1130), and the basis of her judgments are utterly undependable. The 
long and tedious passage describing the process of Fame's arbitrary 
judgment indicates at once how frequently her decisions are unjust to 
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those who plead for earthly renown and how frequently they are just 
(1520-1867). In addition, Fame has the power to substantiate rumor 
once Aventure has given it life: 
And she gan yeven ech hys name, 
After hir disposicioun, 
And yaf hem eke duracioun 
[2112-14] 
Finally, Fame has a relationship with poets that counterbalances the 
negative moral conclusions that her fickle and nonprincipled judg­
ments imply. Running between the dais and wide doors of the great 
hall of her castle, a series of pillars ensconce statues representing 
Josephus, Statius, Homer, Dares, Tytys (Dictys), Lollius (whoever he 
may be), Guido delle Colonne, Vergil, Ovid, Lucan, and Claudian. 
Each poet represents a category of literary or historical matter like 
love, the story of Thebes, of Troy, of the Jews, of Rome, and so on. 
Together their production constitutes the sum of secular historical 
knowledge, providing poets like Chaucer with content and techniques. 
Their works undoubtedly fill the leaves of the "bokes" that the eagle 
has claimed Geoffrey spends most of his free time reading. From 
Vergil, for example, Chaucer got material for the first book of this 
work; from Ovid he got material for both books one and three. From 
Lollius he will get his Troilus. Fame then is not simply a phenomenon 
of sound like Rumor. She is at once an undependable judge and an 
attractive figure who keeps good and significant company. 
Distinctly different from his response earlier in the poem, the per­
sona's reaction to the House of Fame reveals from the first a skeptical 
understanding of Fame's ambiguous moral value, pursuit of which he 
ultimately rejects: 
I cam noght hyder, graunt mercy,

For no such cause, by my hed!

Sufficeth me, as I were ded,

That no wight have my name in honde.

I wot myself best how y stonde;

For what I drye, or what I thynke,

I wil myselven al hyt drynke,

Certeyn, for the more part,

As fer forth as I kan myn art.

[1874-82] 
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We admire the persona's integrity. Having recognized Fame's "feble 
fundament" (1132), and having witnessed the curious relationship 
between the nine suits to Fame and her judgment, his rejection shows a 
refusal to gamble his own reputation on Fame's "condicioun" (1904) 
or on the fickle "ordre of her dom" (1905).13 But how does this 
partially allegorized episode, after which Chaucer names the poem, 
develop or realize the confusing and fearful issues driving the nar­
rative to this point? Geffrey himself explicitly asserts no connection 
between what he thought he was going to learn and what he actually has 
learned: 
The cause why y stonde here: 
Somme newe tydynges for to lere, 
Somme newe thinges, y not what, 
Tydynges, other this or that, 
Of love, or suche thynges glade. 
For certeynly, he that me made 
To comen hyder, seyde me, 
Y shulde bothe here and se, 
In this place, wonder thynges; 
But these be no suche tydynges 
As I mene of." "Noo?" quod he. 
And I answered, "Noo, parde!" 
[1885-96] 
He expected something different from what the eagle intended. So did 
we. The experience of the House of Fame has refused to answer the 
questions about truth and verification that the first part of the poem 
asked. Instead it has answered an assumed question about the value of 
posterity. The first questions are epistemological, the second is moral. 
The episode in the House of Rumor, presumably the last intended 
segment of the poem, repeats the pattern of revelation and disappoint­
ment that was established at the House of Fame. Tracing sound back­
ward toward its source, the persona discovers that tidings (content for 
his poetry) are compounded of fa l s and soth" (2108) even before their 
image receives a final imprimatur by the nonprincipled Fame. The 
epistemological implications of this discovery are tendentious: the 
truth-value in tidings is impossible to ascertain, the lie-value is signifi­
cant, repute is unreliable, and representation therefore untrustworthy. 
As if to avoid the skeptical conclusion that the experience has been 
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implying, however, the persona uncharacteristically leaves the side­
lines from which he has been observing most of the action. He joins 
the swirl of rumormongers and energetically tries to play, to learn: 
And eke a tydynge for to here, 
That I had herd of som contre 
That shal not now be told for me— 
For hit no nede is, redely; 
Folk kan synge hit bet than I; 
For al mot out, other late or rathe. 
[2134-39] 
These lines are complexly ambiguous and confusing. The speaker 
claims to want "to here" a tiding he "had herd," which will not "now" 
be told "for me." The surface of "for me" denotes that the subject is the 
recipient of the "not-telling," but the context of the passage requires 
the subject to be the agent-producer—"Folk kan singe hit bet than 
I."14 If the subject is the recipient of the tiding, then the grammatical 
aspect is confused, unless we separate the poet " I" from the persona 
"me" because the past perfective indicates an action or event completed 
in the past. Did the poet hear the tiding before the dream and will the 
dream not "now" reveal that tiding to the persona? Or, for the sake of 
avoiding the schizophrenic implications that such a reading implies, 
should we interpolate the eagle's promise of a tiding during the flight 
for the tiding itself, so that the past perfective form of the verb can 
indicate a completed event within the persona's fictional existence? In 
addition to the problem of the role of the subject and the aspect of the 
verb, it is not clear whether "of some contre" means "from" or "about" 
some place. If it means "about" some place, the antecedent of "som" 
could be the desert where the persona asked the name of the "contree" 
(475), although there is no place where he could have heard the answer 
without us also having heard it. Or the antecedent of "som" could be 
the country of the stars through which the eagle carried the persona at 
the time he promised a tiding in the future. Moreover, if "of" means 
"from," then the antecedent of "som" could refer to the meaning 
implicit in the persona's experience of the Temple of Glass. Although 
his experience there was visual, his perception of Dido's complaint was 
aural. Finally "of som contre" could have an extratextual referent in a 
piece of gossip or news relevant to the audience. The grammatical 
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ambiguity of these lines does not allow for a single coherent explana­
tion. It does, however, allow us to draw the general conclusion that the 
tiding will not "now" be forthcoming—"for hit no nede is redely"— 
with the promise that eventually "al mot out." 
Having reached this ambiguously stated nonconclusion functioning 
as a conclusion, the action turns toward the appearance of the man who 
seemed "of gret auctorite." New energy arises in the noise of the people 
running to hear him. But he never speaks. His appearance promises an 
extension of the narrative but not a conclusion, for what kind of 
authority could anyone in the House of Rumor claim that would bring 
the many unresolved elements of this poem to an appropriate end? The 
experience of the Houses of Fame and Rumor has played a trick on us. 
We have been led with the persona to seek meaning for the poem or the 
dream only to encounter frustration every time meaning seems to be 
indicated. It is as if every step we have taken toward the source of all 
meaning, from observation through a flight explaining scientifically 
the nature of sound, from Fame, to Rumor, to a specific authoritative 
rumor, has not led to the essence of things but rather has led to 
insubstantiality. Sound and the meaning it supposedly carries becomes 
finally what the eagle has claimed it is, "noght but eyr ybroken" (765), 
equivalent to the broken and meaningless air that creates logical and 
logistical problems in the Summoner's Tale. 
In the House of Fame, Chaucer has created a complex and ambiguous 
experience to which his ambivalent persona responds with confusion, 
fear, skepticism, and finally with accepting disappointment. The poem 
raises problems about verifiability, credibility, and the value of per­
sonal proof, but does not solve them. The persona's anxiety early in the 
poem about the meaning first of dreams and then of the materials of the 
past appears to be one cause of the poem's inconclusiveness. The alter­
nately repellent elements of Fame and her attractive relationship with 
poets appears to be another. The flight, which serves as a spatial 
transition from one locus to another and from one kind of problem to 
another, provides interesting information about the persona's studious­
ness and promises a reward in terms of a tiding. But the reward never 
comes. Instead a skeptical conclusion begins to surface until the per­
sona grows mysteriously enthusiastic, the text grows confused and 
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shortly thereafter breaks off, and the relationship between the persona's 
waking state and his dream never gets worked out. 
Irrespecitve of the state of its ending, the form of the House of Fame 
is at best inconclusive, at worst incoherent, because of the strange 
interaction between the persona and his experience. The poem raises 
various subjects about literary craft and about the end of poetic achieve­
ment in fame. But the persona's responses to the issues are not suf­
ficiently mediated for the objects of his experience, ambiguous as many 
of them are, to provide him with understanding and us with a sense 
that the poet is in control of narrative coherence. Embarrassed by the 
House of Fame's failure to provide coherent meaning, Muscatine claims 
that it "is most charitably seen as an experiment, wherein the poet's 
energy and imagination by far outrun his sense of form."15 Yet the 
experimental nature that renders the poem's form inconclusive 
represents its greatest critical fascination. 
II 
Despite the completeness of the Parliament of Fowls, its form is 
inconclusive. Chaucer comfortably juxtaposes several contradictory 
allegations about love and about the tradition of writing love poetry so 
that they lie contiguously. But he does not resolve the contradictions.16 
The poem ends at the height of its argument, when the parliament of 
birds has reached a stalemate and Nature has agreed to table the deci­
sion for a year. The poet awakens and turns to other books to find "a 
certeyn thing" (20) that he has not yet found. This is not a conclusion 
but an indication of future plans based on previous failures. The 
coexistence of contradictions and the unresolved central argument cre­
ate inconclusiveness. But unlike the House of Fame, which also contains 
contradictory elements and an unresolved argument, the Parliament of 
Fowls shows Chaucer controlling those elements that make the poem's 
form inconclusive yet not uncomfortable with the pluralism that the 
varying claims about love, its subject matter, suggest. In fact, the form 
of the Parliament of Fowls offers inconclusiveness as its own poetic 
principle. For the first time in Chaucer's poetic career, we find a 
formal indication of what the poet will do on a much larger scale with 
contradicting opinions and various genres in the Canterbury Tales}1 
48 Virtue of Necessity 
Unlike Chaucer's earlier dream visions, where structural confusion 
contributes to inconclusiveness, the Parliament of Fowls is clearly struc­
tured. Although there are moments, including the opening stanza of 
the poem, when the narrator expresses confusion, the poem has a 
straightforward linear movement. Events, descriptions, and speeches 
are tersely handled within the rhyme royal stanza.18 The structure of 
the poem is more clearly ordered and its parts more equitably deployed 
than in the Book of the Duchess or the House of Fame. Yet its form is 
inconclusive because of the nature of its content (its subject matter) and 
the persona's inability or refusal either to draw conclusions from his 
experience or to resolve the set of varying claims about love that his 
experience suggests. 
Compared with the persona of Chaucer's earlier dream visions, the 
most striking feature about the persona of the Parliament of Fowls is 
that he is relatively uninvolved with the process of both the poem and 
his dream.19 Although his confusion about love and his experience in 
learning about it are the ostensible subjects of the poem, the persona is 
only involved with action in four specific places: at the beginning 
where the subject is raised; at the end where it is treated again; and at 
two transitional points in the plot, the first when he turns from book to 
bed and dream, and the second when he needs to move from without to 
within the park. Unlike the persona of the House of Fame, who is 
continually involved with what is happening to him, the persona of the 
Parliament of Fowls comments little on the elements of his experience. 
He remains aloof from what he is seeing and enters the action only 
where he has to pass through some line of structural demarcation. To 
be sure, he repeatedly tells us that he saw one thing or another, as he 
does in his other dream visions. But there is little sense of musing, of 
fear, of sympathy for or about what he sees and little moral comment 
on any of the action. It is as if Chaucer were using the persona, 
especially in the section of the poem presenting the dream, as a living 
camera through whose lens we are allowed to see what he sees, but who 
rarely manipulates our responses by his own interjections, emotions, or 
amplifications. 
One of the reasons for our sense of the persona's aloofness is that he 
is relatively affectless. The persona is hardly felt as a significant actor 
in his reading or in his dream experience, as he was in the readings and 
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dreams of his earlier poems. The experience of the dream, when it 
occurs, has the same quality of paraphrase that the retelling of Macrob­
ius's book has in the early part of the poem. The persona's lack of 
involvement with his dream accounts for the more tranquil manner of 
this poem when compared with either the Book of the Duchess or the 
House of Fame, and for the lack of intensity felt in most of its form. 
Yet, even though the persona's aloofness makes the poem's mood dif­
ferent from the mood of the other dream visions, those four points in 
the narrative where he intrudes contribute to the poem's inconclusive­
ness, for they provide that same sense of ambivalence and naively 
limited understanding that the persona provided to the other dream 
visions. 
The first appearance of the persona is, of course, at the opening, 
where we are given a complicated definition and the persona's confused 
response to it: 
The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne, 
Th'assay so hard, so sharp the conquerynge, 
The dredful joye, alwey that slit so yerne; 
Al this mene I by Love, that my felynge 
Astonyeth with his wonderful werkynge 
So sore, iwis, that whan I on hym thynke, 
Nat wot I wel wher that I flete or synke. 
[1-7] 
The sententia of the first line is common enough—related to the class­
ical "ars longa, vita brevis"—but its application is not clearly pointed 
and its syntactic references are complicated, as if purposely to com­
plicate its meaning.20 We are led to consider first that the speaker is 
talking about life and craft, both of which require a "sharp" conquer­
ing, both of which may be characterized by the oxymoronic "dredful 
joye" because the pleasure of both presumably slides away so easily. At 
line four of the stanza, however, we are told that what came before it 
did not actually refer to life and to craft, but that life and craft and their 
attendant anxieties refer to love. It is finally love that causes the per­
sona's astonishment. The complexity of this opening makes the persona 
insecure; he does not know whether he is floating or sinking. The 
syntax of the opening lines is so ambiguous that readers encountering 
them for the first time frequently wonder whether the persona is 
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commenting on life, on art, on love, or on all three.21 The three terms 
function in paratactic balance without subordination so that they appear 
synonymous. The persona tells us, however, that by art and craft, with 
their anxieties, he means love. But if "al this" means love, then the love 
he has in mind is a concept more encompassing than ours. It is 
apparently capable of including within its definition lived experience 
and human activity such as writing about lived experience; it represents 
the foundation upon which human life and human action ultimately 
rest. 
The persona's broad definition of what he means by love should 
contain some core of certainty upon which the various elements of love 
within the poem will rest. But it does not because the persona, having 
created an ambiguous definition, does not understand it. The stanzas 
that follow the opening present someone who, like the persona of the 
House of Fame, is so overwhelmed by the breadth of the definition that 
he denies knowing "Love in dede" (8); so he dedicates himself to 
learning about it from books that will disclose or test the validity of the 
definition. He tells us "out of olde bokes, in good feyth, / cometh al 
this newe science that men lere" (24—25). But, whereas the book he 
turns to reveals to him a metaphysical end of human life and of human 
action, it does not reveal to him "a certeyn thing," which he apparently 
hopes will help him through his confusion.22 
The persona's contribution to the inconclusiveness of the form of the 
Parliament of Fowls resides precisely in the distinction I have been 
making between the breadth and complexity of definitions about love 
and the limiting narrowness of his search for a certain answer that will 
satisfy his curiosity and help his career as a writer of love poetry. 
Whenever the persona enters the action of the poem, he responds to his 
experience with ambivalence or disappointment. After he paraphrases 
the contents of Macrobius's book, which describes a greater metaphysi­
cal end to love than he apparently can use in his search, he comments 
with disappointment: 
For bothe I hadde thyng which that I nolde, 
And ek I nadde that thyng that I wolde. 
[90-91] 
When confronted by the contradictory sign above the entrance to the 
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park of his dream, he is immobilized—"Right as, betwixen ada­
mauntes two / of evene myght" (148-49)—and he needs to be shoved 
forward by his guide. The fearful reaction to the sign seems caused less 
by the danger that the warning suggests than by the contradiction itself, 
which claims polar opposites to be true of the same experience. Were it 
merely fear, the persona would undoubtedly flee. His immobilization 
suggests his fear that experience within the gates will be complicated, a 
totality created by a balance of opposites. Complication is not what the 
persona wants to encounter in his search for that "certeyn thing." 
Finally, after experiencing the phenomenon of the parliament of the 
birds, the awakened persona's final response, which brings the poem to 
its unconcluded end, is again one of disappointment, as if his dream 
experience had left him in the same state of confusion with respect to 
finding out that thing as his reading of Macrobius: 
I wok, and othere bokes tok me to, 
To reede upon, and yit I rede alwey. 
I hope, ywis, to rede so some day 
That I shal mete some thyng for to fare 
The bet, and thus to rede I nyl nat spare. 
[695-99] 
He dedicates himself to continuing to search because he has not found 
the answer—one presumably about love, life, and craft—in either 
book or dream. 
It is not only the persona's narrowly aimed search and his dis­
appointment, however, that make the Parliament of Fowls in­
conclusive. Other elements of the poem as well contribute to the in­
conclusiveness of its form: the definition of love, the relation between 
the subject of Macrobius's book and the dream, the elements both 
abstract and concrete within the park as well as their relation to the sign 
over the entrance, and, of course, the parliament of birds and its 
conclusion, or lack of it. But, as we look at these elements, we shall see 
that inconclusiveness is so much a part of Chaucer's conception in his 
poem, so much based on what may be called a pluralistic vision of 
reality, that their sum total does not constitute a narrative form made 
incoherent by its inconclusiveness. Rather, it suggests that an in­
conclusive form can be successful. 
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Like the curious opening stanza with its shifting expectations of 
subject, the content of the larger structural units of the Parliament of 
Fowls creates expectations for one kind of meaning only to undercut 
them with new content implying another kind of meaning. For ex­
ample, the unit of the poem concerned with the paraphrase of Mac­
robius leads us to expect a dream connected in some way with what has 
been read. In the Book of the Duchess, the persona's reading of Ceyx and 
Alcyone ultimately had something in common with the greater purpose 
of the dream that followed. But the dream in the Parliament of Fowls is 
not only unclearly connected to the reading of Macrobius (except in the 
appropriation of Affricanus as the guide into the dream park) but the 
persona's disappointed response to his reading makes us wonder why 
the paraphrase was there at all, what contrastive feature the upcoming 
dream might have. Neither a comparative nor a contrastive connection 
is ever implied or drawn. In fact, once the persona has passed into the 
dream park and Affricanus has disappeared from the action, Macro­
bius's book is all but forgotten. Although we might choose ultimately 
to interpret the bird parliament as an ironic working out of Affrica­
nus's assertion that the virtuous man must look to the common profit, 
the interpretation seems more strongly motivated by our modern need 
to find a thematic or structural unity in poetry than it is based on what 
connections the poem itself suggests. Bennett is, I think, correct in 
asserting of the scenes in the dream that 
we cannot establish more than an antithetical and oblique relation be­
tween them and African's discourse in the Proem. There the emphasis is 
on immaterial joys of heaven, here on joys and sorrows of a very 
material earth. Scipio's dream is chiefly concerned with Eternity and 
the Life of spirit; Chaucer's with Nature and the impulses of the 
flesh.23 
I would argue, however, that the very obliquity and antithetical quality 
of relation between Chaucer's dream and Scipio's does serve a function, 
although the function does not suggest unity.24 Rather, it serves to 
support the persona's disappointment with whatever he has learned 
from his reading and to undermine or question the particular validity 
of the authority that Macrobius's book and its doctrine represent. In 
light of the personal experience of the persona's dream, Affricanus's 
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teaching to Scipio appears to be not a conclusive enough monition to be 
valid for everyone. 
The inconclusiveness created by the constrastive nature of the two 
dreams in the poem also manifests itself throughout the different units 
of the dream. For example, on either side of the gate to the dream park 
are contradictory oppositions that immobilize the persona because each 
one appears as an assertion of truth. Once inside the park, however, the 
persona describes only one of the sign's statements, namely "that blys­
ful place / of hertes hele and dedly woundes cure" (127-28). In fact, 
what the persona sees in the park openly contradicts the warning writ­
ten on the dark side of the gate. Whereas the assertions in black had 
stated "ther nevere tre shal fruyt ne leves bere" (137), the persona sees 
a park in which "were trees clad with leves that ay shal laste" (173), a 
park in which there is a garden "of blosmy bowes . . . with floures 
white, blewe, yelwe, and rede" (183-86). Whereas the gate had read 
"This strem yow ledeth to the sorweful were / there as the fish in 
prysoun is al drye" (138—39), the persona sees 
. . . colde welle-stremes, nothyng dede, 
That swymmen ful of smale fishes lighte, 
With fynnes rede and skales sylver bryghte. 
[187-89] 
Whereas the gate had threatened to lead "unto the mortal strokes of the 
spere / of which Disdayn and Daunger is the gyde" (135—36), the path 
in fact leads to a temple of brass about which are dancing women and 
before which are regaled the pleasing and familiar personifications of 
courtly allegory: "Pleasaunce," "Curteysie," "Gentilesse," as well as 
some less familiar but no less pleasant figures like "Dame Pees" and 
"Dame Pacience." It is true that the catalogue of courtly per­
sonifications contains what seems one less than pleasant figure: 
And of the Craft that can and hath the myght 
To don by force a wyght to done folye— 
Disfigurat was she, I nyl nat lye. 
[220-22] 
But this is the only truly unpleasant personification in the park, and the 
persona's response to its disfigured aspect—"I nyl nat lye"—somehow 
makes it appear less egregious because it is recognized as different 
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from, but acceptable within, the list of other pleasant per­
sonifications.25 It is also true that there are some unpleasant aspects 
suggested about love within the temple itself. But these un­
pleasantnesses are represented at a considerable remove, for they are 
perceived not as existing within the park but as being symbolically 
depicted on the wall in the form of a story or a catalogue.26 The 
persona's initial response to what he experiences in the park—"But, 
Lord, so I was glad and well begoon!" (171)—never changes through­
out his description of whatever he sees there. In consequence the reader 
soon forgets the dark warning on the one side of the gate. Or, if one 
does not forget it, one recognizes that the authoritative, though con­
tradictory, quality of conclusiveness of the statement itself has been 
undercut by the action following it. It is as if Chaucer were suggesting 
a conclusive sounding sententia in order purposefully to undercut it or 
to question its conclusiveness by his descriptive technique. 
Not, however, until we reach the main or central issue of the 
poem—the bird parliament—do we recognize clearly why Chaucer has 
been undermining the conclusive sententiae that the elements of his 
poem have been asserting. Here the technique of undercutting expecta­
tion is not simply a device to test the conclusiveness of authority; it is 
part of the poet's conception, whereby created inconclusiveness can 
suggest, and even validate, a pluralistic vision of reality. 
The section begins with Nature explaining the customary procedure 
of bringing together on Saint Valentine's day all species of birds to 
choose their mates. It is expected that the choosing will be carried out 
in traditional medieval fashion, with the birds of highest order begin­
ning and the birds of lower orders following according to an un­
derstood qualitative hierarchy of bird society. The problem, however, 
arises when, after the "tersel egle" makes his choice, another tersel "of 
lower kynde" lays claim to the same mate, whereupon a third tersel 
objects and lays yet another claim to her. The unexpected contention 
not only lasts "tyl dounward drow the sonne wonder faste" (490); it 
makes the other birds impatient because the arguments do not convince 
the group which of the three the female ought to accept. They are 
"withouten any preve" (497). The implication of their objection is that 
the kind of courtly rhetoric which expresses the suit of each of the three 
eagles has interfered with the process of Nature, a process she has 
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established as the reasonable method for choice of a mate. Moreover, 
their argument has interfered with the selection by birds of lower order 
who also have rightful claims to relevant choices of their own. The 
parliament that follows, in which Nature ordains each order of bird to 
have a say in the matter, begins with a direct response to the question 
before them all, namely, how to choose the most worthy of the three 
suitors; but it soon moves wide of the issue and becomes a parliament in 
which each class of bird speaks in general to the issue of love and 
mating, and reveals a spectrum of opinion on the subject. The point of 
the argument is that wherever there is a disparate group, there will be 
disparate opinions with respect to any issue. Furthermore, each of the 
disparate opinions, whether more or less noble, has about it a political 
validity that makes unanimous consensus impossible and even obscures 
the question at issue. 
Chaucer never leads his readers to any conclusion about which claim 
is more just or more important. To be sure, his stylistic parody of each 
class of birds suggests absurdity in the claims of certain classes, like 
that represented by the goose. But it criticizes as well the claims and the 
method of making claims of the courtly class. The opinions of all 
classes are opened to scrutiny, but we are never urged to accept the 
claims of one class as more valid than the claims of another. Rather, 
Chaucer directs our attention to the fact of pluralistic opinion. True, 
the speaker for the birds of ravine suggests that the choice should be 
made according to which of the three suitors is "the worthieste / of 
knyghthod . . . most of estat, of blod the gentilleste" (548-55); true, 
too, the opportunistic argument of the goose is made to seem ridiculous 
because it is so ignoble. If nobility were at issue, then we could easily 
discover which class of birds had the best argument. Nobility is not, 
however, the issue. The issue is rather opinion itself, and what claims 
the opinions of different species of birds reveal. The spectrum of birds 
displays a spectrum of bird opinion about love, each of which appears 
valid and appropriate for the class of bird opining it, whether it be the 
sentimental idealism of the turtledove or the practical sense of choice 
represented by the duck. Nature's final decision to leave the choice of 
mate up to the female eagle suggests that Chaucer is offering individual 
choice in love as the only viable alternative to a selection process where 
opinion is valid. By doing this, he is also leaving the subject of love, 
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about which the entire poem is concerned, up to individual choice, 
implying that there is no one authoritative definition or attitude that 
holds true at all times or in all places. Authority, in fact, is here being 
undermined by an implication that individual opinion has its own 
validity. 
Even the attitude of the figure Nature supports the pluralism that 
the spectrum of bird opinion suggests.27 While Nature functions 
throughout the parliament as leader, as mediator, and as customary 
agent appointed by God to see His plan carried out, she separates her 
allegorical quality from the quality of Reason, who presided over all 
the judgments of Nature since at least the time of Alanus de Insulis's 
Anticlaudianus. In the Parliament of Fowls, Nature comports herself in 
accordance with Reason; she even recognizes that the advice of the 
birds of ravine is the most reasonable. But she also recognizes that on 
the question of love she is different from Reason: 
If I were Resoun, certes, thanne wolde I 
Conseyle yow the royal tercel take, 
As seyde the tercelet ful skyfully, 
As for the gentilleste and most worthi. 
[632-35] 
Hers is the traditional, reasonable counseling, the counseling that 
would look to nobility and to rank when making a decision for a 
mate.28 But Nature accepts the request of the female eagle who says: 
I wol nat serve Venus ne Cupide, 
Forsothe as yit, by no manere weye. 
[652-53] 
She accepts the eagle's request for a year's respite "to have my choys al 
fre" (649). The poem makes clear, then, that the argument which 
concerns the parliament cannot be settled because in matters of love 
Nature and Reason are different and, by implication, in matters of the 
heart the authority of Reason no longer holds total sway over the claim 
of varying individual or, at least, class opinions. 
The Parliament of Fowls ends on this purposely inconclusive note. 
After the "roundel" (actually a triolet), which the birds sing to Nature, 
Saint Valentine, and Summer, the persona awakens and tells us em­
phatically that he has not found the answer he has been looking for. 
"Betwixen Adamauntes Two" SI 
Despite the inconclusiveness of the form of the Parliament of Fowls, 
however, there is no sense of an incoherence of meaning, as there was 
in the House of Fame. Rather, the poem's form is satisfying, completely 
realized, and convincing because its parts were conceived to function in 
an indeterminate way and to suggest an indeterminacy of meaning. 
Inconclusiveness has been useful to this form whose interest has been to 
articulate the possibility of a valid pluralism. Chaucer will create such 
an inconclusive form again, though without the allegorical parapher­
nalia. The Canterbury Tales may be seen as a more complex working 
out of the principle of inconclusiveness the end of which suggests a 
pluralistic vision of reality as valid. 
Before examining how Chaucer creates this inconclusive narrative 
form on a far vaster scale than in the Parliament of Fowls, however, we 
must first look at the other main line of narrative development in 
Chaucer's career, the line that concerns the persona, turned narrator, at 
work on objective, legendary narration as opposed to subjective dream 
vision experience, for it too teaches Chaucer how to control narrative 
development, so important an element of each of the tales within the 
Canterbury Tales. In the next chapter, I shall examine what problems 
the poet confronted and mastered in his rendering of legendary materi­
als, as they most fully may be witnessed in Troilus. 

IV.	 "Of Storial Thing": Anelida and Arcite and 
Troilus and Criseyde 
Chaucer continued to be fascinated by dreams and their 
relation to truth, and to write dream visions until late 
in his career. He continued to develop his poetic tech­
nique of representing experience through a first-person 
narrator, and, as we shall see, he used the form of the 
dream vision abstractly to fashion the outer form of the 
Canterbury Tales. But the dream vision represents only one major 
narrative kind that occupied him throughout his career. More than 
half of the bulk of his work is comprised of third-person narratives 
that, after him, I am calling "storial."1 Whether these narratives come 
from his own mouth, as in Troilus and Criseyde, or from the mouths of 
characters whom he invents to tell them, as in the Canterbury Tales, 
their forms and their power derive only partially from Chaucer's liter­
ary interest in how to express personal experience. They derive as well 
from his interest in how to translate and indite materials from "olde 
bokes." It is the purpose of this chapter to explore some ways by which 
Chaucer fashions earlier, not necessarily inconclusive, works by others 
into narrative forms whose conclusiveness is as problematical as those 
of his dream visions. As with my argument about Chaucer's dream 
visions, my purpose here is to show how Chaucer created from tradi­
tional literary forms an inconclusive kind of narrative literature. 
Anelida and Arcite and Troilus and Criseyde are two early examples of 
Chaucer's storial narratives. Each is different in genre and form, yet 
each exemplifies how the narrator creates peculiar effects that ul­
timately render his storial materials inconclusive. Let us examine first 
Anelida, not the best of Chaucer's works, to see the nature of in­
conclusiveness in its form; we shall then be able to confront Troilus, 
perhaps the best of Chaucer's works, to see the immensely more com­
plicated ways in which the poet creates inconclusiveness from a source 
that is originally conclusive. 
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The abortive Anelida is so brief that its inconclusiveness seems 
caused more by its fragmentary state than by the conception and ren­
dering of its form. Yet, strictly speaking, even the fragment that 
Chaucer left us is formally inconclusive, since it breaks off at a point 
where it has not accomplished anything like what it alleges it will do at 
the beginning. For all its claim to be a "noble storie" (13), requiring 
epic invocation to Mars, Anelida is actually an ignoble story about an 
abandoned woman, whose stylized complaint occupies the bulk of its 
lines. In this sense the fragment is not unlike the fragment known as 
the Squire's Tale, which also promises to do many things, but does 
something different in its short space.2 It may be argued, however, 
that the Squire's Tale is ironically intended, that in it Chaucer is work­
ing to demonstrate a young man's inability to organize, order, and 
deploy poetic materials appropriately and that he wants to suggest by 
the story the Squire's immature artistry in the face of good intentions or 
high pretensions. Anelida, on the other hand, cannot receive so charita­
ble an interpretation since the narrator who tells the story is Chaucer 
himself and since the work does not suggest an ironic intention. 
Yet, Anelida is not without its felicities, mostly found in the non-
narrative portion of the poem. The complaint, which imitates in 
strophic stanzas French models of the compleynte d'amour, is actually a 
remarkable tour de force. In fact, the sure hand with which Chaucer 
creates, orders, and rhymes Anelida's complaint makes the awkward­
ness of the narration that precedes it seem more egregious. After the 
epic invocation and a beginning of action, there is no development of 
plot. We move from mention of Theseus, Ipolita, and Emilye to 
Thebes and to the catastrophe after the war of the Seven against 
Thebes; we then settle on Anelida, the "quene of Ermony" (71—72), 
who is outstanding both for her beauty and her "stidfastness." The 
narrator then introduces us to Arcite the Theban knight (85) and two 
lines later tells us that "he was double in love and no thing pleyn (87)." 
The narrator neither tells the story that has caused this evaluation nor 
depicts a developing relationship between the two main characters. 
Instead, he pitches the narrative forward to the complaint, suggesting 
by the procedure that the narrative materials and the questions they 
raise are insignificant paraphernalia used simply to prepare for the 
lyrical portion. 
"OfStorial Thing" 61 
In the woodenness of its narrative structure, Anelida resembles some 
of the tales of the later Legend of Good Women. But in its form—at least 
in the form of the fragment we have—the poem resembles the Book of 
the Duchess, in which the narrative leads up to (and away from) an 
elaborately rhetorical set piece like a complaint. Moreover, its com­
positional method is also like that of the Book of the Duchess in the way 
Chaucer uses one source to begin, echoes others as he proceeds, but 
mostly depends on his own invention and imagination. To be sure, the 
narrator of the poem claims specific authority, which establishes the 
venerable, storial nature of the piece. He tells us, in fact, the story is so 
venerable that most of us have forgotten it entirely: 
That elde, which that al can frete and bite, 
As hit hath freten mony a noble storie, 
Hath nygh devoured out of oure memorie. 
[12-14] 
This striking image of age as a voracious beast devouring stories recalls 
the instability of literary materials suggested by the melting names at 
the foundation of Fame's house. Here, however, the narrator is intent 
on doing something about it. He wants to rescue the story from obliv­
ion, to claim for his own time its significant meaning, and to preserve 
it for posterity.3 To do this, he names Statius and Corinna as his 
authorities, uses epic invocation to elevate the style, and quotes Statius 
directly as an epigraph.4 Yet, only the beginning derives from Statius, 
actually from Statius by way of Boccaccio's Teseida.5 The remainder of 
the narrative portion sometimes echoes Statius, sometimes Boccaccio, 
sometimes Dante and Ovid; the lyrical portion, Anelida's complaint, 
has no specific authority, except in its Ovidian mood. Like Chaucer's 
earlier dream visions, which echo and translate Froissart, Dante, and 
Alanus de Insulis, among others, Anelida, for all its suggestion of 
being a different kind of narrative form, a storial narrative, uses the 
dream vision as its model. 
One difference between Anelida and a dream vision like the Book of 
the Duchess, however, is that whereas the Book of the Duchess is suc­
cessfully realized, Anelida is not. The reason lies, I believe, in the 
nature of the modes in which Chaucer casts each poem. The Book of the 
Duchess is a dream vision, using subjective experience for its narrative; 
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Anelida, on the other hand, begins with an epic, storial format but 
moves so quickly away from its storial beginning to the complaint that 
its form appears more like a dream vision and less like a storial nar­
rative. The action seems primarily intended for the lyrical set piece. 
One reason why Chaucer may have abandoned the piece is that the 
work's form does not accommodate comfortably or subordinate 
appropriately the elements of epic and of dream vision that coexist 
within it.6 There is, of course, the possibility that the parts may 
ultimately have cohered in proper subordination when the work was 
finished.7 But that is unlikely, for the problem with the portion we 
have is not so much one of coherence, as in the House of Fame, but one 
of incongruity or lack of intelligible sequence in the elements of its 
form. 
Chaucer returned to the materials of Anelida when he "made" the 
book of Palamon and Arcite, which became the Knight's Tale in the 
Canterbury Tales. The Knight's Tale has no trouble accommodating into 
its epic form the long rhetorical complaints, like those by Arcite in 
Thebes and Palamon in prison. In fact, the lyrical intensity of the 
complaints seems as appropriate to the otherwise leisurely pacing of the 
narrative as do Theseus' two speeches about the nature of love, and 
even more in keeping with the expectations of the form than the 
Knight's lengthy refusal to narrate Arcite's funeral. The complaint in' 
Anelida, by contrast, overwhelms the narrative portion that precedes it, 
making the narrative appear to exist expressly for the purpose of the 
love complaint. The subheading of Anelida—The Compleynt of feire 
Anelida and fals Arcite—suggests, however, that the poem should not 
be taken as an epic narrative, despite its opening, but as a set of 
complaints, the one by Anelida, the other by Arcite, held together by a 
narrative filigree. As such, the form of Anelida resembles the form of 
the Broche of Thebes (the complaints of Mars and Venus), in which a 
narrative filigree binds together the elaborate complaints of the two 
planet-deities.8 The elaborate astrological references that constitute 
much of the narrative of the Broche of Thebes keep that piece squarely in 
the tradition of allegorical dream visions, or at least in the tradition of 
the love-complaint; hence its form is successfully realized.9 This is not 
true for Anelida, however, because the genre in which it is conceived is 
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not clear. On the one hand, we expect from the subtitle a complaint, 
commonly cast in the form of dream visions. On the other, we expect 
from the invocation to Mars, to Pallas, and to the Muses on "Parnas­
so" an epic, an expectation sustained by three hexameters from Statins 
that the narrator quotes at the beginning of the story, and by the 
narrator's storial intention in the invocation: 
For hit ful depe is sonken in my mynde, 
With pitous hert in Englyssh to endyte 
This olde storie, in Latyn which I fynde, 
Of quene Anelida and fals Arcite. 
[8-11] 
Although the sad mood of the passage sustains our expectation of a 
complaint form, the intention to render into English an "olde storie" 
found in Latin suggests another form. 
We do not have enough of Anelida to tell us whether, and in what 
ways, the inconclusiveness of the poem's form derives from its mixture 
of genres and of narrative modes, from the way its narrator uses 
authority and sources, or from its fragmentary state. The inconclusive­
ness of the poem's form may derive from all of these, or inconclusive­
ness may simply be a narrative condition of all of Chaucer's poetry 
because of his compositional method. Let us therefore turn to Troilus, 
Chaucer's longest and most complex storial narrative, a complete poem 
with a beginning, middle, and end, a work identified generically as a 
tragedy, whose plot derives from one primary source, Boccaccio's / / 
Filostrato. By examining Troilus, we shall be able to understand more 
completely than we can from Anelida the relationship of Chaucerian 
inconclusiveness to generic choice and how, and in what ways, the 
nature of the narrator who is rendering the storial narrative from his 
source ultimately contributes to the inconclusiveness of the new work's 
form, despite the conclusiveness of the plot in the original source. I 
shall examine the ways in which the narrator's rendering of Boccaccio's 
conclusive plot, and his involvement with the characters of that plot, 
create a narrative form whose conclusiveness is problematic. Finally, I 
shall discuss both the genre and the ending of Troilus to show how 
Chaucer's alterations reinforce the inconclusiveness of the form by 
undercutting our tragic expectations. 
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II 
The plot of Chaucer's Troilus is conclusive. The events work them­
selves out in the fashion expected from the very first action of the story, 
Calchas's betrayal. The dedication at the end subjects the poem first to 
"alle poesie," namely, to the writers in the epic tradition, then to 
"moral Gower" and "philosophical Strode," both of whom, whatever 
their personal involvement with the poem's creation, the adjectives 
preceding their names characterize as appropriate to its concerns. Yet, 
despite the conclusiveness of the plot and the appropriateness of the 
dedications, there is a sense of inconclusiveness in the form of Troilus 
not related to the plot and its concerns but to the narrator rendering the 
plot. 
It is easy to recognize in the narrator of Troilus a character consistent 
with the persona who told his experiences in the dream visions. 
Although this character appears more sober, he is no more earnest than 
the persona of the Book of the Duchess and the House of Fame. The 
self-portrait of Chaucer in the second book of the House of Fame—the 
studious, serious, almost cloistered academic-by-night, not the fright­
ened actor in that poem—seems to represent the sense of character 
Chaucer wanted his narrator to possess in Troilus. The simplistic 
naivete of the persona of the Book of the Duchess is overwhelmed in the 
House of Fame by the complexities that his studiousness has produced. 
The result is a more sober character who appears as the persona of the 
Parliament of Fowls and the narrator of Troilus. But by the time of 
Troilus, the objects of the narrator's interests have altered somewhat. 
Whereas previously the persona was filled with wonder about his 
experiences, whereas he suffered and was frightened by the im­
plications of his dreams because they taught him a skepticism that he 
apparently feared, the narrator of Troilus is no longer a seeker after 
answers to theoretical questions. Rather, he has become a translator of 
other people's works. In the earlier poems, he wondered about many 
general things; now he has a purpose, an intention to render a historical 
aspect of the matter of Troy. The student of personal dreams and of 
poetic experiences has given way to the maker in English of other 
people's stories. It is as if the younger man has matured into a pro­
fessional being, not an unlikely change if the persona is at all modeled 
upon the real Chaucer.10 
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Similar as are Chaucer the narrator of Troilus and Chaucer the 
persona of the dream visions, they differ in their function to the form 
and in their relationship to the content. In a dream vision, a persona 
tells of his own experiences in a situation. The narrator of a storial 
work, however, most often describes a situation that is not his own. A 
dream vision persona by nature is more intimate, more involved with 
his telling, whereas a storial narrator tends to be more aloof because he 
is telling someone else's story. But in Troilus something curious hap­
pens. Although we expect the narrator to remain aloof from the story, 
we discover that he gets frequently and intensely involved with his 
fiction, appearing at once as a narrator of someone else's story and as a 
persona in the experience of his own poem. This narrator, then, has 
two functions: he is the historian of someone else's plot, responsible to 
his author to get it right, and an actor in the experience of rendering 
that plot, drawn for his own reasons to alter the effect of the plot on us. 
These two functions are not always integrated, and at times they create 
a tension in the poem's form that undercuts the authority that the story's 
author, the fictional Lollius, originally gave it and causes ambiguity in 
the meaning of the work. The result of this tension is inconclusiveness 
in the poem's form. Let us look at this complicated use of the narrator 
in Troilus to see how it creates an inconclusive form in a narrative 
whose plot is otherwise conclusive. 
Morton Bloomfield has argued that the narrator of Troilus evokes 
and controls "distance" in the poem, an aloofness from the materials of 
his source that separates us from the plot in "temporal, spatial, aesthetic 
and religious ways."11 The narrator's formal concerns in the poems 
repeatedly distance us from the inner events of the plot and "make us 
more aware of Chaucer the narrator than ordinarily."12 By contrast, 
but to our same ultimate awareness of the narrator's centrality, the actor 
in the experience of rendering this plot collapses the distance by calling 
attention to his own sympathies for the characters and their activities. 
For example, the narrator renders Troilus's love behavior in book one 
ironically, thereby controlling the impatience we would otherwise feel 
at the hero's self-indulgence. Yet his feelings about the value of such 
love and his sympathy for his hero's suffering make us feel the poig­
nancy of Troilus's pain more intensely and cause us to identify with 
him even while we feel the irony and distance that it creates. Speaking 
of style, Muscatine, after Bethel, calls this effect one of "multi­
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consciousness, the simultaneous awareness of different and opposite 
planes of reality."13 
The double role of the narrator, as historian and as involved actor, 
affects the presentation of Criseyde even more complexly than it does 
the presentation of Troilus. On the one hand, the narrator's warnings 
of Criseyde's falseness and its effects, and his apparently heavy depen­
dence on his presumed source, especially in the fourth and fifth books 
of the poem, distance us from her actions by preparing us for them. 
On the other hand, his emotional response to her and his view of her as 
a "hevenyssh perfit creature" (1.104), as well as his repeated attempts 
to avoid confronting the moral conclusions he must necessarily draw 
from her actions, break down the distance between us and her and 
make us feel more intensely about her. Distinguishing between Chau­
cer the narrator and Chaucer the poet—not between Chaucer the histo­
rian and Chaucer the actor, as I have been—Donaldson describes the 
complicated effect of this double mediation on our responses to 
Criseyde: 
At some of the moments when his narrator is striving most laboriously 
to palliate Criseide's behavior, Chaucer, standing behind him, jogs his 
elbow, causing him to fall into verbal imprecision, or into anticlimax, 
or making it redundant—generally doing these things in such a way 
that the reader will be encouraged almost insensibly to see Criseide in a 
light quite different from the one that the narrator is so earnestly trying 
to place her in.14 
This double role for the narrator causes an affective inconclusiveness 
in the perceived form of the work. It blurs issues, confuses reader 
response, and makes ambiguous the fictive reality of the poem. It also 
interferes with our responses to the events of the plot by making us so 
aware of Chaucer the narrator as the teller of the tale that we cannot 
read this poem simply as a story, as we would other storial narratives 
like romances. We are forced to read it as a subjective narrative, a story 
being told by a character whose consciousness and even unconscious­
ness mediate and control the effect, the significance, even the truth 
contained within the form. 
In the dream vision poems, we have often been aware of the com­
plicated persona. In fact, we have frequently been as aware of him as 
we have been of the objects of his experience. But in those works, we 
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do not find anything particularly unusual about this awareness, for, 
after all, the experiences of the poem are the persona's and he is the 
subject. Troilus, by contrast, is storial in its mode; Troilus and his 
"double sorwe" are both the subject and the experience to which we are 
invited to attend. Thus the narrator's intense involvement in Troilus 
seems peculiar. 
Narrators mediate our experience of the text. In the narrative litera­
ture preceding Chaucer, the narrative voice of a Chretien de Troyes or 
of a Wolfram von Eschenbach is clearly heard and strongly felt, but it 
does not generally interfere with the workings of the fiction to the 
extent that Chaucer's voice does. Generally, the narrative voice leads us 
into the fiction and moves us from episode to episode or from book to 
book when the work is an extended one. Frequently, it tells us what to 
feel—pity for a lover's pain, fear for a hero's life, and so on. The 
narrator uses his power to chasten or reassure us morally as well as to 
criticize others for not telling the story properly.15 But the narrator of 
Troilus manipulates us in two directions. He creates distance from his 
text by telling us of its ending, by separating us in time from it, by 
philosophizing action; and he abridges distance by identifying with the 
action, by making the judgments as if he were a part of, or close to, the 
action, and by psychologizing action. More important, the narrator of 
Troilus manipulates us not so much by telling us what to feel or where 
to turn our attention but rather by telling us how he feels or where he is 
taking us. It is as if Chaucer is mediating the history he derives from 
his stated source Lollius through a character whose consciousness is as 
central to our total sense of the poem's form as is the plot. 
Bloomfield tells us that "the Chaucerian sense of distance and aloof­
ness is the artistic correlative of the concept of predestination."16 I have 
already argued that the sense of distance in Troilus is not simply one of 
aloofness but of a sliding scale, now aloof, now close, now moving 
away from the plot, now closing space between the plot and our experi­
ence, always asserting the narrator's consciousness as the sieve through 
which the plot must be pressed. In context of Bloomfield's argument, I 
take "predestination" to mean the necessity that God knows by virtue of 
His ability to see all time and all action in one point. Just as the reader 
must accept the events of Troilus through the narrator's point of view 
and with his insistence on the end, and just as Lady Philosophy would 
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argue to Boethius, and a theologian to us, that we must accept the 
meaning and end of our being through an awareness of God's vision, 
which is different from our own, so we must accept the events and the 
end of any fiction through the consciousness of any narrator who, no 
matter what his relation to the author, claims to be the maker of the 
fiction. In this way the sense of distance that a narrator establishes 
between us and the events of his text provides an artistic correlative to 
determinacy of life, or of plot. The narrator, like God, can be om­
niscient. But when the narrator gets involved with his fiction, as does 
the narrator of Troilus, or as do many of the pilgrims who tell tales on 
their way to Canterbury, the form becomes inconclusive because the 
narrator's particular psychology qualifies a total awareness of reality 
and places greater emotional weight on certain elements of the story 
than would be expected from a truly omniscient being like God. Such a 
narrator becomes, thus, a character different from the author in that he 
is finite and perceives finitely. In Troilus the narrator is a character 
who has grown familiar to us from earlier works; he is a lover manque, 
a curious and skeptical scholar, a historian with a kind of frightened 
interest in philosophical questions about love, about necessity, about 
the ends of poetry. This character is limited by the particulars of his 
own psychology, by his fears, his skepticism, his sympathies. 
Chaucer could have developed as a poet in any number of ways and 
with any number of interests. From the first, however, his chief 
interest in literary representation was psychology, and his chief re­
sponses to the issues that his personae encountered were psychologistic. 
Whereas Aristotle insists on the primacy of action over character, 
Chaucer, who did not know the Poetics, emphasizes from the begin­
ning character and psychology (Aristotle's "Thought") over action.17 
The dream vision as a narrative form in which Chaucer chose original­
ly to write his narratives never required a sense of plausible plot. The 
form of dreams is by nature determined by psychological need and 
association, not by plausible consequences to people's activities. When 
we consider Chaucer's early works, we think not of their plots, for the 
journeys the persona undertakes hardly cohere as plots. We think of 
these works as narrative experiences not so much of what happened but 
of who or what was encountered, like the Black Knight, the eagle, 
"OfStorial Thing" 69 
Fama, Affricanus, Lady Nature, a goose, a turtledove, a duck, a 
whelp. Most of all, we recall the consciousness of the character named 
Geffrey, whose dream experiences Chaucer narrated. 
In Troilus, where plot is a significant factor and where events create 
the tragedy of the story, we might expect an emphasis on action over 
character. Thus Muscatine argues that in this poem "characterization is 
a device, not an end."18 Yet, aside from the first action of Calchas' 
betrayal, which is necessary to begin the story, the opinions and feel­
ings of the characters in the poem appear more significant than the 
action of the plot.19 For all its discussion of fortune and its relation to 
human action, for all its consideration of the actions of the war between 
Troy and the Greeks, Troilus is a tragedy of character.20 Not only is 
the narrator the central consciousness in control of audience response, 
the characters and their feelings within the plot occupy our concern 
more significantly than the plot itself. Charles Owen puts the matter 
thus: 
The action in the poem is determined in large measure by the character 
of the actors. Troilus may be struck suddenly by love, but his response 
to the situation is an expression of his character. Throughout the poem 
we watch men and women moving and thinking and feeling. Frequent­
ly they are victims of their own self-deception. But their actions 
emerge; they are not imposed.21 
The abuse that love creates in Troilus in book one, the satisfaction that 
he finds in book three, and the disabuse that he receives in book five 
are of a piece and belong to the category of character rather than of 
action. Troilus's psychology motivates his behavior. Although 
Troilus's disillusionment finally results from his perception of 
Criseyde's action of giving Diomede his brooch, the action is made 
known to Troilus beforehand in a dream and his responses proceed 
from his psychology. 
In another way, Criseyde's interior monologue in book two (701— 
812) is ultimately as significant as any action she subsequently per­
forms, for her psychology, which is revealed there, motivates her 
subsequent actions. It even functions as an action, for its length and 
development represent Chaucer's way of convincing us through narra­
tion of inner thought that Criseyde's love for Troilus was not a "sodeyn 
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love" (2. 667), as opposed later to Diomede's (5. 1024). In fact, in 
Criseyde's case, action seems to function as a revelation of character, 
rather than the other way around. 
The first thing we learn of Criseyde, even before we meet Troilus, 
is that she takes personally her father's treason—she was "in gret 
penaunce" (1 . 94). Her first conclusion about her father's action re­
veals immediately the intense ambivalence that motivates her character 
throughout: She "nyste what was best to rede" (1. 96). The first look 
she casts at Troilus in the temple, which causes him to be struck down 
by Love's arrow, reveals the psychological complexity with which 
Chaucer imbues her from the beginning: 
To Troilus right wonder wel with alle

Gan for to like hire mevynge and hire chere,

Which somdel deignous was, for she let falle

Hir look a lite aside in swich manere,

Ascaunces, "What! may I nat stonden here?"

And after that hir lokynge gan she lighte.

[1. 288-93] 
Although Criseyde's look is "somdel deignous," it is caused by the way 
she drops her eyes and from the corner of them seems to ask an 
ambiguous question. Is the question a challenge, or is it a fearful 
response to her sense that as the daughter of Calchas she might be out of 
place in the temple and its society? Finally, the lightening of her look 
dissolves the tension of what the side-glance suggests and appears 
flirtatious, as if to undo both the challenge and the fear. This response 
to a situation reveals a woman who is both proud and afraid, who is 
uncomfortable in a situation and who handles the situation with a look 
that defends her in her discomfort, yet conceals the discomfort in a 
stereotypically feminine way. The look is above all one of a woman 
who is insecure. All subsequent action that Criseyde performs or to 
which she allows herself to be subject may be explained by what can be 
interpreted from this look, although the gullible narrator and the many 
male critics who follow the narrator in their affection for her fail to 
recognize in their responses their own susceptibilities to an insecure 
woman in a difficult plight. This is not to say that critics should not be 
interested in Criseyde. Chaucer was himself so interested in the com­
plexities of her psychology and their relation to her actions that he 
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considerably altered Boccaccio's less complex Criseida by psychologiz­
ing the actions of his heroine. Whereas her actions cannot be defended 
morally, they are psychologically explicable, and the narrator's interest 
in the psychological explanation of her character continually preempts 
his interest in, and evaluation of, her actions. 
Pandarus is the final example in Troilus of Chaucer's intense interest 
in character. Boccaccio's Pandare is a young contemporary of Troilo. 
His role in the plot is significant, as the role of the go-between in any 
romance would be. He functions, for example, as "Ami" in Le Roman 
de la Rose or as Lunete in Chretien de Troyes' Yvain. But in Troilus, 
Chaucer has transformed and individuated the type. He has extended 
Pandarus's role beyond the requirements of the plot. Pandarus is de­
veloped as a character not unlike the persona of Chaucer we have 
known in the earlier dream visions and not even unlike the character of 
Chaucer the narrator. His guileless proverbial nature is totally win­
ning, and his role may be extensive precisely because of Chaucer the 
poet's continuing interest in the literary representation of himself as a 
character. 
When we first encounter Pandarus in book one, we get a sense that 
he is selflessly motivated to do anything that would alleviate his friend's 
suffering.22 In fact, there is no reason to suspect that he will be 
anything but typical in a courtly love story. But as the narrative pro­
gresses, we notice that Pandarus's involvement with the lovers is ex­
traordinarily manipulative, as if his own disappointed amorousness, 
discussed at the beginning of book two, can receive voyeuristic satisfac­
tion in bringing his friend and his niece together. The comic mileage 
Chaucer gets from Pandarus's control of the situation that precipitates 
the night of love in book three causes us to forget that here is a lovable 
busybody who may somehow be finding his own gratification in being 
close to and, perhaps, overseeing the sexual consummation of the 
relationship. His maturity, moreover, makes it plausible that he is 
conscious enough of his own motives to offer the long disavowal in 
book three (238-343), the so-called "baud" speech, in which he ex­
plains his distaste for his role and discredits the baser motives that may 
have created it. 
This interest in character over plot in Troilus is not peculiar to 
Chaucer. Courtly romances provided the dream vision writers of the 
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thirteenth century with a model for their own interest in character, and 
Chaucer's dream visions followed the model of his predecessors by 
emphasizing the kind of interiority congenial to a work concentrating 
on character. In fact, the romance as a narrative genre may be dis­
tinguished from other contemporary narrative genres, like the chansons 
de geste, precisely because of its interest in character. Thus, by Chau­
cer's time, the priority of character—plausible if conventional 
character—over plot—plausible and consequential action—had been 
developing for centuries. What is peculiar to Troilus is the way in 
which Chaucer's interest in character led him to develop a narrator of 
finite consciousness and strong desires, who does not feel free to report 
events according to his own wishes but who claims to be tied to a given 
history. Throughout Troilus the narrator as a character plays off his 
own opinions and desires against the givens of Lollius's story, manip­
ulating our responses as he sees fit, yet remaining true to the facts of the 
history as Lollius said they occurred. The result is a poem whose form 
contains a tension between a narrator's consciousness of what he wants 
and the facts he is required to report. It is a tension between objective 
fact and subjective desire that is never resolved, although it is rendered 
irrelevant by the narrator's final turn away from the matter entirely to 
embrace at the end of his work the tranquility of religious truth. 
This tension has been so frequently remarked that it needs no 
reiteration here, except to claim that because of it the poem is never felt 
as a conclusive form.23 We can understand better the sense of in­
conclusiveness that the tension creates by examining elements of the 
poems superstructure, the beginnings and ends of the books that call 
attention to the narrator's manipulation of distance. For example, the 
narrator brings book two to an end at a point in the action that might 
otherwise appear inappropriate. Book one had ended with the narrator 
claiming he was going to "stynte of Troilus a stounde" (1086), after 
having brought us through the hero's first serious bout with despair. 
Book two begins, after its proem, with a signification of time in May 
and with Pandarus bent on making Criseyde aware of Troilus' love for 
her. The changes of time, scene, and concern seem appropriate for the 
beginning of a new section. The book concludes with the anxious 
expectation of a first confrontation between Troilus and Criseyde. It 
leaves the hero in a "kankedort" (1752). It may be argued, of course, 
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that this is a good point to end a book, for the felt tension of the hero 
might make us curious to continue. But since Criseyde has already 
made clear to Pandarus that she would meet Troilus, although she has 
not made clear how much she would commit herself to him, the tension 
we perceive in the form at the end of book two is misleading. It is 
Troilus's tension, not ours. Besides, the book ends right in the middle 
of the scene at Deiphebus's house, and when the action gets under way 
again after the proem to book three, the scene at Deiphebus's house 
continues to its natural end. The unity of action and place that authors 
who compose in chapters or books commonly respect here is violated. 
The reason for the violation, of course, is clear. This is not the point 
where Troilus's fortunes change, for they began to change in book two; 
nor is this the point in the narrative where Troilus and Criseyde realize 
their love for each other, for that too has occurred previously. Book 
two ends and book three begins at this point in the plot because it is the 
place where the hero and heroine actually meet each other face to face 
for the first time. The need to begin a book at the point in the narrative 
where the lovers meet may explain why Chaucer has split the scene in 
two. But the split also has the tangential effect of beginning the action 
of book three in the middle of things, making the consummation of the 
love between Troilus and Criseyde—the central concern of book three 
and the only emotional gratification of the entire poem—appear the 
most epic fact of the poem. This structure also allows the narrator to 
write in his proem stanzas dedicated to Venus and to the praise of love 
and its law, subjects appropriate to the events that are about to occur in 
book three; yet the interruption of the consecutive action of the scene 
also enables Chaucer to emphasize the narrator's presence at a place 
where, it could be argued, we need him least, a place where the action 
has built to a pitch of excitement capable of propelling itself to its 
natural end without the narrator's formal interruption. 
Oppositely, but ultimately to the same effect, book four ends 
abruptly on perhaps the most seriously desperate note in the poem: 
For mannes hed ymagynen ne kan,

N'entendement considere, ne tonge telle

The cruele peynes of this sorwful man,

That passen every torment down in helle.

For whan he saugh that she ne myghte dwelle,
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Which that his soule out of his herte rente, 
Withouten more, out of the chaumbre he wente. 
[1695-1701] 
The stanza offers us a hyperbolic analogy for Troilus's pain with which 
the narrator bows out; then with spare, unadorned language, it sug­
gests Troilus's desperation, the finality with which he accepts his in­
ability to change her mind. Book five begins abruptly without the 
introduction of a proem or the emotional mediation that it can offer: 
Aprochen gan the fatal destyne 
That Joves hath in disposicioun, 
And to yow, angry Parcas, sustren thre, 
Committeth, to don execucioun; 
For which Criseyde moste out of the town, 
And Troilus shal dwellen forth in pyne 
Til Lachesis his thred no lenger twyne. 
[1-7] 
One more stanza records the length of time that the affair has contin­
ued, then, without further ado, turns to Diomede, who is waiting to 
retrieve Criseyde. This is the point in the story where the audience 
most needs the narrator to help. Instead, he keeps himself as much out 
of the opening of the book as he can and consequently forces us more 
closely than before into the fiction and the pain that it is describing. It 
may be that Chaucer did not compose a proem for book five because he 
saw the end of the book as the most appropriate place to present his 
narrator's formal observations. But the effect of no formal proem is 
almost devastating on the reader who, without a mediator, is forced to 
identify with the lover's pain more intensely. Arguments have been 
advanced that in an earlier version of Troilus books four and five were 
one book that Chaucer separated into two when he revised the poem.24 
But insofar as we accept the version of the poem Chaucer left us as 
complete, whether or not it was ever revised, we must accept Chaucer's 
failure to provide the narrator's accustomed proem as intentional, pur­
posely breaching the narrative distance that the former proems of 
former books maintained. Moreover, since Chaucer must have known 
that book five required a proem for the consistency of its structure and 
that his audience would have been conditioned to expect it there, after 
he had provided proems for the other books, I can only conclude that 
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its absence functions slyly to disappoint us of our expectation of finding 
a narrator, making us thereby consider his absence, even while the 
absence forces us to identify more intensely with Troilus's pain. 
The narrator's involvements, or lack of them, with the formal struc­
ture of his poem are akin to the sliding distance that the narrator's 
involvement with his characters and plot created, and they contribute 
to the sense of tension that is felt in the poem's total form. The tension 
occurs precisely because of the narrator's control of our responses to the 
text he is presenting. On the one hand, he causes us to feel aloof from 
the narrative by warning us of its sad end, by presenting his own 
philosophical observations about the nature of fortune and of love, and 
by forcing us to be involved with his sentiments as well as with him as a 
fact in the poem. On the other hand, he can beguile us so profoundly 
by the fictive magic of both his text and his rhetoric that by the end we 
recognize that our responses have been completely in his control. The 
narrator has become the first principle of the poem; his consciousness, 
now intensely pained, now involved, now sympathetic, now moralistic, 
has challenged the power of the story itself to offer us both "sentence" 
and "solaas." When the narrator is ambivalent about the values of the 
actions and of the forces within the world of his poem, we feel ambiva­
lently about them; when he falls in love, so to speak, with the heroine 
of his own making, so do we; when he grows impatient with Troilus's 
love-pains and creates humor from them in book one, we grow im­
patient yet smile; when he sees humor in Troilus's clumsy initiation to 
love-making in book three, so do we; when he suffers with Troilus in 
books four and five, excuses or criticizes Criseyde, or feels distaste for 
Diomede's oily experienced art, so do we. So much are our responses in 
the narrator's control, so much has his presence enthralled us in the 
historical world of his making, that we rarely question his motives. 
The narrator's complex involvement, then, greatly contributes to 
our sense of the poem's inconclusiveness, for the tension that he creates 
in the form is rarely resolved. Rather, it creates in turn a sense of 
disjunction between the otherwise conclusive storial materials and the 
narrative consciousness who, though committed to rendering the facts 
accurately, repeatedly struggles to ameliorate the moral conclusions 
that the historical materials require us to draw.25 No reader of Chau­
cer's final treatment of Criseyde in book five can avoid the sense of 
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moral inconclusiveness that the narrator creates as he both faces the 
facts of his herioine's actions yet tries nonetheless to understand, to 
mitigate, even to overlook if possible what she has done. The narrator's 
refusal to draw moral conclusions about Criseyde—"men seyn—I not" 
(5. 1050)—prepares us for a similar treatment of the hero and of the 
world of the story as we approach the end of the poem. However, the 
ending that the narrator offers at that time so strongly contradicts both 
his sympathetic treatment of his heroine and his sympathetic presenta­
tion of the world in which his lovers lived that the ending of Troilus 
comes as a surprise whose effect is not to conclude but to reinforce, 
even to extend, our sense of the inconclusiveness of meaning in the 
poem.26 It is with the ending of Troilus, and with its effects, therefore, 
that I shall be concerned for the remainder of this chapter. 
I l l 
There are actually two endings to Troilus, a situation that must 
inevitably affect the conclusiveness of any poem's form. The first 
ending (5. 1765—98) brings the plot of Troilus's love to its close. It 
offers a moralitas about the proper decorum of lovers, names the 
poem's genre as a tragedy, and subjects the work to the evaluation of 
the epic poets, hence to epic tradition. This ending is conclusive, for its 
morality grows directly out of the poem's action; its envoy and dedica­
tion are completely in keeping with the expectations for the genre that 
the poem has manifested from its first lines. However, the second 
ending (5. 1799-1869), sometimes called the epilogue, undercuts the 
sense of conclusiveness we feel from the first. It extends the plot 
through the death and apotheosis of the hero; it Christianizes the 
moralitas of the first ending by urging young lovers—"he or she" 
(1835)—to love God before all else; it condemns the activities of the 
plot and the aspirations of even the most noble characters within it; it 
even questions the value of "olde clerkis speche / in poetrie" (1854— 
55) and rededicates the book to the guardianship of a contemporary 
philosopher and a contemporary moral poet; finally it concludes with a 
prayer. Needless to say, this double ending creates a peculiar disjunc­
tion in the work's form, for its meaning seems to be contradictory. In 
the context of the rest of the poem, the second ending abruptly opposes 
the values for which the poem has stood and makes all the sorrow and 
suffering within it appear both unnecessary and, finally, "untragic." 
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Although Chaucer does not name the genre of his poem until he 
reaches the first ending, it is clear from the first lines that the work is a 
tragedy. Following Aristotle, we think of tragedy as a mimetic form 
whose plot describes an action, the movement of a hero toward his 
inexorable destiny, over the course of which he (and the audience) 
realizes certain truths about justice, human limitation, fallibility, 
power. D. W. Robertson has argued that Chaucer meant something 
different by tragedy than we do because he was using not a Greek but a 
Boethian model of both human fallibility and cosmic providence.27 
Whatever differences exist between Chaucer's understanding of for­
tune in a Christian universe and our sense of the Greek concept of fate, 
Chaucer's practice in Troilus, and the definitions of tragedy we find in 
the Monk's Tale, show that he was aware of at least two essential 
qualities inherent in the tragic genre: the sad or disastrous ending, and 
the suggestion through its form of the limits of human power in a 
universe greater than human consciousness can reasonably apprehend. 
What is missing from Chaucer's tragic form is the positive sense of the 
value of human action that Sophocles before him or Shakespeare after 
him maintained. Nowhere does Chaucer construct a tragic form whose 
darkness grows light by the sense of human dignity that an Oedipus 
can realize by putting out his eyes or a Hamlet can retrieve by his 
death. The plot of Troilus, like the plots of the stories in the Monk's 
Tale, reaches its end in the falling off of man's power at the hands of 
Fortune. It ends on a pessimistic note of the betrayal of love and the 
disabuse of an idealistic lover whose mistress has followed the most 
practical, most opportunistic, course. The world of Chaucer's tragedy 
is thus bleaker than most other tragedies we know. Ironically, however, 
the pessimism of the tragic form of Troilus occurs because of Chaucer's 
paradoxical treatment of love, whose carnal and spiritual sides he never 
distinguishes in the plot, but whose carnal side he condemns at the end. 
By means of his narrator and his characters, Chaucer analyzes the 
nature of love, which he presents both as necessary to the human 
condition and as the highest good for which man can strive. Early in 
book one, the narrator offers us a striking simile to describe the neces­
sitarian nature of love: 
As proude Bayard gynneth for to skippe 
Out of the weye, so pryketh hym his corn, 
Til he a lasshe have of the long whippe; 
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Than thynketh he, "Though I praunce al byforn

First in the trays, ful fat and newe shorn,

Yet am I but an hors, and horses lawe

I moot endure, and with my feres drawe";

So ferde it by this fierse and proude knyght: 
Though he a worthy kynges sone were, 
And wende nothing hadde had swich myght 
Ayeyns his wille that shuld his herte stere, 
Yet with a look his herte wax a-fere, 
That he that now was moost in pride above, 
Was sodeynly moost subgit unto love. 
[218-31] 
The didactic amplification surrounding this simile asserts what the 
image describes, that love is a condition from which man is not free— 
"for kaught is proud, and kaught is debonaire" (214)—that all men 
must love: 
For evere it was, and evere it shall byfalle, 
That Love is he that alle thing may bynde, 
For may no man fordon the lawe of kynde. 
[236-38]28 
In the proem to book three and in Troilus's praise of love later in that 
book (1254-74), Chaucer speaks of this necessary condition as the 
highest good of man's aspirations, the goal to which all nature tends. 
Never, however, does he distinguish fleshly and spiritual love. Rather, 
he represents love as a general principle that motivates all action within 
the poem, as it does within nature. It motivates the narrator to tell his 
story in the first place; it motivates Troilus both to suffer and to try to 
win Criseyde; it motivates Criseyde both mysteriously—"who yaf me 
drynke" (2. 651)—and pragmatically in her choice first of Troilus and 
then of Diomede; it also motivates Pandarus to bring together the two 
lovers, to support their relationship, and to support Troilus after 
Criseyde departs for the Greek camp. Ironically, and to the ultimate 
dissolution of the relationship, love even motivates Calchas to seek his 
daughter from Troy in exchange for Antenor. 
The tragedy of Troilus is thus a tragedy of earthly love, which the 
narrator repeatedly asserts is both necessary and good, but which the 
action of the last two books reveals to be merely necessary. From the 
"OfStorial Thing" 79 
beginning the narrator, Troilus, and Criseyde alternately consider the 
value of earthly love with respect to necessity. When in book four 
necessity begins to work against the lovers, Troilus seeks to resolve his 
practical problems by philosophy.29 In Jove's Temple he tries to reason 
himself out of necessity toward a sense of possible freedom for his 
actions, but a lover and not a theologian, he encounters only frustra­
tion. Like the Nun's Priest who cannot "bulte it to the bren" (7. 
3240), Troilus can only bring himself to a notion of conditional neces­
sity, the limited end that even Boethius could not transcend without 
metaphysical help from Lady Philosophy. Consequently, he abandons 
his will and depends with implicit faith on Jove's benignity. But the 
Jove to whom Troilus prays, in whose temple he tries to reason, not 
only remains silent as the denouement of the plot occurs but holds "in 
disposicioun" the "fatal destyne" (5. 1-2) of the poem's protagonists. 
Critics as different as Robertson and Bloomfield have argued that by 
this dark philosophical turn Chaucer intended to show both the failure 
of human ability to reason oneself to answers about the nature of man's 
free will and the uselessness of the pagan gods whom the narrator 
condemns in his religious ending to the poem. They feel similarly that 
as a Christian, with full knowledge of salvation, and as a didactic poet, 
expected to exemplify for his audience the failure of even the most 
virtuous of pagans, Chaucer intended from the beginning the Chris­
tian ending for the tragic form of his poem.30 Yet, if we consider the 
Knight's Tale, which Chaucer was composing at about the same time, 
we can see that his Christianity was not necessarily the cause for the 
tragic form of Troilus. The conception of the genre in which he was 
writing may equally well account for it. 
The Knight's Tale is similar to Troilus in its mixture of seriousness 
and humor and in its ironic technique to accommodate the disjunction 
of values in its form. It differs, however, from Troilus by virtue of its 
being, finally, a comedy, cautiously optimistic about man's power to 
figure out, and in some ways to control, his own destiny. Despite its 
sad and tragic moments, the tale ends happily, and without the need to 
transcend its pagan setting. One of the ways in which Chaucer averts 
the tragic implications of the Knight's Tale is by refusing to render 
from his source, Boccaccio's Teseida, Arcita's spiritual flight. Thus he 
avoids making his audience consider from the perspective of eternity 
8 0 Virtue of Necessity 
the pettiness or uselessness of human action even in the face of the third 
book's suggestion of the planet-god's involvement in human affairs. By 
not using Arcita's flight, Chaucer makes it necessary for a character 
like Theseus to reason his own way to the meaning of the mysterious 
accidents that a universe greater than man has imposed upon human 
will and action. 
When Arcite dies in the Knight's Tale, the Knight-narrator disclaims 
knowing the place to which his character's soul has gone. He says he is 
"no divinistre" (1. 2811). Answers to the important questions that 
Arcite asks before he dies—"What is this world? What asketh men to 
have?" (1. 2777)—must be left to the human characters in the story to 
figure out. Egeus offers a pessimistic, though reality-oriented, 
apothegm about the limits of life: 
This world nys but a thurghfare ful of wo, 
And we been pilgrymes, passynge to an fro. 
Deeth is an ende of every worldly soore." 
[1. 2847-49] 
Somehow these truisms gladden Theseus for a while so that, according 
to human custom, he can have Arcite buried in a traditionally heroic 
way. At Egeus's suggestion, Theseus has been forced to consider the 
ultimate necessity of all human beings, namely, that death may not be 
avoided. By the time the poem reaches its conclusion in the "Chain of 
Love" speech, however, we find that Theseus has made a virtue of the 
necessity of death by reasoning his way for his subjects and for us to the 
idea of continuation through succession. The poem thus becomes tenta­
tively optimistic, for Theseus can suggest how man may soften the pain 
of mortality and answer Arcite's valedictory questions. 
Although it is ironic in connection with Troilus, what men ask to 
have of the world in the Knight's Tale is love, which binds together 
nature and supernature in a chain and enables man to have power over 
mortality by means of succession. The Knight's Tale ends, as all comedy 
ends, with the universe perceived in a balanced order and with a 
marriage supposedly ensuring succession. A philosophical attitude, not 
a religious faith, has averted the pessimistic view of life implicit in 
Arcite's death and in Egeus's response to it. The heavenly perspective 
that Arcite's spirit supplies in the Teseida is not needed for the Knight's 
"OfStorial Thing" 81 
Tale because man has reasoned his way to a solution, and, as Theseus' 
last speech indicates, can even test his philosophical conclusions empir­
ically by observing material phenomena and human institutions like 
stones, trees, rivers, and civilizations (1. 3016—26). By the end of the 
Knight's Tale, Chaucer has brought us to recognize not only the limits 
of man's power and the failure of human agency in a world of fortune, 
as Troilus posits, but he has shown us as well the extent of man's power 
and his ability to discover it. 
Unlike the Knight's Tale, Troilus from the first is without any opti­
mism that might mitigate the bleak universe inherent in its tragic 
vision. Despite all the praise for the power and value of love in the 
poem, love actually works to devastating effect. No appropriate solu­
tion is available to any of the characters of the plot, not even to the 
narrator outside the plot, except the death of the hero and the defama­
tion of the heroine. The tragic form of the poem shows how historical 
events necessarily dominate the human spirit and how human beings 
are impotent to act with lasting efficacy. 
In light of both the tragic form of Troilus and the irony that imposes 
the consequences of historical events on human desires, what I have 
called the first ending of the poem seems too trivial, insufficient to the 
task of the ending. To be sure, Boccaccio's Filostrato had concluded 
with an admonition to men not to get involved with such sensual and 
fickle women as Criseida, and Chaucer's first ending, urging "every 
lady bright of hewe / and every gentil woman" (5. 1772-73), not to be 
like Criseyde, represents a similar moral conclusion. But the world of 
Troilus is too complicated, too charged with ambiguous philosophical 
and complex psychological issues, never implied by Boccaccio's ver­
sion, to allow a comment about the decorum of lovers to suffice for a 
conclusion. We may assume that Chaucer understood this and found in 
Arcite's flight above the earth, and in the changed perspective on 
earthly activity that the Teseida provided, a more appropriate way to 
end his poem satisfactorily. But just as the first ending of Troilus seems 
insufficient to the complex meaning of the poem, so his second ending 
seems oversufficient, for it actually denies tragedy as a necessary condi­
tion and makes all the talk in the poem about necessity in love, in will, 
in history, seem unimportant in a way it had not seemed until that 
point. 
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Despite all the pain and disappointment that Fortune and Criseyde's 
actions have caused, Chaucer has made Troilus so clearly a poem in 
praise of the wondrous vicissitudes of earthly love that when the nar­
rator turns, after the envoy in which he calls his poem a tragedy, to 
deny the value of love, many readers feel uneasy, if not embarrassed, 
about their own previous involvement with the lovers and their 
plight.31 From the vantage point of the eighth sphere, the sublunary 
world must truly appear no greater than a mustard seed. The timeless­
ness of eternity, to which we are exhorted to repair at the end, makes 
the cell of earth and the behavior of its inhabitants appear as busy as an 
anthill. Yet, just as an ant's-eye view of his own world would un­
doubtedly see order and meaning in the activity, so we have seen order 
and meaning in the world of human action, in its wars, its wooing, its 
religious observances, albeit pagan, and in its parties and politics. 
Although the narrator has warned us throughout the poem that the 
story would end wretchedly, the plot has continually beguiled us away 
from those warnings. The narrator, moreover, has encouraged our 
interest in the hopes and fears of his characters and has continually 
caused us to take seriously both the power and the weakness of the 
human condition. Ours is not the first age to recognize Troilus as an 
important and meaningful statement about the relationship between 
necessity and human aspirations before the age of grace. But in our 
day, we need exegetes like Robertson to remind us that the Christian 
message implicit throughout the poem is related to contemptus mundi, 
for Chaucer the narrator refuses to remind us. 
Because the narrator refuses to remind us of this message, although 
he warns us of the sad end of the story, the standard Christian moralitas 
that readers of medieval literature expect as a matter of course and that 
the narrator finally provides at the end does not feel appropriate, not at 
least in the intensity with which he admonishes us with it. Not only 
does he have the spirit of the dead hero "lough" at the weeping mourn­
ers and damn "al oure werk that foloweth so / the blynde lust, the 
which that may not laste" (1823-24); he addresses us in formal ex­
emplary rhetoric about the ultimate worthlessness of the values that his 
poem has incorporated: 
Swich fyn hath, lo, this Troilus for love! 
Swich fyn hath al his grete worthynesse! 
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Swich fyn hath his estat real above, 
Swich fyn his lust, swich fyn hath his noblesse! 
Swich fyn hath false worldes brotelnesse! 
[1828-32] 
And again three stanzas later: 
Lo here, of payens corsed olde rites, 
Lo here, what alle hire goddes may availle; 
Lo here, thise wrecched worldes appetites; 
Lo here, the fyn and guerdoun for travaille 
Of Jove, Appollo, of Mars, of swich rascaille! 
[1849-53] 
He even rejects the value of his own endeavors as a scholar and poet 
whose literary career has been spent in reading the poetry of others. 
Lo here, the forme of olde clerkis speche 
In poetrie, if ye hire bokes seche. 
[1854-55] 
The intensity and extent of these condemnations make us feel that the 
narrator might be overreacting, the consequence of which, in this case, 
is to overconclude. 
It is a commonplace of psychology that overreactions are im­
moderate responses to a situation, motivated by a feeling of the in­
sufficiency of a more measured response. The second ending of Troilus 
appears to be such an overreaction, motivated by a sense of the in­
sufficiency of the first ending to the demands of the work. As a result, 
it is an overconclusion that not only overwhelms the moral implications 
of the first ending but undercuts as well our sense of the poem's genre. 
I do not believe that the second ending may be read merely as an aspect 
of what C. S. Lewis has called Chaucer's practice of "medievalizing" 
Boccaccio's Renaissance work by opening out his story didactically to 
the topic of salvation, the ultimate Christian purpose of all literature.32 
Rather, the ending denies the magnificent tragic meaning about the 
ultimate pain of the human condition—a central concern of all 
tragedy—whose conclusions were clear from the poem's first lines. 
With this second ending, Chaucer is implying the critical notion, often 
held since his time, that tragedy cannot truly exist in a Christian 
universe. The shift in perspective away from a concern with earth and 
its affairs, which constitutes the second ending of Troilus, creates an 
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inconclusiveness in the poem's form. The overreactive last stanzas of 
heavy moral rhetoric function as a structural correlative to Chaucer's 
ironic technique throughout the narrative, working as the narrator's 
involvement with his materials has been working. 
In Troths Chaucer has presented us with a form of fiction in which 
the content is mediated through a persona with an individuated psy­
chology. Although this kind of persona-mediated fiction is intrinsic to 
the dream vision form, in Troilus it manifests itself differently because 
of the storial nature of the material to which the narrator commits 
himself. We can see in the procedure a clear anticipation of Chaucer's 
procedure in the more complex form of the Canterbury Tales, where a 
narrator will tell a storial narrative completely in the control of his or 
her own narrative consciousness. There are great differences between 
the two forms, in part because the narrator of Troilus claims to be the 
author himself at work on a text, whereas the narrators of the Canter­
bury Tales are not. But the devices of composition in Troilus, like the 
proems, work like a frame and a framed matter and control the felt 
distance between the audience and the text. Chaucer will use this device 
again and again in his last work. Having developed himself as a 
character in his earlier poems, Chaucer now in Troilus develops his 
power as a poet who can determine and control a storial narrative 
through that same fictional consciousness. For this reason, perhaps, 
Troilus has been called the first modern novel, if by novel we mean a 
fiction determined and controlled by a narrator created separate 
(though not necessarily different) from the author. The inconclusive­
ness of such a literary form resides in the narrator's individual psychol­
ogy combined with his total control of his materials, which make the 
view of things he represents necessarily partial. 
The Legend of Good Women, which depends on Troilus for its mo­
tive, and which Chaucer presumably was writing during the time 
when he was composing the earlier part of the Canterbury Tales, con­
tinues to develop the persona of Geffrey in the dream vision part and 
the narrator Chaucer in the storial part. It is at once a dream vision and 
a set of storial narratives, using the technique of mediating a narrative 
through a narrator's psychology. As I shall show in the next chapter, 
the poem is unsuccessful not only because it is incomplete and desultory 
but because, curiously, it is Chaucer's only major work whose form is 
not inconclusive. 
V. "Redy to Wenden": The Legend of Good Women 
and the Outer Form of the Canterbury Tales 
Though incomplete, the Legend of Good Women re­
solves the problems it raises. It is a conclusive narrative 
form. Its conclusiveness may be one reason why it has 
generally been considered one of Chaucer's least suc­
cessful works. Once the storial part of the poem gets 
under way, readers either lose interest in its content or 
grow impatient with its execution. ' Yet the form of the Legend of Good 
Women is interesting to think about in context of Chaucer's other 
narratives, for it marks a simple development from Chaucer's earlier 
works whose result is complicated and significant.2 The poem com­
bines a dream-vision prologue and a set of storial narratives into one 
composite, consequent structure whose form resembles no earlier work 
by Chaucer, although it is remarkably similar to the more complex 
form of the Canterbury Tales in the way it combines an outer form, or 
frame, with an inner form of stories. In the first part of this chapter, I 
shall disucss.the conclusiveness and composite structure of the Legend of 
Good Women, which functions as a prototype for the outer form of the 
Canterbury Tales. In the second part, I shall turn to the outer form of 
the Canterbury Tales to examine the relationship between the work's 
inconclusiveness and the multi-level complexity of the outer form. 
The plot of the prologue to the Legend of Good Women relates how 
Chaucer has a vision in which the God of Love is angry with him for 
having written of a bad woman in Troths. Queen Alceste, a very good 
woman indeed, intercedes on Chaucer's behalf; she tempers the God of 
Love's rage by ordering the poet to do penance for his poetic sin: 
Thow shalt, while that thou lyvest, yer by yere, 
The moste partye of thy tyme spende 
In makyng of a glorious legende 
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Of goode wymmen, maydenes and wyves, 
That weren trewe in lovyng al hire lyves: 
And telle of false men that hem bytraien, 
That al hir lyf ne do nat but assayen 
How many women they may doon a shame; 
For in youre world that is now holde a game. 
And thogh the lyke nat a lovere bee, 
Speke wel of love; this penance yive I thee. 
[F, 481-91] 
The persona Chaucer undertakes the penance, although the poet 
Chaucer never finishes the work. Yet the form of the poem is conclu­
sive because Chaucer continually writes of good women who "weren 
trewe in lovyng" and of "false men that hem bytraien." He could have 
spent the rest of his life on the project, progressively adding more 
legends of either good women or false men—the list of such classical 
stories seems to be endless. But he could not have made the poem's 
form more conclusive than it already is since the poem's conclusiveness 
resides not in its execution, for which completion would be a necessary 
consideration, but in its plan, which is to reiterate by different ex­
amples a continuously singular theme. 
The single-minded didactic impulse that propels the legends is final­
ly of limited interest, despite certain felicities of style and an occa­
sionally interesting use of rhetorical tropes. The reason, I think, is 
clear from the first legend. Cleopatra is a perverse choice of a good 
woman and might have offered the narrator the chance to characterize 
in smaller form someone potentially as rich as Criseyde. But Chaucer 
avoids or overlooks any details of his heroine's life or behavior that 
might lead him away from his singular narrative purpose of speaking 
well of women who were true in loving and badly of men who were 
not. 
When details periodically stand out in the legends, they seem 
momentarily curious or dissonant to the univocal didactic injunction, 
but the narrator soon makes them relevant to his theme. Instead of 
letting them stand or developing them to some point of ambiguity—a 
method of which Chaucer was fond in his earlier works—the narrator 
directs attention to the moral conclusion that may be drawn from the 
detail. Here, for example, is the suicide of Lucrece: 
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But pryvely she kaughte forth a knyf, 
And therwithal she rafte hirself hir lyf; 
And as she fel adoun, she kaste hir lok, 
And of hir clothes yet she hede tok. 
For in hir fallynge yet she had a care, 
Lest that hir fet or suche thyng lay bare; 
So wel she loved clennesse and eke trouthe. 
[1854-60] 
The point about Lucrece's modesty is striking. When the same detail is 
used in the tragedy of Julius Caesar in the Monk's Tale, it unexpectedly 
complicates our assessment of the emperor's "manhede," which, along 
with "wisedom" and "greet labour," brought him "from humble bed 
to roial magestee" (CT, 7. 2671—72). It also enriches our understand­
ing of the Monk as a character. In this passage, however, the detail 
suggests no ambiguity. Lucrece's sexual modesty is a necessary element 
of a virtuous wife's nature that the narrator uses for the conclusive 
purpose of speaking well of women. 
What is true about details within the stories is also true about the 
total form of each of the legends. Whether a legend is about a question­
ably good woman, like Cleopatra, an unquestionably good woman, like 
Lucrece, a woman like Thisbe, whose virtue has never been a part of 
our interest in her story, or one like Philomela, whose violent revenge, 
though justified, seems irrelevant to the narrator's purpose of writing 
about the good woman as passive victim, there is something about the 
form of each story that remains flat. The reader carries away two 
general senses of the form of the individual legends: first, they are 
shaped as a series of brief—sometimes too brief—descriptive nar­
ratives interspersed with, or followed by, a series of complaints about 
the suffering of betrayed lovers; and second, their totality is one of 
pathos, unabashed, indulgent, and without much of the irony Chaucer 
characteristically uses to contain and control his interest in the pathetic 
elsewhere. Although irony is present in some of the legends, like those 
of Thisbe or of Hypsipyle and Medea, it is an irony available only to 
the learned who study the same stories in other versions.3 Generally 
speaking, we need to know what Chaucer did to Ovid to appreciate the 
irony. It is not readily available in the text itself. Pathos, rather than 
irony, controls affect in the poem, yet the pathos of each story is so 
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much of a piece that the general sense of the nine legends taken together 
is curiously similar to the sense one gets from other penances, like a set 
of Hail Marys or Our Fathers that a sinner repeats in order to atone 
for his sin. Although the repeated prayer may cleanse chanters or help 
them transcend their state, it mesmerizes others who hear it but who 
are not caught in the same state of feeling. 
I do not know what event at court caused Chaucer to write the Legend 
of Good Women as a penance and to select the format that requires a 
series of brief stories with the same intention and in the same pathetic 
mode. John Fisher suggests that both the Confessio Amantis and the 
Legend of Good Women "appear to stem from the same royal com­
mand."4 Since we have no biographical data to confirm the specula­
tion, it seems as fruitful to ask what this list of stories, similarly 
narrated, suggests about Chaucer's literary consciousness. 
Robert Worth Frank has argued that in the Legend of Good Women 
Chaucer was working toward a narrative form concerned with "feel­
ing" and that he was developing "an awareness of the problem of 
'characterization,' " with its emphasis on "role" and a "sense of per­
sonality."5 Frank's argument sustains my own. It is especially impor­
tant to consider that role and a sense of personality give the form of the 
Canterbury Tales its most intense dramatic quality. Yet, in his attempt 
to give more dignity to the legends by showing them to be intrinsically 
interesting, and by arguing that Chaucer did not abandon them because 
he was bored by them, Frank overlooks both the truly monotonous 
effect of the legends taken together and the significance of the 
monotony.6 
The nine narratives comprise a series of stories reiterating a common 
theme and a common mood. Taken as a whole, they constitute a single 
structure, a tale, as the Monk's series of tragedies constitute a tale, 
which the persona tells for a certain purpose.7 As a single tale, this 
series is unrelentingly tedious. Chaucer is never so consistently and 
extensively tedious elsewhere, unless he intends to be, as in the Monk's 
Tale, or in the Melibee where the pilgrim Chaucer, interrupted from 
telling his tale of Sir Thopas, responds to criticism of his abilities by 
offering a "litel tretys" that turns out to be an enormously long and 
redundant moral tract. The consistently reiterative structure of the 
storial section of the Legend of Good Women has a mesmerizing effect, 
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as if the poet were doing penance with a vengeance on an audience that 
may have required him to undertake the project in the first place. If it 
is true that the effect of the storial portion of the Legend of Good Women 
is intentional, then we need to look at the prologue to the poem, and at 
the persona in the prologue, to see how and why Chaucer develops the 
familiar figure of himself as persona into a fictional character moti­
vated to produce the effect. Once we have examined this development 
in the presentation of the persona, we shall be able to examine the entire 
composite structure of the Legend of Good Women to see how the form 
of the poem functions as a prototype for the form of the Canterbury 
Tales} 
The persona of the prologue is a man familiar to readers of Chau­
cer's earlier dream visions, except that he is neither hysterical, as in the 
House of Fame, nor afraid of his own skepticism, as in the Parliament of 
Fowls. Otherwise he is quite recongizable. He is a poet, he likes 
books, except in May when he likes flowers, especially the daisy. He is 
skeptical, in this case about the afterlife; but since no one has ever 
returned to talk about the afterlife, he believes that we must believe in 
things that cannot be proved by sense experience. He is, thus, still the 
man with abiding interest in what Payne has called the theme of "the 
nature and functions of art and the justification of the artist."9 The first 
forty lines of the prologue in both versions raise the issue of the 
limitation of human knowledge and the need to believe opinions from 
books of the past about facts that an individual cannot himself verify 
firsthand; they also urge us to honor these books "there we han noon 
other preve" (F, 28). In the earlier dream visions, the persona was 
frightened by his inability to understand the truth-value of literary 
traditions and frightened even when presented in the dream with first­
hand experience. In this poem the persona is committed to believing 
authoritative opinion even without personal experience—"Bernard the 
monk ne saugh nat all, pardee!" (F, 16). He is willing to have "feyth 
and ful credence" (F, 31) in books and in authority. 
The persona has a vision in which the God of Love accuses him of 
having sinned against love. Despite his protestations of innocence and 
no indication that he ever feels any contrition for what he has done (F, 
462-74), he undertakes a penance to please Alceste and to pacify the 
wrath of the God of Love. The penance, of course, is the series of 
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legends of good women; but because the persona feels no remorse—in 
fact, because he feels that he is innocent—the undertaking is without 
the energy that derives from the contrite and without the interest that 
motivated him elsewhere. The voice of the narrator of these legends, 
then, must not be heard as the voice of Chaucer the persona familiar to 
us from Chaucer's other poems. Rather, in the prologue the familiar 
Chaucerian persona develops into a yet more complicated fictional 
character because he agrees to take an identity not consistent with his 
own sense of himself. More significantly, he agrees to project this 
identity through the stories he tells.10 
The F prologue makes little explicit connection between the theme 
of belief and the charges of betrayal. The persona raises the issue of 
belief again (F, 97-102) and claims that he will explain what he means 
at the appropriate moment—"whanne that I see my tyme" (F, 101). 
But it is forgotten as the plot moves on to the adoration of the daisy and 
then to the vision of the God of Love and of Alceste. The G prologue, 
however, corrects and clarifies somewhat why the persona begins his 
poem about a vision with the trope of belief in things not seen with the 
eye. In it the persona tells us: 
But wherfore that I spak, to yeve credence 
To bokes olde and don hem reverence, 
Is for men shulde autoritees beleve, 
There as there lyth non other assay by preve. 
For myn entent is, or I fro yow fare, 
The naked text in English to declare 
Of many a story, or elles of many a geste, 
As autours seyn; leveth hem if yow leste! 
[G, 81-88] 
Here our interest is directed not to the prologue itself but to the series 
of tales of good women, intended to follow the prologue, that the 
persona will indite from old sources. By the time he revised his pro­
logue, Chaucer must have recognized that the trope of belief was 
significant for the second part of the new form he was creating. 
Moreover, in the G prologue, the poet understood that although he 
chose to believe things the eye could not necessarily see, there might be 
those who would choose not so to believe. Thus he gives his readers the 
freedom to doubt by concluding his remarks with a statement of 
choice—"leveth hem if yow leste!" 
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In the time between the writing of the first prologue and the second, 
Chaucer must have recognized that he was evolving a new form, one 
that he had not developed earlier but that he would continue to develop 
in the form of the Canterbury Tales, a work he may also have been 
beginning at that time. This would be a form containing a dream-
vision of personal experience and a story, or group of stories, rendered 
from "olde bokes." The persona would be characterized by his actions 
and by what others said about him, and the voice of the story, or 
stories, that he rendered would somehow accord with the personality 
that the prologue established. 
The form may be diagrammed abstractly as a bipartite structure 
combined by a linear causality: since A, then B. Part A, the dream-
vision prologue, consists of a plot of fixed dimension whose concern 
motivates part B. Part B, the storial unit, comprises a series of plots, 
discreet unto themselves yet of a theme that can be repeated in­
definitely. Despite the causality between parts A and B, however, the 
form of the work is not organic. Rather it is serial. It can be ex­
perienced partially, either A or B, or parts of B; yet its parts are not 
independent, since all units of the storial part have a first cause, a 
character, voice, or consciousness developed in A and projected 
through B. Moreover, just as any unit of part B takes significance 
from part A in the total form, so part A requires at least some units of 
part B for its own fulfillment. Yet part A puts no limit on how often 
the discreet units of part B may be repeated. In the retraction to the 
Canterbury Tales, Chaucer mentions that the Legend of Good Women had 
stories about twenty-five ladies, suggesting that he had set a limit on 
the number of variations he intended. Our evidence shows that he 
actually stopped before he finished nine legends; but we also know 
from part A of the Legend of Good Women that Alceste wants him to 
continue the undertaking for the rest of his life, an appalling wish. 
Whatever the number, however, the form of the poem is conclusively 
realized as soon as one or two of the units of part B appear. Despite the 
limitless repetitive possibilities of part B, the demands of the form 
have been satisfied as soon as the series is under way. 
The similarity of the form of the Canterbury Tales to this form is 
clear. Like the Legend of Good Women, the form of the Canterbury Tales 
consists of two major structural parts, A and B. The A part, a prologue 
extended into narrative links, motivates and causes B. B is a set of 
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units, tales in different voices, at once discreet, capable of being read 
without their connection to A, yet dependent, motivated by the events 
that transpire in A and enriched in meaning by the characters and by 
some issues encountered there. The A section offers an original plan 
that thirty tellers will tell four tales each, but that original plan is 
altered during the course of the work and is never fully realized. As 
with Legend of Good Women, however, the number of units making up 
the B section of the Canterbury Tales is not as important as the fact of 
the causal relationship between those units and the A section, and the 
perhaps paradoxical quality of independence that each of the units 
manifests. Moreover, although the B section of the form of the Canter­
bury Tales comprises storial narratives, as does the B section of the 
Legend of Good Women, the tales in the earlier poem follow upon each 
other in an unattached serial order, whereas in the Canterbury Tales 
they are significantly attached to the links developed from the A sec­
tion. This attachment alters the nature of their serial quality. 
Donald Howard, after Paul Ruggiers, has conveniently called the 
two major elements of the structure of the Canterbury Tales the inner 
and the outer forms.11 The nature of the relationship between these two 
elements of the form and the inconclusive structuring of the inner form 
will be the subject of the next chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, 
I shall examine how Chaucer developed the outer form of the Canter­
bury Tales, the A section, beyond its model in the Legend of Good 
Women so that it could accommodate the massive amount of storial 
narrative he had planned for it. Then I shall examine how Chaucer 
made what was conclusive in the Legend of Good Women inconclusive in 
the Canterbury Tales, resulting in a large narrative form that could 
suggest a multifaceted, yet valid, sense of subjective experience and 
opinion about the nature of the world. 
II 
J. V. Cunningham has convincingly argued that "the literary form 
to which the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales belongs and of which it is 
a special realization is the form of the dream-vision prologue in the 
tradition of the Romance of the Rose and of those associated French and 
English poems of the subsequent century and a half."12 The form of 
the Prologue is thus the same as the form of the A section of the Legend 
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of Good Women, although the ways in which it is different seem to me 
as significant in accounting for its success as Cunningham's argument 
for the ways in which it is the same. Let us look at some of these 
differences. 
Although the outer form of the Canterbury Tales resembles Chau­
cer's dream visions in its use of recognizable conventions, like the 
journey, it is not a dream vision. The persona never falls asleep, nor 
does he claim to be recording an experience in a dream. Rather, he 
rehearses a waking event, a journey through geographical reality from 
Southwerk to Canterbury. The familiar spring trope that opens the 
prologue does not induce sleep and the loosening of the imagination in 
dreams about love or truth. Rather, the opening lines energize the 
human species to action; they emphasize the copulating of nature's 
elements, the production of the new. The riches of these lines have 
been so frequently mined that we need not examine them here, except 
to point out that like many of Shakespeare's sonnets the grammatical 
structure of the first sentence develops a causal relationship between 
nature's fecund impulses and man's urges to do, to act, to move, and 
not to sleep or wonder. Chaucer connects the "when" of April (1), the 
"when" of Zephirus (5), the assumed "when" of the "yonge sonne" (7), 
and of the birds who "maken melodye" (9), with the "then" of people 
who long "to goon" on pilgrimages, to "seken straunge strondes" (13), 
and to "wende" (16) from all over England, the geographical place, to 
the specific shrine of Canterbury. Like the generalized "folk" (10), 
and the more specific "palmeres" (13), the persona is also in a state of 
energized becoming. He tells us that he "lay" at the Tabard Inn "redy 
to wenden on my pilgrimmage" (20-21). In precisely the place where 
we would expect the sleeping and the dream to occur "at nyght" (23), 
after the "sonne was to reste" (30), the persona sees that he has "time 
and space" (35) to tell us about the people who accompanied him on his 
journey. Chaucer may have discovered from the F version of the 
prologue to the Legend of Good Women that sleeping was not necessary 
for visioning—although changes in the G version suggest that he was 
uncomfortable with the idea. In this form, however, the persona does 
not go to sleep at night; but if sleep and dreams are automatic assump­
tions of this form, then the sleep will be like that of the birds who 
"slepen al the nyght with open ye" (10), for the portraits of characters 
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that follow the opening lines involve details that are quite undreamlike. 
They are filled with actual details of geography, generally of little 
interest to a dream vision, but of considerable interest to the reporter of 
actualities: the Knight's battles in identifiable though outlying regions; 
the Squire's campaigns in the Low Countries; the Prioress's convent at 
Stratford atte Bo we, the Merchant's concern for the ports of Mid­
delburgh and Orewelle, and so on. 
In the outer form of the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer is externalizing 
the usually internalized dream vision. Historical time and space are 
significant. There is evening, a next morning, an identifiable inn in a 
familiar locale with a historically known innkeeper. Later, in the links 
that extend the outer form, there is movement through measureable, 
known, and familiar landscape. The dream-vision conventions have 
been altered to appear actual rather than ideal, journalistic rather than 
imaginative, objective rather than subjective. Absent from the form as 
we have come to know it in Chaucer's earlier works are the expressions 
of anxiety about truth, and about how books, learning, and dream 
experience can show truth. Absent as well are concerns about poetic 
identity and value, the appropriate and best subjects of poetry, and the 
relation between poetry and truth. Present is the desire to have words 
"be cosyn to the dede" (742), record what happened as it happened, 
speak plainly (727), not feign (734—35). In short, the persona is here 
concerned with mimesis, a concept Chaucer probably absorbed from 
the tradition of Plato's Timeus. In the outer form of the Canterbury 
Tales, Chaucer is no longer interested in the relationship of aesthetic or 
poetic questions to truth, certainty, and belief; rather, he is interested 
in how to depict an actuality as it was perceived by the senses and as it is 
now being remembered. 
There is a formal corollary to this new interest in reporting an 
actuality in the past rather than a dream of the imagination. Chaucer 
extends the form of the dream-vision prologue, now perhaps better 
called the recollection, into a series of narrative links that chart the 
journey more or less specifically and relate the events as they developed 
through time. These links frame the storial materials that occupy the 
bulk of the new form, altering the serial nature of the fictions as the B 
part of the Legend of Good Women presents it. The links create a frame 
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structure in which the outer form, reporting historical actuality, sur­
rounds the inner form, narratives expressed by actual, or at least 
stipulated, people. In the Canterbury Tales, storytelling is no longer an 
act of personal commitment to authority for the sake of bringing the 
audience to see the correct moral, as it had been in Troilus; it is neither 
an activity of imaginative experience in dreams, as it had been in the 
dream visions, nor a distasteful penance for a sin not felt as significant, 
as it was in the Legend of Good Women. Surrounded by an actualistic 
frame, storytelling becomes a representation in fictional form of im­
agined attitudes toward the world, meant at once simply to pass time 
and to reveal the natures of an established assortment of people from 
different levels of society. This unique form has the consequence, or 
end, of suggesting that subjective opinion is valid, that many opinions, 
the vicious as well as the virtuous, make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to ascertain with certainty the absolute truth of any matter—as, say, the 
matter of marriage—that certainty is contingent upon possibility. 
Finally, it suggests that reality may be expressed pluralistically. The 
formal corollary to this new kind of fictional structure is that in­
conclusiveness is no longer a problem the form manifests by represent­
ing anxieties about how to ascertain and express truth. Rather, in­
conclusiveness is a manner of representing complexity and multi­
fariousness. Its power is that it does not conclude, draw the line, cease. 
In the form of the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer has made virtue of 
necessity by developing a narrative form congenial to his own interests 
and techniques, yet without the problem to his moral nature that the 
use of first-person subjective form produced and without the peculiar 
kind of tension created in Troilus between what the narrator wanted for 
his fiction and what he had to give it because of authority. Moveover, 
with this form, Chaucer is less likely to be misunderstood and accused, 
as he had been for his writing Troilus. Here, the persona, now char­
acter, is freed from the moral responsibility of his writing: "blameth 
nat me"; "my wit is short"; "he moot reherce as ny as evere he kan"— 
disclaimers abound. Consequently, he can experiment, test, question 
all the themes that had previously interested him. By writing the 
Canterbury Tales, Chaucer discovers a narrative form experimental by 
nature, needing neither completion nor conclusiveness. With this form 
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he can project onto imagined characters, whom he claims to be real, 
imagined opinions expressed through stories that he claims these 
characters told. 
Howard is undoubtedly correct in arguing that, since what we have 
of the Canterbury Tales is all we are ever likely to get, we might as well 
view it as a whole, even in its fragmentary state.13 One assumes that, 
since the work is conceived as a journal of a completed past event, 
Chaucer originally intended to complete it, for he had in mind a 
complete journey. Although that journey ends, finally, in Canterbury 
after most, though not all, of the pilgrims have told one tale, not back 
at Southwerk after each of the pilgrims has told two tales going and two 
returning, the Canterbury Tales is ended. In the prologue to the Par­
son's Tale, we are prepared for an ending; the tale by the Parson is a 
spiritually appropriate meditation on the moral, or immoral, life and 
on salvation; even the imagery of copulation and fructification, in­
troduced in the General Prologue, is reintroduced in the last fragment 
to knit up the matter by suggesting that the true fruit of human desire 
is salvation; finally, the author's leave-taking of his book after the 
Parson's Tale asserts that we have reached the end. Because of these 
indications, the Canterbury Tales may be said to be ended, closed, or 
shut.14 But the middle of the work is open. The order of its parts is by 
no means certain. Nor is the girth of its content. We have no idea how 
many people after the Canon's Yeoman might have or could have 
ridden up; we have no idea whether or not the Plowman, the Guilds­
men, or the Yeoman would have told tales or what the nature of their 
tales would have been. The Canterbury Tales ends because the author 
stopped his writing. But it is neither complete, since it does not fulfill 
either of its stated intentions, nor conclusive, since it nowhere settles 
the issues it raises. 
A narrative form cannot be conclusive that allows for opposing 
claims but refuses to evaluate or judge.15 In the Canterbury Tales each 
character represents in a tale an attitude toward the world. The 
Knight's is noble, the Miller's is not; the Reeve's is vicious, the Frank­
lin's is not. Each attitude expresses an opinion that derives from a 
particular set of values. No opinion is true or untrue; no set of values 
absolute. The Wife of Bath urges experience against authority, the 
Franklin urges "gentillesse"; Chaucer the pilgrim urges prudence, the 
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Manciple urges silence; the Second Nun revokes carnality, the Canon's 
Yeoman revokes alchemy; the Parson revokes the world of both flesh 
and fiction; Chaucer the maker revokes those tales that "sownen into 
synne." But the Canterbury Tales urges all possibilities and revokes 
none. Possibility is the central concern of the entire work and in­
conclusiveness is the means through which the form expresses it. Just 
as the tales about Sir Thopas and by the Monk are purposefully in­
complete, the form of the Canterbury Tales is purposefully in­
conclusive. 
I am interested in two ways that Chaucer makes the outer form of the 
Canterbury Tales inconclusive: his method of making authoritative 
adjudication impossible and his method of creating in the portraits of 
the General Prologue characters of varying, though plausible, attitudes 
whose later tales suggest plausible, though varying, versions of reality. 
The narrator asserts in the General Prologue that he has no intention 
of mediating or of evaluating the actions or the opinions of the people 
he has met: 
Whoso shal telle a tale after a man,

He moot reherce as ny as evere he kan

Everich a word, if it be in his charge,

Al speke he never so rudeliche and large,

Ore ellis he moot telle his tale untrewe,

Or feyne thyng, or fynde wordes newe.

He may nat spare, althogh he were his brother;

He moot as wel seye o word as another.

[731-38] 
The poetic intention of the Canterbury Tales, then, will not be to tell a 
truth in order to create an appropriate moral response; rather it will be 
to tell the truth of an experience exactly as it happened. The narrator's 
responsibility is to "pleynly speke" (727) about what he encountered; it 
is not to judge. 
The narrator is so committed to this journalistic rehearsal of his 
experience that he even refuses to edit or judge remarks or tales by 
characters, such as the Miller, whose concerns might outrage his au­
dience's sense of decorum. Knowing, because he has supposedly ex­
perienced it, that the Miller's Tale might be offensive to some, he 
warns us that we are about to hear an outrageous piece, but he refuses to 
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alter in any way the piece or the manner of its presentation. In the 
prologue to the Miller's Tale, he tells us what his responsibility as a 
reporter entails: 
I moot reherce 
Hir tales alle, be they bettre or werse, 
Or elles falsen som of my mateere. 
And therfore, whoso list it nat yheere, 
Turne over the leef and chese another tale; 
For he shal fynde ynowe, grete and smale, 
Of storial thyng that toucheth gentillesse, 
And eek moralitee and hoolynesse. 
Blameth nat me if that ye chese amys. 
The Millere is a cherl, ye knowe wel this; 
So was the Reve eek and othere mo, 
And harlotrie they tolden bothe two. 
Avyseth yow, and put me out of blame. 
[1. 3173-85] 
These lines repeat the intention to rehearse the entire matter as it 
happened but add that the responsibility for judging lies with us. We 
must know what we are interested in hearing; we must recognize that 
churls tell churlish things; we are free to "chese another tale" if our 
sensibilities are offended; we make the wrong choices. 
As if to confound any attempt we might make to establish an au­
thoritative model of adjudication for the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer 
gives us Harry Bailly as host and self-proclaimed judge on the pil­
grimage. Harry's stated literary standards are Horatian, offering the 
prize to the "tales of best sentence and moost solaas" (798). But since it 
is one major purpose of the Canterbury Tales to raise many philosophi­
cal, generic, social, and psychological issues, it is difficult to imagine 
the Horatian standard as an appropriate measuring stick or to imagine 
Harry objectively measuring with it even if it were. Harry is petty 
bourgeois—"a fairer burgeys is ther noon in Chepe" (754)—whose 
motives for action are always personal and economic. He is a "myrie 
man" (757), but he does not begin to "pleyen" (758) with the pilgrims 
until after "we hadde maad oure rekenynges" (760). He decides to 
accompany the pilgrims because he wants them to return to the Tabard 
Inn after their journey and because, we learn in later links, an absence 
from his wife Goodelief would come as a welcome vacation in the name 
of profit. True, he has an appropriate sense of social hierarchy that 
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ought to qualify him to be a judge of social situations. Hence the "cut" 
falls to the Knight "by adventure, or sort, or cas" (844)—or by Har­
ry's tampering;16 but he is easily overborne by churls, as the Miller 
shows after the Knight has finished the first story. 
Harry's judgments are often peculiar and always subjective. At 
times they have little relevance to the tale he is supposed to be judging. 
He insults the Pardoner, perhaps justifiably, defending himself 
against the Pardoner's insinuations about his sinfulness; and he insults 
the Monk whose tale, admittedly dull, is filled with the sententiousness 
Harry himself has requested. He trivializes the moral of the Shipment's 
Tale, has an unexpectedly hysterical—perhaps inebriated—response to 
the Physician's Tale, takes sides between the Canon and the Canon's 
Yeoman, attacks the Parson and the Reeve, and chides the Franklin, 
the pilgrim Chaucer, and the Cook. He is not a trustworthy judge. 
As opposed to the narrator's refusal to judge and Harry Bailly's bias 
in judging, there is a judgment by the pilgrims, either as a group or as 
individuals. Sometimes the judgment comes forth in universal con­
sensus, as after the Prioress's Tale where we are told that "every man / 
as sobre was that wonder was to see" (7. 691—92). Sometimes it is a 
group judgment, as when the "gentils" react to Harry's request that the 
Pardoner tell "som myrthe or japes" by crying "Nay, lat hym telle us 
of no ribaudye!" (6. 319-24). Most frequently, however, another 
character responds to a tale or to a situation. The nature of these 
responses is varied, now direct, as with the Merchant to the Clerk's 
Tale, now indirect, as with the Franklin to the Squire's Tale, now as a 
keeper of the peace, as with the Knight to the Monk and Pardoner, 
now as an aggrieved party, as with the Reeve and Summoner to the 
Miller and Friar. Whether or not we accept the judgment depends on 
how reliable or noble we perceive the judge to be. Since we perceive 
the Knight as an ideal character, and his tale as a "noble" tale, we accept 
as just his interruption of the Monk and his peace-keeping role at the 
end of the Pardoner's Tale. Otherwise, we may only ask whether or not 
the response and judgment are appropriate, for we recognize personal 
and, at times, vicious motives behind the response. Since our accep­
tance of a character's judgment of another character or tale depends on 
what we know about the characters from their portraits, let us look at 
Chaucer's method of constructing them in the General Prologue. 
Chaucer creates portraits in a traditional form, the catalogue, and 
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according to commonly assumed principles of rhetorical description 
But the portraits are unique in the tradition of medieval catalogue 
portraiture because Chaucer juxtaposes detail in them, which results in 
an inconclusive or, at least, open-ended portrait form that he may 
develop in the narrative links. From these portraits come the various 
consciousnesses who project their personalities through the stories they 
tell, and hence control meaning in the inner form of the Canterbury 
Tales. Thus, they contribute to making the work inconclusive, con­
cerned as much with psychological plausibility and opinion as with 
moral truth. To recognize how the unique style and structure in these 
portraits makes them inconclusive, we must first understand the nature 
and end of medieval catalogue portraits in general. 
Rhetorical descriptio in the form of a catalogue is one of the most 
basic techniques for establishing character in the Middle Ages. Man­
uals like those by Geoffroi de Vinsauf and Matthieu de Vendome direct 
would-be writers to describe character according to a commonly 
assumed symbolism of face and body.18 Although the conventions for 
the symbolism derive originally from the Neoplatonic and allegorical 
world of medieval perception and interpretation, the technique came 
also to be used on nonallegorical but nonetheless conventional charac­
ters like heroes and heroines of courtly romance.19 Whatever the liter­
ary mode, the catalogue portrait was static rather than dynamic and 
avoided specific individuation by using generalized physical detail to 
suggest an abstract ideal ultimately for moral evaluation. Here, for 
instance, is Guillaume's description of the face of Idleness from the 
first part of Le Roman de la Rose: 
Cheveus ot blons come bacins, 
la char plus tendre que poucins, 
front reluisant, sorciex votis; 
li entr'ieuz ne fu pas petis, 
ainz ert assez grant par mesure; 
le nes ot bien feit a droiture 
et les ieuz vers come faucons. 
Por feire envie a ces bricons, 
douce aleine ot et savoree, 
et face blanche et coloree, 
la bouche petite et grossete, 
s'ot ou menton une fossete. . . .20 
"Redy to Wenden" 101 
[Her hair was yellow as a golden bowl, her flesh more tender than a 
little girl's, her forehead radiant, with arched brows; the space between 
her eyes was not small, but just the right size; her nose was straight and 
well-formed, and her eyes colored as a falcon's. Enviable were her soft, 
sweet breath, her face of pink and white, her mouth small but ample, 
her dimpled chin. . . .] 
The description continues down to her feet in an assumed and expected 
order, classifying rather than individuating according to notions of 
ideal beauty. As with Idleness, the other personifications in the courtly 
dance that the dreamer joins are all composed of generalized qualities 
of ideal beauty. The audience understands the symbolic meaning of the 
physical qualities so that a poet rarely needs to direct his audience's 
attention to it. 
Occasionally, we find aspects of this non-individuated, generalized 
physiology in the General Prologue. In the portrait of the Squire, the 
modifiers defy specificity, although their sum total is of courtly ex­
cellence: "evene," "wonderly," "greet," "fresshe," "faire," "wed." 
The same is true of those elements of the Prioress's portrait that 
represent her as a courtly lady: 
Ful semyly hir wympul pynched was 
Hir nose tretys, hir eyen greye as glas, 
Hir mouth ful smal, and therto softe and reed\ 
But sikerly she hadde a fair forheed. 
[151-54] 
As with the Squire, the italicized modifiers of the Prioress's beauty 
represent the general rather than the specific. 
Details in descriptions of ideal beauty could, of course, make dis­
tinctions in classes or types yet still not individualize. In the Knight's 
Tale, for instance, Lygurge and Emetreus both represent ideal manli­
ness, although the particulars of their descriptions suggest symbolically 
contrastive allegiances; in the Miller's Tale, the details in the portraits 
of Alisoun and Absolom support the parodic intention of the tale by 
directing Alisoun's ideality to the barnyard and Absolom's ideality to 
courtly effeminacy.21 Sometimes an unusual use of detail could charge 
the expected ideality with ambiguity, as with the portrait of Criseyde 
toward the end of book five of Troilus. In three stanzas of moralized, 
though unspecific, description of his heroine, whose ostensible inten­
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tion is to present an example of ideal womanly beauty, the narrator 
excepts Criseyde from the convention of ideally beautiful women by 
telling us that her eyebrows were "joyneden yfere" (813). In a note 
F. N. Robinson tells us that this particular of joined brows "was held 
to be a mark of beauty, and sometimes as the sign of a passionate 
nature" in Greece.22 Where it appears in descriptions of Criseyde in 
Dares, Joseph of Exeter, Benoit, and Guido, however, the detail is 
sometimes used positively and sometimes used to suggest a "lak" in the 
excellence of the ideal, as it is in Chaucer. Since it is not likely that an 
audience would know the historical tradition behind the particular of 
Criseyde's joined brows, it would readily assent to Chaucer's implica­
tion that the brows somehow represented an imperfection not in beauty 
but in character. Unusual or specific physiological particulars 
represent moral shortcomings and not individuality or uniqueness. 
Like the portrait of Criseyde, the portraits in the General Prologue 
use rhetorical descriptio in catalogue form to present character. Also in 
the tradition, the portraits use specific detail for a moral end. For 
instance, each of Chaucer's lascivious characters, of whom there are 
many, possesses some physiognomic peculiarity that represents not 
merely a genetic inheritance but a fault in spiritual condition as well. 
These characters are "gat-tothed" (468); they have voices "as smal as 
hath a goot" (688); they sweat profusely, or they have bulging eyes, or 
wens on their noses. Their faces are pocked or boiled, their hair is 
limp, or they are bald. The choleric Reeve is skinny and close-shaven, 
the sanguine Franklin has a white beard and reddish complexion. 
Oppositely, the portraits of the morally ideal characters, the Knight 
and the Parson, contain no physical details, although each has identify­
ing appurtenances, like the Knight's stained "habergeon" (77), or the 
Parson's staff. 
Yet, every reader of the General Prologue senses that however much 
the portraits use specific physical detail to suggest moral evaluation, 
however, much they appear symbolically to represent social types or 
estates,23 they transcend the conventional, the typological, the symbol­
ic. Chaucer's style, his organization of particulars, makes the portraits 
dynamic; it quickens them with a sense of individual life, a life lived, 
as it were, through time and from which readers want to derive motive 
and experience to explain character. For instance, we may learn that the 
Wife of Bath has a literary heritage from La Vieille in Le Roman de la 
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Rose, that the fact of her five "housbondes at chirche dore" (460) 
suggests her figural connection to the Samaritan Woman of the New 
Testament, and that her wide-set front teeth suggest a problematically 
energetic libido; we may learn that the Pardoner derives from Faux 
Semblant in he Roman de la Rose and that the many details in his 
portrait that suggest his ambiguous sexuality symbolize what has been 
called "scriptural eunuchry."24 But our first response is that both 
characters, to name the two most potentially mimetic portraits, have 
about them a sense of their own individual history that transcends the 
conventions or at least makes the corrupt spiritual condition that the 
conventions suggest less significant to our interest in them than their 
identity, psychology—their personality. 
What is more, once the characters of the portraits become animated 
in the narrative links that grow out of the General Prologue, Chaucer 
sometimes makes it impossible for us to derive a moral evaluation from 
the iconographic and symbolic particulars in the portraits, for he gives 
us historical information that explains the detail literally, as much as 
the detail may earlier have appeared to be symbolic. For example, early 
in the portrait of the Wife of Bath, we learn that she is deaf in one ear. 
Robertson shows that Chaucer uses this detail to suggest that the Wife 
was a sinner who refused to hear the new music of salvation.25 As 
much as this detail may suggest moral evaluation in the portrait, 
however, it becomes less conclusive as Chaucer develops his portrait 
into a character. In the prologue to her tale, the Wife tells us that she is 
deaf because her fifth husband struck her a blow that deprived her of 
her hearing. To be sure, we do not know this in the General Prologue, 
nor are we surprised, once Jankin hits her, that she grows deaf, since 
she had refused to listen to him read from his "book of wikked wyves" 
(3. 685). But if the Wife's deafness originally stands out as a symbol of 
her sinfulness, Chaucer chooses not to leave the symbolism unattached 
to an actual explanation for the fact. In consequence, the moral evalua­
tion we may first have made on the basis of the detail in the portrait is 
ultimately but one element of a complex response. We recognize that 
the detail may not have been intended simply for moral evaluation, that 
it is historically explicable. 
The example of the Wife of Bath suggests a characteristically 
Chaucerian mode of operation. Chaucer constructs his portraits of 
concrete particulars. Because the particulars are conventional, they 
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suggest symbolic or typological meaning, hence moral evaluation. Yet 
Chaucer's seemingly random method of structuring his details and his 
apparent interest in extending the concrete or literal significance of a 
particular into the links imbues the portraits with a mimetic and 
dynamic potential suggesting an individual, at times neurotic, psychol­
ogy with personal motives for actions and attitudes, personal history, 
and a future. In other words, detail in the portraits can function both as 
a marker for moral interpretation and as an accident in individual 
psychology, history, or genetics. 
Morality and psychology are not inimical categories in interpreta­
tion. But they are usually distinct. Chaucer, however, often suggests 
both either in a single detail or by coordinating two or more details in a 
series of couplets. The technique creates irony that ultimately com­
plicates both moral evaluation and character analysis, for it undercuts 
the quality of absoluteness in each category. The effect on the form of 
the portraits of this complication is an inconclusiveness akin to the 
inconclusiveness in the form of Chaucer's earlier works. But, whereas 
inconclusiveness in the earlier works was in some measure either un­
intentional or, as in Troilus, finally unacceptable, in the portraits of the 
General Prologue it is intentional, created by a conscious poetic tech­
nique that undercuts absolute moral evaluation and leaves interpreta­
tion open-ended, without the possibility of concluding, without even 
the need to conclude. 
The portrait of the Prioress offers an excellent example of how this 
intentionally inconclusive structuring works.26 Chaucer tells us that 
the Prioress's name is Madame Eglentyne—a sweet-smelling wild 
rose—which locates her in both religious and courtly traditions for 
which the rose is a central symbol, but which also ironizes both, since a 
wild rose is neither the red rose of the courtly tradition nor the white 
rose of the Marian tradition. The images Chaucer attaches to her 
throughout her portrait contrast yet unite in ambiguous alliance con­
ventions from both religious and courtly life. About her singing of the 
religious service, we are told: 
Ful weel she soong the service dyvyne, 
Entuned in hir nose ful semely. 
[121-22] 
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The image suggests that she does her religious duty with an eye for 
fashion, since nasal singing was the current style in Chaucer's time. 
This is but one of many images, like the Prioress's "pynched" wimple 
(151), her rosary "gauded al with grene" (159), and the remarkably 
ambiguous brooch she uses for costume jewelry (160-62), which align 
yet contrast the religious and courtly conventions that compose her 
portrait. On a larger scale within the portrait, but to the same ironic 
and ambiguous effect, are the couplets that contrast the Prioress's 
fastidious table manners, perhaps the most trivial expression of courtly 
sensibility, with her "conscience," her charity, and her pity, qualities 
expected of a nun. Having composed the images of her courtliness by a 
simple coordinative syntax, Chaucer turns from the courtly to the 
Christian elements of her conscience with the emphatic use of the 
negative "but," suggesting that the lines following will negate by 
contrast the lines preceding them. What follows, however, is a face­
tious listing of more triviality, this time more egregious because the 
sphere of interest is religious, not courtly. The Prioress weeps out of 
charity and pity when she sees mice caught in traps or when her 
pampered and perhaps illegally kept dogs are beaten. Because the 
triviality of her charity is of a piece with the triviality of her courtli­
ness, the coordinate "but" does not contrast good against bad—as it will 
do in the portrait of the Parson. Rather, the word functions to sub­
ordinate another set of details of similar effect to those that preceded it. 
When Chaucer turns again from her "conscience and tendre herte" 
(150) to describe her face and costume according to expected courtly 
rhetorical conventions, we do not feel that we are moving into yet 
another set of conventions, but rather that we are continuing the ori­
ginal set in the same manner. 
Chaucer clearly did not intend to place the Prioress in a simple 
moral category representing either an inappropriate nun with mis­
guided spirituality or a courtly lady manquee with trivial aspirations. 
Rather, he wanted her to exist ambiguously before us, all sides of her 
nature, her courtliness and her Christianity, equally trivial. The con­
ventions from the one undercut yet extend the conventions of the other. 
Both sides of her identity are finally of little substance, yet ironically, 
perhaps even tragically, the Prioress reveals them because she wants to 
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appear "digne of reverence" and "estatliche of manere" (140-41). 
Chaucer leaves her portrait purposely inconclusive by alternating ele­
ments from the two life-styles she expresses, which produces a sense in 
us that the Prioress is deficient both as a nun and as a courtly lady. But 
this complexity leads beyond simple moral judgment; it produces a 
psychological picture of a woman whose frustrations lead her to over-
sentimentalize her charity and perhaps to overeat—Chaucer uses the 
adverb "ful" nine times in his description of her and tells us that 
"hardily, she was nat undergrowe" (156). 
The characteristics that Chaucer catalogues for us in his portrait of 
the Prioress, conventional as they are, hold the potential for later, more 
specific and individual character development along psychological 
lines that absorb, if they do not preclude, moral judgment. Whatever 
is sadistic, bloody, or sentimental in the tale she later tells, whatever is 
bathetic in its identification with the "litel" child and his suffering 
mother, whatever is shocking in the Old Testament judgmentalism of 
her story about a Christian martyr and in her presentation of the Virgin 
as one who "ravyshedest" the Holy Spirit "doun fro the Deitee" (7. 
469), has plausible motivation from the portrait Chaucer draws of her 
in the General Prologue. 
Like the portrait of the Prioress, all the portraits of the General 
Prologue juxtapose conventional details from different, often in­
congruous, modes of life that produce a double sense that most pil­
grims are at once types and individuals. Since the catalogue convinces 
by the accretion of particulars, Chaucer simply lines up details and 
images in his portraits. He ties together details in loose coordination, 
using "and" to summarize or "but" to contrast them. At times he uses 
the slightly more subordinating "for" to suggest a causal connection 
between particulars, as in the portrait of the Friar (218, 220, 225, 
227, 229). Basically, he coordinates details within a couplet, in which 
case the rhyme controls the effect, or from couplet to couplet. Most 
characteristic about the syntactic organization of detail in the portraits 
is its skillfully random effect, its apparent lack of order and control, 
which creates irony and humor, seems stylistically appropriate to a 
recollection of the past, and suggests a sense that conclusive moral 
evaluation is not possible. 
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III 
Chaucer creates inconclusiveness in the forms of the portraits of the 
General Prologue in three specific ways. He disarranges the expected 
order of detail so that the character-types common to catalogue descrip­
tion elsewhere become individuated, potentially dynamic and mimetic 
instead of static and typical. He repeats words, phrases, or images 
from portrait to portrait, so that their context alters their connotation. 
And he uses double entendre to create ambiguity and often unresolv­
able contradiction. However, since Chaucer the pilgrim mediates our 
recognition of Chaucer the poet's techniques, let us get to his poet 
through his pilgrim, whose subjective approach to description and 
refusal to judge at once increase our sense of a free flow of associated 
particulars and intensify our sense of inconclusiveness.27 
The pilgrim Chaucer intends to be an impressionistic journalist. He 
will describe the other pilgrims according to the way they seemed—"so 
as it semed me" (39). And they all seem just fine. Adjectives like 
"worthy," "good," "fair," "noble," "gentil," "solempne" abound 
throughout the portraits, as do phrases like "noon hym like" (Physi­
cian), "no man nowhere so virtuous" (Friar), and "ful riche of ex­
cellence" (Sergeant of Law). The pilgrim Chaucer likes most all his 
companions and agrees with all their opinions (except the Summoner's 
on excommunication), either by assenting openly to a pilgrim's opin­
ion, as with the Monk, or by praising the actions of each pilgrim even 
when those actions are reprehensible, as with the Physician and the 
Pardoner. As a journalist, the pilgrim Chaucer shows an un­
discriminating enthusiasm for what he thinks to be an abundance of 
talent and excellence among the pilgrims. 
The pilgrim's refusal to criticize—in fact, his apparent commitment 
to praise—forces us to make our own sense out of the particulars in the 
portraits, especially the incongruous ones, and finally to evaluate the 
character for ourselves. This couplet from the Wife of Bath's portrait 
is a stunning example of the pilgrim's technique and its effect: 
She was a worthy womman al hir live 
Housbondes at chirche door she hadde fyve. 
[459-60] 
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In the space of one couplet, we see the Wife's femininity praised 
because she has fulfilled herself as a woman by having had five hus­
bands. We are left to judge whether or not "husbandizing" perfects the 
worth of a woman. Similarly, the following paired couplets from the 
portrait of the Physician exemplify the technique more expansively: 
Of his diete mesurable was he, 
For it was of no superfluitee, 
But of greet norissyng and digestible. 
His studie was but litel on the Bible. 
[435-38] 
Without the narrator's moral consciousness—in fact, because of his 
exuberant praise of most actions—the reader is led into the poet's ironic 
trap, recognizing on the one hand that the ingenuous pilgrim is limited 
in his perception, and on the other that his very charitable, if simplis­
tic, approach to the world is nonetheless a good value to which all good 
Christians must pay attention. 
A more-developed case in point is in the portrait of the Monk, 
whose manliness and venereal pursuits at once qualify him to be an 
abbot and yet disqualify him from being a good monk. As with the 
Prioress, the Monk's portrait is constructed of competing sets of details 
from the courtly—in this case the chivalric—world, and from the 
monastic Christian world.28 Neither side ever gets the upper hand, 
and when the pilgrim openly agrees with the Monk's refusal to follow 
the rules of monastic life—"and I seyde his opinion was good" (183)— 
we, who have been critical because he had not fulfilled his vows, must 
consider with the pilgrim whether the rules are not after all too strin­
gent, whether a man of the Monk's physical stature and drive might 
not need "the space" of holding "to the newe world" (176). When we 
reach the question "How shal the world be served?" (187), we recog­
nize that we have been trapped, for we know that a monk's role is not to 
serve the world but to serve God; yet we also know that there is 
something valuable about a man of the Monk's virility serving the 
world—Harry Bailly will later comment on it with considerable envy 
(7. 1932-62). Chaucer the pilgrim's commitment to praise the 
characters who emerge from Chaucer the poet's technique of combin­
ing details with frequently contradictory implications produces the 
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complex characterizations that, as Muscatine points out, "on a large 
scale disarrange and make quasi-dramatic the sequence of tales as a 
whole."29 
The several stylistic devices that create such complexity of 
characterization in the individual portraits also create the dynamism 
felt among and through all portraits taken as a whole. Chaucer, work­
ing through his pilgrim character, charges words and phrases in one 
portrait with another connotative sense in another. He rings changes 
on the meaning of terms while creating a connection from portrait to 
portrait between the standards and values that the terms represent. 
Thus he creates an ironic interchange between us and two or more 
characters within the portrait gallery. The most obvious example of 
this technique is in the repetition and development of the word worthy, 
introduced in the first line of the Knight's portrait and emphasized 
throughout it, so that the word comes to signify the virtuous quality 
Chaucer wants us most to respect in the Knight. By the time we reach 
the Merchant's portrait, where the term appears three times to suggest 
the Merchant's financial concerns as opposed to the Knight's virtue, 
Chaucer has already changed the connotation of "worthy" in the por­
trait of the Friar, who is interested in "worthy wommen of the toun" 
(217), women of wealth, who is himself "swich a worthy man" (243) 
because it 
Acorded nat, as by his facultee, 
To have with sike lazars aqueyntaunce. 
[244-45] 
The Friar is worthy because his interest is in places "ther as profit 
sholde arise" (249). 
Chaucer accomplishes the same kind of ironic effect and dramatic 
result when he repeats a line from one portrait in another portrait. In 
the portrait of the Squire, he balances the gently patronizing humor 
that the pilgrim creates in his description of the Squire with the re­
markably dignified final couplet that makes unimportant the "litel 
space" (87) of the Squire's military experience: 
Curteis he was, lowely, and servysable, 
And carf biforn his fader at the table. 
[99-100] 
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When he repeats the line about courtesy in the new context of the 
Friar's portrait, it sounds unctuous, obscene, and sarcastic: 
And over al, ther as profit sholde arise, 
Curteis he was and lowely of servyse. 
There nas no man nowher so vertuous. 
He was the beste beggere in his house. 
[249-52] 
Yet the repetition of most of the line from the more idealized Squire's 
portrait in the Friar's portrait makes us wonder what courtesy really 
means. A similar intrusion occurs when, after the pilgrim has called 
the Knight "a verray, parfit gentil knyght" (72), in praise of his 
spiritual nature, he calls the Physician "a verray, parfit praktisour" 
(422), in praise of his materialism. 
Finally, Chaucer's brilliant use of double entendre, perhaps his most 
outstanding stylistic technique in the portraits, conflates into one line 
or into a couplet or two competing, even discordant, details that charge 
the portraits with the paradox of ethical contradiction. I have already 
quoted the couplet about the Wife of Bath's worthiness as a woman. To 
this may be added the line "She koude muchel of wandrynge by the 
weye" (467), which brings together in one ambiguous image the 
Wife's sensuality and her spiritual penchant for visiting religious 
shrines throughout Europe. Or, the line that combines her wealth and 
her competitiveness by emphasizing that if any woman in her parish 
were allowed to go to the "offering" before her, then "she was out of 
alle charitee" (452). Chaucer's remark that the Monk is "a manly man, 
to been an abbot able" (167) connects surprisingly the Monk's 
masculinity with his religious calling. The obscene remark bringing 
together the Friar's linguistic facility and his lasciviousness is a less 
terse example: 
In alle the ordres foure is noon that kan 
So muchel of daliaunce and fair langage. 
He hadde maad ful many a mariage 
Of yonge wommen at his owene cost. 
Unto his ordre he was a noble post. 
[210-14] 
The Sergeant of Law "war and wys" (309), who "semed bisier than he 
"Redy to Wenden" 111 
was" (322), uses his great learning and wisdom to purchase outright, 
hence without record of his possibly shady dealings: 
Al was fee symple to hym in effect; 
His purchasyng myghte nat been infect. 
[319-20] 
The three lines concluding the portrait of the Physician align that 
character's pharmaceutical interest in soluble powdered gold and his 
interest in money by the implication that plagues are economically good 
for the medical business: 
He kept that he wan in pestilence, 
For gold in phisik is a cordial; 
Therefore he lovede gold in special. 
[442-44] 
The list of examples can be extended, for double entendre represents 
one of Chaucer's most basic techniques for energizing by compression 
the sometimes contradictory lists of qualities that catalogue description 
required of him.30 
Chaucer effected in the General Prologue of the Canterbury Tales a 
most unusual and complex form of description. Working within the 
tradition of rhetorical description listing qualities in the form of a 
catalogue, but using a journalistic, noncritical, and loosely coordinated 
hypotactic style, he created a set of portraits at once morally symbolic in 
traditional ways and capable of energetic and psychologically mimetic 
development. The conventionalism of the portraits derives from tradi­
tional methods of description, yet his organization of these symbolic 
details within each portrait and his alignment of noncontiguous ele­
ments from different modes of life and with different expectations 
express an individuation unknown to, and unexpected from, the tradi­
tion. In the portraits Chaucer creates characters who rest in a middle 
state, a state between the static, the exemplary, and the dynamic, even 
the mimetic. It is up to the narrative links that follow the General 
Prologue and to the tales themselves, which represent in some ways the 
moral and psychological values of the pilgrims we meet in the por­
traits, to show whether Chaucer will move to a mimetic fiction or 
remain traditionally in an exemplary one. When the narrator completes 
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his portrait gallery, the character-types of the portraits are, like the 
narrator himself, "redy to wenden" (21) on their own pilgrimage. 
Yet, because the form of the Canterbury Tales is both unique for 
Chaucer and unique in the literature that Chaucer knew, the poet had 
no compositional model; he had to go it alone as he worked out his 
plans for its organization and meaning. His progress throughout the 
tales was not linear. He knew where he wanted to start and where he 
wanted to end. The progress of the geographical journey may have 
represented the structural arch. But he clearly did not understand how 
to follow that arch and what to say as he went. Without a model, but 
with the ambivalence about meaning that seems as much a part of 
Chaucer the poet as it is of Chaucer the persona and narrator, it is no 
wonder that the Canterbury Tales is fragmented in the way that it is. 
The outer form of the Tales enabled Chaucer to solve the epistemologi­
cal problems his earlier poems had confronted. But before his compos­
ite form could express pluralistic opinion as its own end, he would have 
to make the outer and inner forms interpenetrate so that they appeared 
to be one, and he would have to vary the storial materials of the inner 
form so that the meaning of one tale in context of another would appear 
inconclusive. How Chaucer went about these tasks will be the subject 
of the next chapter. 
VI.	 "After my Lawe": Inconclusiveness and the 
Fragmentary Nature of the Canterbury Tales 
Inconclusiveness sustains the poetics of the Canterbury 
Tales. It underlies the numerous fictional voices that 
relate	 the outer and inner forms, and it motivates 
Chaucer's method of composing in fragments. 
Although I shall not discuss the meaning of any tale 
specifically, except when it is relevant to my argument 
about the entire work, inconclusiveness also charges the content 
(thematics) of the Canterbury Tales with the energy of paradox.' Thus 
it functions both as a principle of structure and as a tactic to control 
meaning. 
A mass of discrete storial narratives makes up the inner form of the 
Canterbury Tales. It is commonly assumed that Chaucer composed 
some stories, like the tales by the Knight, the Monk, and the Second 
Nun, before he composed the Canterbury Tales as a single work, pre­
sumably not conceiving a pilgrim's voice to speak these tales but later 
assigning a fictional teller to them. Other tales, like those by the 
Canon's Yeoman and the Pardoner, so thoroughly depend on the fic­
tional consciousnesses of their tellers that Chaucer must surely have 
written them in his characters' voices. Yet, whether Chaucer conceived 
first of tale, first of teller, or of the two inseparably, he intended every 
storial narrative of the Canterbury Tales ultimately to have a fictional 
voice different from his own, a voice spoken by one of the characters 
on the pilgrimage. He never accomplished this intention completely. 
The voices in about one-fourth of the tales cannot be identified clearly 
with the attitudes or the values of the pilgrims who tell them. In the 
Shipman's Tale, for example, the narrator says little to suggest that he is 
the Shipman of the General Prologue. In consequence, the Canterbury 
Tales, despite its many coherent virtues, is not fully realized. Nonethe­
less, as in Chaucer's earlier works, but on a vaster scale, narrative voice 
in the Canterbury Tales controls meaning. 
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In all cases before the Canterbury Tales, the speaker had been the 
poet himself, either as persona in a dream experience or as a translator 
of another author's text. He had sought to tell his dream "aryght" 
(HF, 79), to render facts correctly, and to direct meaning in the 
experience toward its appropriately moral end. But the literary materi­
als that the speaker rendered rarely gave the simple answers he wanted. 
More often than not, they left him in a state of confusion, as in the 
House of Fame, or of dissatisfaction, as in the Parliament of Fowls. Both 
states even reappear periodically in Troilus and the Legend of Good 
Women. In the Canterbury Tales, however, Chaucer frees himself from 
the earnest persona, who previously had been unable to make his 
information fit an expected system. He invents fictional tellers on a 
purported journey, makes himself merely one more teller, separating 
himself from the burden of writing with a univocal moral goal. He 
simply reports what each said, "everich a word" (1 . 733). With such a 
new form, Chaucer can now think about the multifaceted implications 
of fiction without suffering the anxiety of didactic responsibility. Per­
haps he thought as follows: "Let a miller tell a ribald story, a squire be 
interested in talking birds; let a manciple render Ovid, a physician translate 
Livy; let a nun translate a saint's life and a prioress tell a miracle of the 
Virgin. I will play my part by parodying the silly metrical romances and by 
parodying myself as the inept poet for whom I have become known; if that 
tour-de-force should fail, I will turn dutifully to my other literary role in 
life, that of translator, and I will translate an important moral text about 
the virtue of prudence. This course is itself most prudent, for though I cannot 
be a poet as is the moral Gower, I can poetize nonetheless." 
In his new form, Chaucer could experiment with the kinds of mean­
ing that different genres, modes, and voices could express. Certainly 
aware since the House of Fame of the limited truth-value in literary 
expression, Chaucer could translate or invent many kinds of stories in 
the Canterbury Tales that claimed to represent some truth about the 
nature of the world and about man's goals, yet that paradoxically 
remained mere opinions because their narrators were limited. These 
fictions may have contained a clearly readable didactic pulse elsewhere 
in a source, like that part of Nicholas Trivet's Les Chroniques ecrites 
pour Marie d'Angleterre that is the source for the Man of Law's Tale.2 
In the Canterbury Tales, however, a character like the Man of Law 
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recalls the fiction and projects his own values through the story.3 Thus 
the tellers color meaning in the tales, at times in peculiar ways. The 
characters on the pilgrimage tell stories merely to pass the time and to 
win a prize; Chaucer tells stories that reveal in their course the spiritual 
or psychological "condicioun" of the tellers and suggest, in effect, that 
a narrative consciousness different from the author's must limit the 
truth-value a story can express. 
Discounting the problem tales, whose problems no doubt result 
from the incomplete state of the work, I believe that in the Canterbury 
Tales Chaucer imbued the fictions of the inner form with the voices of 
characters or personalities developed in the outer form. During the last 
two decades, researchers have shown this practice to be more closely 
related to learned rhetorical methods of composition than to a "dramat­
ic principle," an innate drive to represent and interpret perceived 
reality.4 But the source of this practice is less important to this argu­
ment than its effect—the creation of a composite narrative form at once 
dynamic and inconclusive because personalities of the outer form suf­
fuse the fictions of the inner form. Each tale of the inner form, an 
independent fiction with an assumed omniscient narrator, becomes, in 
context of the other tales, an opinion. Even the Knight's and the 
Parson's tales become mere examples of stories that express their tellers' 
values and needs, not Chaucer's, not the reader's, not the other pil­
grims'. The existence of all the tales in context of each other makes both 
a former and a later statement seem partial. Thus the Canterbury Tales 
experiments with the power of opinion and the limits of meaning. 
Chaucer achieves this kind of inconclusive form by creating an 
interchange between the outer and inner forms of the work in both 
obvious and subtle ways. The most obvious way is by creating a 
dynamic in the outer form that the tales of the inner form intensify and 
complicate, as when the Reeve and the Summoner respond with fic­
tions to the Miller and the Friar respectively, when the characters of 
the "Marriage Group" respond in some way to the Wife of Bath, when 
the Franklin responds to the Squire, when the Miller tells a story "to 
quite" the Knight's story, and when the Nun's Priest tells a tale in 
response to the Monk's Tale, echoing through its course the Prioress's 
Tale. This dynamic contributes to the inconclusiveness of the entire 
form because these tales, responses to the values of other tellers and 
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tales, attack, undermine, correct, or develop the themes of the tales to 
which they are responses, making the values within those tales, as well 
as within their own, appear partial or inadequate. 
Chaucer also achieves inconclusiveness by matching a teller's psy­
chology with his tale's theme in three-quarters of the tales, or, to put 
the matter another way, by using the fictions as projections of his 
tellers' attitudes. Few of us, for example, doubt the motivation between 
character and tale in the cases of the Pardoner and the Wife of Bath.5 
However, motivation exists between most of the characters and their 
tales, so that the tale represents not only the values of a social type, like 
a Franklin or a Miller, for which the conventions of typology would 
function simply to describe moral universals, but a personal psycholo­
gy often working curiously to extend meaning. Two examples will 
have to stand for many. 
The Reeve's Tale is not merely a story a low-class Reeve might tell, 
not even a story that merely punishes a miller for the supposed insult of 
Robin the Miller's story. It incorporates as well the anger and self-
hatred at being old and impotent that the Reeve's prologue raises from 
implicit indications in his portrait in the General Prologue. Oswald's 
attitude turns a simple fabliau plot into a dark, mean, and cruel story 
about vengeance, self-hatred, and bestial sexuality that punishes 
Oswald for a condition he cannot abide in himself, a condition not 
relevant to Robin the Miller, as he has been presented to us, and not 
explained by a vice typologically expected of a Reeve. 
The effect of the Merchant's Tale is more complicated because the 
General Prologue leads us to expect in the tale the manifestation of a vice 
related to the Merchant's concern about "th' encrees of his wynnyng" 
(1. 275). But Chaucer does not develop the related particulars about 
the Merchant's profiteering, unless marriage is understood to be re­
lated to profit; instead the Merchant becomes one of the tellers in the 
"Marriage Group." In his prologue he tells us that his wife "is a 
shrewe at al" who could "overmacche" the devil if he "to hir ycoupled 
were" (4. 1218-22). He also says that he will not tell a tale "of myn 
owene soore" (4. 1243), then presents a mordant examination of the 
folly that occurs when "tendre youthe hath wedded stoupyng age" (4. 
1738). The tale reveals to us what the prologue and the portrait with­
hold, a complex relationship between marriage, youth, age, and sexual 
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appetite that suggests retrospectively why the Merchant condemns both 
his wife and marriage after only two months. 
The highly developed characterization of the Reeve in the prologue 
to the Reeve's Tale extends the psychological dimensions of meaning in 
his tale. Oppositely, the complexly represented materials of the Mer­
chant's Tale enrich our understanding of the Merchant in his prologue. 
The relationship between the teller of the outer form and the tale of the 
inner form creates in the Canterbury Tales a series of self-revelations of 
which the characters themselves are not necessarily aware.6 If tales by 
characters such as the Reeve and the Merchant represent deep psycho­
logical motives of which the tellers are not aware, then what they 
suggest about the typological "condicioun" of the teller is continually 
complicated by our deeper understanding of their psychological "con­
dicioun."7 
The third and final example of how Chaucer creates inconclusive­
ness through an interchange of outer and inner forms in the Canterbury 
Tales is more radical than the other two, for it represents not an 
interchange but an interpenetration between the two fictional planes of 
the composite form whereby inner and outer forms are no longer 
distinguishable. As a general rule, Chaucer distinguishes between his 
inner and outer forms in the Canterbury Tales; hence he forces his 
reader to infer from a tale, a separate fiction, the values and motives 
that the character of the outer form represents. He distinguishes be­
tween a prologue, a statement generally about self in the outer form, 
and a character's tale, a story about the world in the inner form through 
which that character projects his or her values. Although the man­
uscripts are not unanimous in their handling of rubrics, they generally 
follow what I assume to have been Chaucer's own practice of separating 
by headnotes the tales from each other, from prologues and epilogues, 
and from interchanges between two or more characters. Yet in those 
prologues and tales where self-revelation is most explicit, the dis­
tinctions between inner and outer forms of the Canterbury Tales 
curiously disappear. 
The Pardoner and his tale represent the most outstanding case in 
point. At first we find much mediation: an introduction in which the 
Pardoner tells us he is going to think "upon som honest thyng" 
(6. 328); a prologue in which he tells us with stunning honesty how 
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corrupt and hypocritical he is; and a sermon-like tale in which he 
exemplifies in a story the corruptions of which he has confessed himself 
to be guilty. But the tale does not come to an end in its expected place or 
manner, as we find in other tales, nor does a headnote indicate a 
movement to an epilogue or end-link. During the Pardoner's recital of 
his sermon in story form, which he knows "al by rote" (6. 332), the 
boundary between the tale with its moral goal and the performance 
with its profit motive merge within the Pardoner's consciousness so 
that he seems to forget where he is and falls into his own fiction. When 
he has completed his sermon-tale and his benediction, he turns im­
mediately to Harry Bailly and the other pilgrims as if they were his 
audience of "lewed" people, presumably convinced that he has hood­
winked them by his brusque honesty. The effect of this fluid in­
terchange between inner and outer forms produces one of the most 
intensely dramatic moments in the entire Canterbury Tales. Harry 
Bailly feels threatened and responds by insulting the Pardoner violent­
ly. The insult is effective, for the Pardoner, previously voluble and 
glib, secure in the power of his words to control the reality around 
him, is struck dumb—"This Pardoner answerde nat a word" (6. 956). 
Chaucer creates a similar effect with the Wife of Bath. In sorrje 
senses fact and fiction merge in her presentation of herself since her 
autobiography is her tale. She tells us that her poetic is to "speke after 
my fantasye" (3. 190), and while drifting through nostalgic reminis­
cences, she catches herself up and returns to her structured history: 
But now, sire, lat me se, what I shal seyn? 
Aha! by God, I have my tale ageyn. 
[3. 585-86] 
So beguiled are we by the liveliness of the Wife's prologue, we need to 
be reminded by the Friar at its end—an end that concludes with a 
prayer like so many of the tales proper—that this was indeed a pream­
ble to a tale and not a tale itself. Although the rubrics of, say, the 
Ellesmere Manuscript make clear at this point that the Wife's prologue 
is ended and her tale is about to begin, there is a sense that the story 
following the Wife's "preamble of a tale" is yet one more example, 
relevant to the first, of the Wife's personal story of the woes in mar­
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riage. It may even have been this sense that a character's history could 
iteself be a tale that made Chaucer tamper with the Wife's actual tale, 
shifting to the Shipman what is commonly believed to have been her 
first tale and eventually supplying her with another one that fit the 
character more tightly.8 Whatever Chaucer's reasons, it is clear that 
the Pardoner thinks her autobiography is a tale. Early in the wife's 
prologue, he says, after she has threatened him, "as ye bigan, / Telle 
forth youre tale" (3. 185-86). To this she replies: "Now, sire, now 
wol I telle forth my tale" (3. 193), and she returns to tell the history of 
her marriages. 
The places where Chaucer obliterates the expected fictional dis­
tinctions between the inner and outer forms of the Canterbury Tales are, 
admittedly, few. Aside from the two already discussed, there is only 
the peculiar fact that the first part of the Canon's Yeoman s Tale is 
actually the Canon Yeoman's professional autobiography and not his 
fiction.9 In kind, it is like the prologues to the tales by the Reeve, the 
Wife of Bath, and the Pardoner. This kind of obliteration, confusing, 
of fictional boundaries seems to be one of Chaucer's experimental 
methods for creating fluidity between the two components of his com­
posite form, a method by which he tests how far he can proceed in the 
direction of making the voice of the outer form penetrate the fiction of 
the inner form, or vice versa. In effect it intensifies a reader's sense 
that the stories are fictive projections of the characters on the pilgrim­
age and provides the Canterbury Tales with a mimetic potential found 
nowhere else in the encyclopedic forms of stories popular in the Mid­
dle Ages, both of which contribute to the inconclusiveness of the entire 
form by making meaning partial, equivocal, inextricably an element of 
the limited consciousnesses of those characters purported to have been 
on the journey to Canterbury. 
Inconclusiveness is not related only to the mimetic potential with 
which Chaucer imbues the form of the Canterbury Tales, however. It is 
an element of the work's structure, a principle by which Chaucer 
composes and with which he can explore and test the manifold ways 
fiction can represent reality. It is, then, both a principle and a method 
of composition. Chaucer not only composed the Canterbury Tales in 
fragments; he "fragmentized" meaning within each fragment. In order 
to understand the principle, let us look at the method. 
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II 
What can we know about how Chaucer composed his massive and 
complex Canterbury Tales when we do not have his workbooks or his 
plans? We do not even have the text he himself wrote. The different 
groups of manuscripts disagree on the order of the fragments, and the 
most authoritative manuscripts of the most authoritative group, the 
Ellesmere and the Hengwrt, even disagree on the content. The 
Hengwrt, for instance, contains neither the prologue to the Merchant's 
Tale nor the Canon's Yeoman's prologue and tale. Despite the admit­
tedly serious drawbacks that the lack of an original text presents, 
however, two characteristics of Chaucer's compositional method 
emerge. First, although the order of the fragments within the man­
uscripts varies and the materials of each fragment occasionally differ, 
the fragment itself appears to be the basic unit of composition. It 
represents something like Chaucer's own habit or idea of construction, 
the one his literary executors, presumably following his wishes, passed 
on to the scribes. Second, Chaucer customarily constructed his frag­
mentary units to include tales on varied themes or points of view. As a 
general rule, he did not allow the meaning implied by one tale in a 
fragment to stand without countering, altering, or in some way enrich­
ing it by the implied meaning of a companion or companions. 
No matter how our modern editions vary in their ordering, the 
Canterbury Tales exists as a group often fragments.10 One fragment, 
number seven, contains six tales but only five tellers. Two, numbers 
one and three, contain three tales each; of these, fragment one also 
contains the General Prologue, assuring it of first place in the order, 
and a brief fragment by the Cook. Four fragments, numbers four, 
five, six, and eight, contain two tales each and constitute the largest 
number of similarly structured fragments. Finally, three fragments, 
numbers two, nine, and ten, contain only one tale each, except that 
fragment ten also contains the retraction, which assures it of ultimate 
place in the order, especially since the retraction exists in every manu­
script where the Parson's Tale is complete. Seven of the ten fragments, 
then, contain more than one tale; of the remaining three, there is 
evidence that Chaucer was working on extending two of them to in­
"After My Lawe" 121 
elude at least one more tale. Let us examine briefly what evidence the 
fragments with only one tale offer that Chaucer considered extending 
them to include at least one more tale. 
Fragment two contains an epilogue in which the Host asks the 
Parson to tell a tale after the Man of Law has finished his tale. When 
the Parson refuses, either the Shipman, the Squire or the Summoner— 
the manuscripts vary11—asserts that his "joly body schal a tale telle" 
(2. 1185). Although Robinson tells us that there is manuscript support 
for the theory "that Chaucer abandoned the Epilogue," its existence 
shows Chaucer's intention, at one point in the development of the 
Canterbury Tales, of offering at least one more tale in this fragment, 
one that would contrast the morally tendentious tale of the Man of Law 
in a way that a tale by the Parson could not. The epilogue and the 
curious prologue to the Man of Law's Tale suggest that this is the least 
"finished" fragment of the ten, the one whose form is least clear.12 But 
in it we nonetheless can see evidence that Chaucer considered using at 
least two kinds of contrastng fictions.13 
It is interesting to speculate that Chaucer planned a similar contrast­
ing structure for fragment nine. The prologue to the Manciple's Tale 
introduces dramatic materials which suggest that Chaucer may once 
have intended to juxtapose the Manciple's story of Phoebus and the 
crow with a tale from the Cook. The fragment opens with Harry first 
calling upon the Cook to tell a tale—"he knoweth his penaunce" 
(9. 12). but the Cook cannot respond because he is asleep. Whereupon 
the Manciple offers to tell a tale, but not before he ridicules the Cook. 
Chaucer is establishing here the familiar dramatic situation of having 
Harry call upon one teller only to have another teller preempt his 
choice. In fact, after the Manciple berates the awakened Cook, Harry 
warns him that the Cook might choose "another day" (9. 71) to reveal 
things about him that "were nat honest, if it cam to preef' (9. 75). In 
response to this statement, the Manciple retracts his insult, recognizing 
that the Cook might "lightly brynge me in the snare" (9. 77). He 
offers the Cook some wine, then tells a tale about why it is best to keep 
silent.14 The content of the prologue to the Manciple's Tale suggests 
that Chaucer created this altercation to motivate a second tale by the 
Cook. The design resembles the pattern of altercations he already had 
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created between the Miller and the Reeve and between the Friar and 
Summoner. 
Even if the speculation should prove unconvincing, the first line of 
fragment ten, which follows the Manciple's Tale and also contains but 
one tale (plus the retraction), indicates that Chaucer wanted to make a 
contrastive connection between the materials he finished before he 
stopped writing. The last fragment begins: "By that the Maunciple 
hadde his tale al ended" (10. 1). Evidently Chaucer intended a tempor­
al relationship between these two last fragments, the one following 
immediately upon the preceding one. In effect, therefore, he wanted 
the two tales by the Manciple and the Parson to be seen in contrast. 
Although the prologue to the last tale connects it to the fragment 
before, there is no indication, as in the other two fragments containing 
single tales, that Chaucer considered adding another tale. The position 
of the Parson's Tale at the end and the nature of its subject matter 
suggest a special consideration for it. It is conceived as a singularly 
important statement of man's spiritual purpose in life, intended "to 
knytte up al this feeste, and make an ende" (10. 47). It turns our 
attention to salvation, the main spiritual goal of European life in the 
fourteenth century. The Parson's treatise on sin and repentance 
represents an orthodox view of the world and of man's function in it. It 
was neither given to Chaucer's age, nor to Chaucer, to question or 
undercut the orthodoxy that the Parson's Tale represents. Whatever 
peculiar angle of devotion—Lollard or otherwise—this meditation 
might represent, the main lines of it respond to all that has come before 
in the Canterbury Tales with an earnest religious answer (and without 
the complication by personal motive one would expect from a 
fourteenth-century book about the nature of the world). Its existence in 
a fragment without other opinions in the forms of tales, but with 
Chaucer's own retraction, seems both appropriate and just. The fact 
that fragment ten contains only one tale, however, does not invalidate 
my argument about Chaucer's "fragmentizing" method since even 
fragment ten has a binary structure, if we consider Chaucer's retrac­
tion. 
My purpose in discussing the three single-tale fragments has been to 
delineate a potential pattern of composition similar to the compositional 
pattern of the other fragments. In the Canterbury Tales, seven of the ten 
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fragments contain at least two tellers and two tales; of the remaining 
three fragments, two contain materials for possible development into 
fragments of more than one teller and tale, and one opens by referring 
to a tale in the fragment before it. The evidence is overwhelming that 
Chaucer's compositional method was "fragmentizing," dialectically 
presenting in each fragment one valence—an issue, an opinion, an 
attitude, or a theme—and at least one counter or alternate valence. By 
such a method, he either limited authority or extended possibility in 
each of the fragments, and hence structured the Canterbury Tales by a 
principle of inconclusiveness that implied pluralism of opinion as its 
end. 
This principle of inconclusiveness has even motivated the enormous 
critical drive to establish unity in the Canterbury Tales. The com­
plicated diversity of themes and subjects without a clear architectonics, 
as in the Divine Comedy, challenges readers to order and organize 
meaning where Chaucer does not. We have been treated to arguments 
on the unity of the entire Canterbury Tales,15 the unity of fragment 
one,16 of fragment seven,17 and of fragment eight;18 there has also 
been an argument relating the thematics of fragment six to fragment 
five;19 and there have been many arguments relating the fragments 
that comprise the "Marriage Group,"20 commonly thought to include 
fragments three, four, and five, but to exclude the tales by the Friar, 
the Summoner, and the Squire within the fragments. No argument to 
my knowledge has ever been advanced about the unity of fragment six, 
despite many excellent analyses of each of the tales as independent 
entities. Yet such an argument could be made. 
The tales by the Physician and the Pardoner, which make up frag­
ment six, are unified by a common assumption about how language 
means. Both the Physician and the Pardoner invert the dichotomy 
between substance and accident by taking accident for substance. The 
canny Pardoner tells us he understands both the dichotomy and the 
inversion when he says: 
Thise cookes, how they stampe, and streyne, and grynde,

And turnen substaunce into accident,

To fulfille al thy likerous talent!

[6. 538-40] 
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Howard's analysis of the Pardoner and his tale has shown clearly how 
transposing the spiritual matter of salvation with the material matter of 
profit ultimately brings about the Pardoner's humiliation.21 A similar 
principle of inversion without the undoing of the teller works im­
plicitly in the Physicians Tale, which precedes the Pardoner's Tale in 
the fragment. The Physician tells a seemingly moral tale about false 
judges and contrasts it to the powerful bond between father and daugh­
ter, wherein true judgment is implied.22 A long introduction describes 
Nature's role in making creatures and the role of governesses and 
parents in nurturing them. The brief narrative then dwells upon the 
dilemma Virginius faces when Apius and his henchman plan to de­
bauch his namesake Virginia, hence ruin the reputation of both father 
and daughter. After establishing that Virginia was "floured in virgi­
nitee," chaste "as wel in goost as body" (6. 43-44), the narrator 
describes how Virginius interprets Virginia's chaste spiritual condition 
in terms of the physical condition of virginity. In defense against 
Apius's desire "in lecherie to lyven" (6. 206) with Virginia, Virginius 
beheads her: 
Hir heed of smoot, and by the top it hente, 
And to the juge he gan it to presente. 
[6. 255-56] 
Virginius deprives his daughter of her maiden's head in order to save 
her maidenhead. He presents the one to the judge who desires the 
other. Like its companion in the fragment, the Physician's Tale offers 
an example of the devastating effect of taking accident for substance. 
The inconclusiveness of the fragment lies in the ambivalent response 
readers feel. The Physician tells a story that he believes describes virtue 
defeating vice while we wonder how the means has justified the end. 
The Pardoner, a "ful vicious man" by his own admission, tells a 
"moral tale" (6. 459-60) whose end is material gain. Both tellers 
consistently reverse Saint Paul's dictum that the letter slayeth but the 
spirit giveth life, yet each in his own way proves the dictum right. 
Like fragment six, each fragment of binary structure presents a tale 
upon a certain theme and follows it with a tale that develops that theme 
in another, sometimes contrary, direction. The second response invari­
ably derives from the first, but the nature of its thrust is so different 
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that the second statement complicates the meaning of the first. The 
fragment becomes inconclusive by virtue of its mere placement in 
context of its companion. In fragment eight, for instance, both the tales 
by the Second Nun and the Canon's Yeoman deal with the idea of 
"business" and the profit derived from it. By a single-minded faith that 
borders on spiritual obstinacy, Cecilia multiplies the number of souls 
saved. The Canon's Yeoman by contrast, seeks to inspirit matter, 
transform and "multiplye" the worthless to the precious with the 
frustrating result that he is left black in the face. The order of reading, 
from the Second Nun's Tale to the Canon's Yeoman's Tale, however, 
reveals the theme of business, profit and "multiplicacion," unusually, 
for the first story is actually a simply told Saint's Life devoid of the 
explicit alchemical metaphor. Only by the retrospective contrast of the 
Canon's Yeoman's Tale, which follows it, does the literal story of Saint 
Cecilia assume the metaphorical richness we understand it to carry. In 
this way its structure is like fragment six, whose overall meaning 
works by a retrospective contrast. 
Fragments four and five also deal with two versions of the same 
theme, each version enriching the other by contrast and complicating 
our understanding of the theme. Because these fragments form the 
second and third parts of the "Marriage Group," we rarely consider 
them as independent units. When so considered, their forms appear to 
be related by virtue of their binary structure and different from the 
form of fragment three, which inaugurates the subject of marriage but 
is constructed in a very different way. Let us look first at these binary 
fragments of the "Marriage Group." 
Both the tales by the Clerk and the Merchant in fragment four are 
without doubt about the condition of marriage, and both refer to the 
Wife of Bath, who began the debate in fragment three. But the tales 
within this fragment also have a relationship in common beyond their 
considerations of marriage. Their common theme is the willfulness of 
men. Both tales, quite different in form, genre, and tone, present 
versions of willfulness in men and examine its effects, the former on 
the world within Walter's control, the latter on January himself. 
The Clerk's Tale examines Walter's willful testing of Griselde's 
promise "nevere willyngly, / in werk ne thoght," to "disobeye" (4. 
362-63). The clerk repeatedly criticizes the extent and severity of 
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Walter's testing. He even explains it in terms of psychological obses­
sion: 
But ther been folk of swich condicion 
That whan they have a certain purpos take, 
They kan nat stynte of hire entencion, 
But, right as they were bounden to a stake, 
They wol nat of that firste purpos slake. 
Right so this markys fulliche hath purposed 
To tempte his wyf as he was first disposed. 
[4. 701-7] 
The tale concludes by openly calling intolerable the relationship be­
tween dominance and submission that the narrative has described; 
instead it calls for a symbolic interpretation: 
This storie is seyd, nat for that wyves sholde 
Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee, 
For it were inportable, though they wolde; 
But for that every wight, in his degree, 
Sholde be constant in adversitee. 
[4. 1142-46] 
The Merchant's Tale approaches the issue of willfulness differently, 
suggesting that willfulness is endlessly tolerable as long as it is directed 
at the self, that is, as long as January blinds himself to the truth that his 
senses apprehend and his reason offers. "Ye algate in it wente! . . . He 
swyved thee, I saugh it with myne yen," (4. 2376-78), January ex­
claims to May in the pear tree. Yet he accepts her judgment that "Ye 
han som glymsyng, and no parfit sighte" (4. 2383), and her explana­
tion: 
Right so a man that longe hath blynd ybe, 
Ne may nat sodeynly so wel yse, 
First whan his sighte is newe come ageyn, 
[4. 2401"3] 
January even accepts what May tells him: "Ther may ful many a sighte 
yow bigile" before "youre sighte ysatled be a while" (4. 2405-6). The 
tale ends with January's continuance in willful blindness and with the 
happiness of a willed innocence as he looks forward to the birth of his 
heir: 
This Januarie, who is glad but he? 
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This Januarie, who is glad but he? 
He kisseth hire, and clippeth hire ful ofte, 
And on hire wombe he stroketh hire ful softe. 
[4. 2412-14] 
In the discussion of marriage, the Merchant's Tale neither challenges 
nor denies the Clerk's Tale. Rather, the two tales work together exam­
ining two versions of male willfulness in marriage and implying ways 
in which we can interpret and understand it. 
The relationship between the tales by the Squire and the Franklin, 
which make up fragment five, is less transparent because the Squire's 
Tale is itself incomplete. Since we do not know whether Chaucer 
created the tale as an intentional fragment, as he seems to have done 
with his tale of Sir Thopas, or simply never completed it, any examina­
tion of its relationship to the Franklin's Tale must remain speculative.23 
About the two tales of this fragment, however, this much is certain: the 
Franklin's Tale develops from the Franklin's response in the link to the 
Squire and his tale. Whether for reasons of flattery or for genuine 
appreciation, the Franklin admires the Squire's "gentil" manner. His 
own tale, of course, is about "gentillesse," and in it he is sanguine 
about the power of "gentillesse" in human beings to make things right 
and to overcome a difficult situation. By contrast, what we have of the 
Squire's Tale spends much time—its second part—emphasizing 
Canacee's "gentil herte" in response to the suffering falcon whose lover 
"semed welle of alle gentillesse" (5. 505), but who showed that he had 
"no gentillesse of blood" (5. 620) when he flew off with a "kyte." 
Whatever other matter the first part of the tale contains, whatever else 
of "grete mervailles" (5. 660) the Squire promises to tell but never 
does, seems peripheral to the central action of the second part of the 
tale, its most coherent part. The concern of this part is directly related 
to the concern of the Franklin's Tale. But whereas the second part of the 
Squire's Tale implies that "gentillesse" is a quality easily feigned, the 
Franklin's Tale understands the term as a genuine condition of char­
acter, not influenced by birth or limited to class. Though both tales use 
the concept of "gentillesse," each understands and applies it dif­
ferently, creating a sense, as with "multiplicacion," that "termes" 
themselves can create ambiguity because they can contain their con­
ceptual opposites within them. 
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The first fragment of the "Marriage Group," fragment three, con­
tains only one tale about marriage, and two others, by the Friar and the 
Summoner, that have nothing to do with marriage. It is curious that, 
however often the "Marriage Group" is discussed, from the time 
Eleanor Hammond introduced the term until now,24 no one has 
seemed particularly concerned with the possibility that this fragment 
might have its own thematic coherence not necessarily concerned with 
marriage.25 Moreover, critical interest in the subject of marriage in 
the three fragments that constitute the "Marriage Group" has caused us 
to overlook the fact that the form of fragment three is different from 
the form of the two other fragments. Fragment three contains a long 
prologue and three tales, two of which are intended as attack and 
rebuttal. The two other fragments do not follow this pattern, for they 
contain only two tales, the second of which is not conceived as an 
answer but as a variation on a theme presented in the first. The struc­
tural pattern of fragment three is more similar to the pattern of frag­
ment one than it is to the pattern of fragments four and five. Both 
fragments one and thre contain a long prologue, the earlier 858 lines 
long, the latter 856 lines long. Both prologues are then followed by a 
tale, one an epic that asks "what is this world, what asketh men to have" 
(1. 2777), the other a romance that asks what "wommen most desiren" 
(3. 905). Both fragments introduce a second tale of a different nature 
that yet a third pilgrim takes as a personal attack. The third teller then 
responds vengefully with a third tale to "quite" the insult. In form, 
then, and not considering the nature of the content, fragment three 
shows Chaucer working out a structural pattern already established in 
fragment one.26 
The similar pattern and construction of fragments one and three 
indicate that Chaucer also used another method to create inconclusive­
ness as he composed the fragments of the Canterbury Tales. This 
method was more complex than in the binary fragments, for it offered 
in a triadically structured fragment a causal motivation from the outer 
form to the second and third tales of the fragment. The difference 
between the two fragments under discussion is that whereas the second 
tale of fragment one, the Miller's Tale, reflects thematically on the 
first, the Knight's Tale, while it develops cause for a response from the 
Reeve to follow, the second tale of fragment three, the Friar's Tale, has 
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no obvious thematic connection to the Wife of Bath's Tale, which pre­
cedes it, although, like the earlier fragment, it develops cause for a 
response to follow from the Summoner.27 Let us look first at some 
thematic and structural connections within fragment one before con­
jecturing about analogous connections in fragment three. 
The Miller's Tale presents both a contrastive world view and parodic 
echoes of the Knight's Tale. It offers a fabliau and the spirit and values 
of the fabliau in place of the Knight's epic with its elevated philosophi­
cal concerns. Two idealistically loving knights trying to win a royal, 
bloodlessly virginal lady become in the Miller's Tale two libidinously 
driven clerks who seek to bed a lusty married wench; a mature, wise 
conquerer, a builder of civilization, who even protracts the action of 
the epic into a stadium he has built, yet learns by an act of the gods the 
limits of human power, becomes a foolish, old husband who builds 
circular tubs to serve as arks and becomes a laughing stock of the town 
because a young man's plan, in a manner of speaking, backfires. The 
window of the Knight's Tale, through which Palamon and Arcite view 
Emily and hence are laid low by love, is transposed down in the 
Miller's Tale to the window on the carpenter's wall through which both 
Nicholas and Absolom are laid low. In contrast to the parodic way the 
Miller's Tale echoes the Knight's Tale, the Reeve's Tale directly ans­
wers, genre for genre, gull for gull, the tale by the Miller with a 
personal animus that carries from the argument between the Miller 
and Reeve in the outer form into the fictions of the inner form. 
However, the tone and attitude of the Reeve's Tale are more vicious 
than the Miller's parody of the Knight's Tale because the intention is 
vengeance and not simply another opinion about the nature of the 
world. 
Despite structural similarity between fragments one and three, 
however, the thematic issues of fragment three are not clearly related 
from tale to tale as they are in fragment one, although the tone, 
intention, and the similarity in the genres of the second and third tales 
of fragment three directly correspond to the tales in the same position 
in the earlier fragment. The Friar mocks the Summoner in a tale 
whose theme concerns the relation of words to intention; in counterac­
tion, the Summoner tells a more vicious, scatological tale with the same 
theme, using the Friar—or a Friar—as the dupe. The relationship of 
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these tales to the tale by the Wife of Bath, however, is less clear. 
Unlike the parodic echoes in the Miller's Tale of subject and theme in 
the Knight's Tale, the Friar's Tale shows no obvious connection with the 
Wife of Bath's Tale, except that the Wife of Bath's theme in the tale— 
what women most desire—and her sermon-like talk on "gentillesse" 
and age reflect Chaucer's interest, as in her prologue, in words, in the 
power of words, and in having the last word. Although these thematic 
concerns relate only obliquely to the thematic concerns with the mean­
ing of words that course through the Friar's Tale and that imbue the 
form of the Summoner's Tale with a kind of nominalistic wit, they all 
have a common source in books one and two of Saint Jerome's Contra 
Joviniam.2* 
I am less interested in the thematic connection between the tales of 
fragment three than I am in how the pattern of construction, a long 
prologue and three tales the second of which motivates the third, 
resembles the pattern of construction of fragment one, and how this 
structural affinity between fragments reveals Chaucer at work on a 
more complex manner of extending the possibilities of inconclusiveness 
than the fragments containing only two tales offer. If the form of the 
Canterbury Tales comprises a series of fragments representing opinions 
that individual consciousnesses project in fictional form, the fragments 
containing three tales each imply a more extensive analysis of the effects 
of varying opinions. In addition to offering two opinions about the 
nature of the world, these fragments present characters who respond 
directly to those opinions, as if the opinions were insults to their own 
integrity; in turn, the characters answer the insult vindictively. Frag­
ments one and three therefore not only reveal a sense of inconclusive­
ness but imply that the pluralism the inconclusiveness suggests may 
create difficulty, especially when vicious motives are either perceived 
or imagined. 
I l l 
By considering thematic as well as structural relationships within the 
individual fragments, I have not meant to argue either for a thematic 
unity or for a single meaning in the Canterbury Tales. Although critics 
have argued for a singular, univocal meaning29 and have sensed a 
unifying artistic purpose,30 my own endeavor has been to show that 
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Chaucer's characteristic mode of operation in the Canterbury Tales was 
to create inconclusiveness by a principle of "fragmentizing." Within 
each fragment he offered either another opinion on the same subject or 
theme, or a similar opinion handled differently or in opposition to the 
first. In those fragments containing only one tale, he generally built in 
the possibility for the development of a second, limiting opinion; in the 
other fragments, he offered at least two opinions, the second making 
the first only a partial answer. 
Nowhere in Chaucer's works do we get a fuller, more complete 
picture of the kind of poet Chaucer was, of the breadth of his talent, 
and of the pluralistic effect inconclusiveness could create in the struc­
ture of a fragment than in fragment seven, the longest fragment of 
Canterbury Tales. To close this study of the ways in which inconclusive­
ness functions in the development of Chaucer's narrative forms, I shall 
examine the structure of this fragment, for in it we find Chaucer's most 
mature—at least, most sophisticated—uses of inconclusivness and the 
rich dramatic effect he could create with it. 
Although fragment seven is the only fragment of the Canterbury 
Tales considerably more developed than the fragments containing 
merely two or three tales, Chaucer's pattern within it of alternating 
kinds of tales and tellers supports my claim that he created in­
conclusiveness in all his fragments by providing a counter-valence to a 
first tale with a second. Robinson says about fragment seven that "there 
seems to be no principle of arrangement save that of contrast and 
variety."31 Although this fragment does not continually alternate 
humorous and serious tales—the serious Tale ofMelibee is followed by 
the more serious, because depressing, Monk's Tale—the variety of 
genres that the fragment contains directs our attention to the sense of 
multiplicity underlying Chaucer's constructional practice. This sense 
of multiplicity in turn makes it impossible to attach a univocal meaning 
to Chaucer's intention. Even Alan Gaylord, who thinks the fragment is 
unified by the subject of "the art of story telling," admits that the 
subject is "very broad."32 His argument supports mine in its claim 
that the broad-based subject and highly developed action in the links of 
the outer form of fragment seven serve to make judgment and evalua­
tion the responsibility of the reader rather than of the poet. Harry 
Bailly's simplistic and often misguided assertions cause us to refuse his 
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judgments as either overly nice or overly bourgeois. Harry is working 
Chaucer the poet's purpose of creating inconclusiveness by making 
judgments unacceptable to us. Gaylord recognizes this when he claims 
that if "Harry is the Apostle of the Obvious, Chaucer is the master of 
Indirections."33 Indirection is, of course, one of the principles of 
construction of this fragment as well as of the Canterbury Tales as a 
whole. Its relation to inconclusiveness is obvious in that Chaucer's 
roundabout means of composition, whose goals are not usually clear, 
keep the form from concluding in any certain way the options and 
questions it offers or raises. 
Fragment seven is the most striking example of Chaucer's technique 
of constructing inconclusive fragments not only because it combines a 
variety of genres and develops Harry Bailly as an inappropriate editor 
of the tales. The complex interrelationship between teller and tale as 
well as the juxtaposition of moral and generic considerations make the 
fragment a most significant example. The S/iipman's Tale, for instance, 
is a bawdy and witty fabliau. Yet the tale contains a dark undercurrent 
about the viciousness of mankind that robs the fabliau form of its 
expected joyous energy, an energy felt even in the angry, vicious 
Reeve's fabliau.34 The Prioress's Tale, moreover, intended as a tonal 
and thematic counter to the Shipman's fabliau, is complicated by the 
Prioress's extensive use of an overly sentimental and judgmental 
rhetoric. Like the Reeve's Tale, the Prioress's Tale functions as a psy­
chological revelation of character that cuts deeper than a simple 
appropriateness of tale to teller. It reveals so many particular aspects of 
the Prioress's character, as it was presented in the General Prologue, 
that a typological interpretation of her "condicioun" as the tale reveals 
it is finally less than satisfactory. In light of what we know about her 
naivete and secular aspirations, one cannot read her tale simply as a 
pious Miracle of the Blessed Virgin.35 
Absurdity characterizes Chaucer's Tale of Sir Thopas. The parodic 
and comical mood he establishes in the tale counteracts the sober effect 
of the Prioress's narrative. This tale not only makes fun of the form 
and content of metrical romance; it claims, if taken seriously (and 
Chaucer the pilgrim tells us the tale in absolute earnest), that a legiti­
mate literary genre may be a total failure and that a narrative form can 
be meaningless. Sir Thopas argues for meaninglessness based on a 
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principle of incoherence. Its effect is not much different from that of 
the House of Fame, except that in the earlier poem incoherence seemed a 
problem caused by trying to handle too much within a single form and 
trying to direct that overabundance toward a single conclusion. In Sir 
Thopas, however, incoherence is intentional, not accidental. Harry is 
right that this brilliantly allusive story is "drasty," hence "nat worth a 
toord" (7. 2120). Meaninglessness is its reason for being, and the 
purposeful interruption at the beginning of the Third Fit is as good a 
place to end it as any, for a poem without a meaning cannot have a 
natural conclusion.36 
The purposeful interruption of the Tale of Sir Thopas reminds us 
that there is a fictional audience, not unlike us, attentive to the fictions, 
aware of its responsibility to evaluate. Like us, they too are seeking 
"sentence" and "solaas" from the stories, and like us, they may be 
periodically confused about the point and purpose of a tale. The case is 
even clearer later in the fragment when Chaucer has the Knight in­
terrupt the Monk, for unlike the Tale of Sir Thopas, the meaning of the 
Monk's Tale is very clear indeed. Its clarity not its confusion is what 
makes it intolerable. 
Chaucer's second tale of Melibee is no tale at all. It is a close transla­
tion of Renaud de Louen's Livre de Melibee. Like the Boece, and even 
like the meditation that comprises the Parson's Tale, the treatise could 
probably have stood on its own as one of Chaucer's translations, except 
that its sober reasoning and its argument against vengeful action pro­
vide an antidote to the driving activity, "prickynge," and challenging 
that characterize the Tale of Sir Thopas; hence it serves as a variational 
possibility within the fragment. It does not come, however, as a wel­
come relief; for although the argument of the Melibee is interestingly 
worked out, its length and sober proverbial style seem to be a problem 
for modern readers.37 Harry's response to the tale is positive, but his 
understanding of the virtue of prudence seems doubtful and his narrow 
application of the moral is reductive. Ironically, Harry sees the 
Melibee not only as a moral treatise but as a fiction from which he 
would like his wife to learn something. 
With Chaucer's Tale of Melibee, the pattern of alternation so far 
structuring fragment seven ends, for the Monk's Tale continues the 
sobriety established by the Melibee despite Harry's contrary ex­
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pectations. It moves the sober tone into the realm of the dour and 
bitter. Difficult as the Melibee is to read through, its vision is con­
tinually optimistic. Just the opposite is true of the Monk's Tale. It is a 
pessimistic vision of the world and of man's powerlessness in it. Its 
pessimism is the reason for its remaining incomplete, for the Knight 
senses that the tale contains too much unmediated heaviness. The in­
teresting thing about the Monk's Tale for our purposes is that its 
intentional incompleteness comes about for reasons opposite to those 
that left Sir Thopas purposefully incomplete. Whereas Sir Thopas is 
incomplete because its absurdity and incoherence make conclusivness 
of any sort impossible, the Monk's Tale is incomplete because, like the 
Legend of Good Women, it is conclusive with a vengeance. The Monk's 
Tale may be the most conclusive piece of literature Chaucer ever wrote. 
For the Monk, tragedy is a foregone conclusion, and all the stories that 
make up the tale appear as examples of the same conclusion established 
from beginning—that Fortune deprives man of happiness and that life 
continually frustrates man's urges for power. The two definitions of 
tragedy that flank the seventeen examples are slightly different from 
each other, but the argument of the tale is constructed by a method of 
post hoc, propter hoc, unlike any of Chaucer's other fictions. What is 
defined at the beginning and fictively exemplified throughout the mid­
dle is again redefined at or toward the end (the manuscripts are not 
consistent in their organization of the separable parts of the tale). The 
form of the entire tale is a conclusion, but the conclusion is unsatisfying 
to two members of the pilgrimage and apparently to the poet, so that it 
is interrupted, gently by the Knight and severely by Harry, and then 
followed by the Nun's Priest's Tale, whose greatest virtue is, by con­
trast, the inconclusiveness of its form and the joy that inconclusiveness 
produces. 
The Nun's Priest's Tale may be Chaucer's most beloved tale, but 
nobody has been able to offer a total reading of its meaning. The 
illusiveness of its meaning is, in fact, its chief delight. From its hum­
ble opening, as in black and white, the fable bursts forth into glorious 
technicolor once it moves into the locus amoenus—Chauntecleer's Para­
dise, "a yeerde . . . enclosed al aboute / with stikkes and a drye dych 
without" (7. 2847-48). In this enclosed "yeercle," chickens enact the 
fall of man (birds were always Chaucer's favorite exemplary animals), 
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and his salvation as well. Just as Chauntecleer, despite the warning of 
his dream and his conclusion that "I shal han of this avisioun / 
adversitee" (7. 3152-53), flies down from his edenic perch toward 
impending tragedy, so too he saves himself by his chicken-wit. By the 
end of the story, he has flown "heighe upon a tree" (7. 3417), safe 
from death. From serious line to serious line, the story offers a fre­
quently altering set of attitudes that offer as frequently an altered set of 
conclusions. If anything is certain about the Nun's Priest's Tale, it is its 
alterability, its shifting morality, and its "continuously human sugges­
tion of the relativity of things."38 Chaucer draws through its plot most 
of his literary interests: the value of dreams; the value of love; the 
nature of heroism; the nature of wit; the function of rhetoric; even the 
value of poetry. At the end of the tale, the priest-narrator asks us to 
take the "moralite," assuming that we are "goode men" (7. 3440). But 
the morality is as shifting and inconclusive as the rest of its form. Is it 
that we should not listen to our wives, or that we should? Is it that we 
should pay attention to our dreams, should not be caught in "sensual 
music," should not listen to flattery, should not speak too soon, or 
should use our wits to save us when all else seems to fail? The tale 
suggests all, not one, even though some of the morals reside in joyful 
contradiction with others. 
Since we know almost nothing about the tale's narrator, only that he 
is a brawny priest riding as a part of the Prioress's entourage and that 
he promises to be "myrie" (7. 2817), we can have few expectations for 
the genre or meaning of the story he will tell. The story echoes lines, 
attitudes, and considerations of all the tales that precede it in the 
fragment but never rests long enough to offer a solid ground for 
comparative interpretation. As a mock epic, it incorporates elements of 
fabliau and of tragedy. The Nun's Priest discourses with learning but 
denies learnedness; he raises serious issues about value but claims 
meaninglessness, for his story is simply a tale of a cock. He denies any 
rhetorical ability with brilliant rhetorical flourishes. Even the textual 
problem with calendar time, remarked by modern editors,39 seems to 
work toward the tale's inconclusive effect: 
Whan that the month in which the world bigan, 
That highte March, whan God first maked man, 
Was compleet, and passed were also, 
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Syn March bigan, thritty dayes and two,

Bifel that Chauntecleer in al his pryde,

His sevene wyves walkynge by his syde,

Caste up his eyen to the brighte sonne

That in the signe of Taurus hadde yronne

Twenty degrees and oon, and somewhat moore,

And knew by kynde, and by noon oother loore,

That it was pryme, and crew with blisful stevene.

"The sonne," he seyde, "is clomben up on hevene

Fourty degrees and oon, and moore ywis."

[7. 3187-99] 
Counting from the time that "the world bigan," that time when "God 
first maked man," and depending on Chauntecleer's expertise at read­
ing the heavens astrologically, "by kynde," we get two dates, without 
textual correction, during which the al most-tragedy occurs. The first 
date is May third, a date Chaucer mentions specifically elsewhere.40 
The other date is April first, sustaining any opinion that this tale may 
be taken as an April Fool's joke. Just as the meaning of the tale seems 
conceived in inconclusiveness, so the dates do not align. But their 
nonalignment does not matter. Relativity in telling time seems to this 
tale of a piece with the inconclusiveness of its form. It is with this 
joyously inconclusive tale that Chaucer ends his longest fragment after 
wandering through, testing, and complicating meaning by varying a 
group of dissimilar tales in different genres. Among the many senses 
with which we are left at the end of this tale and of the fragment is the 
sense that everything will be all right. 
Patrick Gallacher argues that the concept of catharsis informs and 
enlivens the Nuns Priest's Tale on both its literal and symbolic levels.41 
In a more figurative way, the same could be said about the form of the 
entire Canterbury Tales. The Nun's Priest's Tale exemplifies an in­
conclusive form within the inner form of the Canterbury Tales analo­
gous to the form of the entire work. Just as meaning within the tale 
constantly alters, points one way then another, raises emotion and 
purges it while on its inexorable route to an end that is ultimately 
happy, though inconclusively so, the form of the Canterbury Tales 
raises alters, shifts, and purges whole spheres of emotion, suggesting a 
spectrum of meaning as the pilgrims move toward Canterbury. The 
form continually tests the appropriateness of opinion while supplying a 
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rich texture of suggestions about the possibilities of literature to imitate 
life and mind, and to mean conclusively. Because often peculiar psy­
chology controls meaning and projects it through various narrative 
genres, the entire form of the Canterbury Tales suggests, finally, that 
for Chaucer conclusive meaning in literature is neither possible nor 
desirable. Yet the form also suggests that opinion itself may validly 
serve as a means for poetry. 
The Canterbury Tales is Chaucer's final, most complex, narrative 
form. It represents the culmination of a career of literary experimenta­
tion with both dream visions and storial narratives. Whatever lessons 
Chaucer learned about meaning and its inconclusiveness from his ear­
lier, more limited, works stood him in good stead as he produced the 
Canterbury Tales. Chaucer was never able to write comfortably within 
the traditional forms he inherited because his questioning mind and 
ambivalent temperament seeking to discover how poetry could 
represent truth continually encountered frustration, equivocation, in­
conclusiveness. Remarkably in the Canterbury Tales Chaucer dis­
covered that he could construct a work that could suggest versions of 
truth; he did not need to adjudicate which version was the best, the 
most acceptable. He could leave evaluation to his audience and to his 
interpreters while he presented all possibilities and denied none. 
Through a series of responses to the questions "What is this world, 
what asketh men to have?", Chaucer produced a narrative form com­
prising many plausible imitations of reality that suggests pluralism 
through opinion. 
This form was not without its problems for Chaucer. The pluralistic 
nature of reality that the form suggests must have worried this poet 
whose earlier works express a continuously earnest desire to know 
things with certainty. The relativity that the form implies may well 
have led Chaucer to create in his later fragments the dark implications 
about meaning and about truth in the world that Howard has 
noticed.42 In these late fragments, Chaucer counterbalances opinions 
about the value of spiritual alchemy and the valuelessness of material 
alchemy; he offers us the Manciple's impassioned conclusion to "kepe 
wel thy tonge, and thenk upon the crowe" (9. 362); and finally, he 
offers us a meditation that is intended to put us in mind of the heavenly 
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city of "Jerusalem celestial" (10. 51). These conclusions suggest an 
increasing realization on Chaucer's part that the form of Canterbury 
Tales was growing problematic, not only because it was implying a 
skepticism that literature could provide certainty of meaning, but be­
cause the relativity that his inconclusive form was offering frightened 
him. The fact that Chaucer chose to end his Canterbury Tales with an 
orthodox Christian meditation by the most idealized pilgrim, and to 
follow it by his own retraction, despite the unfinished state of the 
middle, suggests that he was finally more fearful of the future of his 
soul than the experimental nature of his poetry implies. 
In the fifteenth century, when most of the manuscripts of the Can­
terbury Tales were being copied, those English and Scots poets whom 
we call Chaucerians because they continually imitated and praised 
Chaucer showed little interest in imitating the form the master de­
veloped in the Canterbury Tales.*3 To be sure, Lydgate attempted in 
the prologue to the Siege of Thebes to attach himself to the pilgrimage 
and to tell a Canterbury Tale; Henryson used the Nun's Priest's Tale 
(without its inconclusiveness) in his Fables; and Dunbar used the mate­
rials of the Wife of Bath in his sarcastic Twa Married Ladyes and the 
Widow. Otherwise these Chaucerians of the fifteenth century were 
more interested in imitating the forms of the earlier Chaucer, the 
dream visions and the love narratives. Apparently the fifteenth century 
in England was not congenial to a literary form that enjoyed incon­
clusiveness and the possibilities for pluralistic meaning it suggested. 
For this reason, perhaps, when we work back from the Renaissance, 
we spend little time in the fifteenth century, but move directly to 
Chaucer in the fourteenth for strong signs of a modern epistemology. 
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the persona, but we also recognize a distinction. However, cf. the admonitions in Bertrand H. 
Bronson, In Search of Chaucer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 25—32, and in 
John M. Major, "The Personality of Chaucer the Pilgrim," PMLA 80 (1965): 337-43. On the 
artistic uses of the Chaucerian persona in the dream-visions as opposed to the Canterbury Tales, see 
Dorothy Bethurum, "Chaucer's Point of View as Narrator in the Love Poems," PMLA 74 
(1959): 511-20. 
20. For examinations of the opening and its relation to the meaning of the poem, see H. S. 
Bennett, Chaucer and the Fifteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), pp. 89-90; 
Everett, "Chaucer's Love Visions, with Particular Reference to the Parlement of Foules," in 
Essays, pp. 103 ff.; J. A. W. Bennett, The Parliament of Fowls: An Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 29 ff.; D. S. Brewer, ed., The Parlement of Foulys (London: 
Nelson, 1960), pp. 48 ff.; Clemen, Early Poetry, pp. 130 ff.; Payne, Key of Remembrance, p. 
143; George D. Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 125 ff.; David, Strumpet Muse, pp. 21 ff.; Burlin, 
Chaucerian Fiction, pp. 84 ff. 
21. David, Strumpet Muse, p. 21, comes close to, but finally ducks, the issue of the syntax by 
stating: "One expects the old adage to be applied to the art of poetry, not, as it actually turns out, 
the art of love, but the art of poetry is never far from Chaucer's mind in composing the so-called 
'love visions'." Burlin, Chaucerian Fiction, pp. 84-85, faces the matter of the syntactic ambigu­
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ity, analyzes it rhetorically, and concludes: "It is still possible to ask, is this an art of love or an art 
of loving? A treatise of philosophical objectivity or a practical handbook? Both possibilities seem 
to inform the opening lines." 
22. Bennett, Parliament ofFoules, pp. 44—45, argues that the certain thing is "love doctrine." 
23. Bennett, Parliament ofFoules, p. 69. 
24. Cf. Robert M. Lumiansky, "Chaucer's Parlement of Foules: A Philsophical Interpreta­
tion," RES 24 (1948): 81-89. 
25. The unpleasant quality of Craft is apparently intensified by either confusion or mistransla­
tion from Boccaccio. Regarding these lines, Bennett points out the following in a note: "In the 
following line Craft is described as 'disfigurat'—a nonce word, derived from Boccaccio's sfigur­
ate; the etymological note in O.E.D., s.v., requires revision" {Parliament ofFowles, p. 88 n. 3). 
26. However, cf. Howard Schless, "Transformations: Chaucer's Use of Italian," in Chaucer, 
ed. Brewer, pp. 197-207. 
27. Cf. Charles O. McDonald, "An Interpretation of Chaucer's Parliament ofFoules" Specu­
lum 30 (1955): 456-57. 
28. See the reading in Economou, The Goddess Natura, pp. 145 ff. 
Chapter Four 
1. My distinction between the two kinds of narratives Chaucer wrote—dream-vision and 
storial—is not intended to substitute for the different, interesting, though not particularly rele­
vant distinctions between the various narrative genres in which Chaucer composed. On the 
question of Chaucerian genres, see Paul Strohm, "Some Generic Distinctions in the Canterbury 
Tales," MP 68 (1970-71): 321-28; and also his "Storie, Spelle, Geste, Romaunce, Tragedie: 
Generic Distinctions in the Middle English Troy Narratives," Speculum 46 (1971): 348-59. See 
as well the review article by Theodore A. Stroud, "Genres and Themes: A Reaction to Two Views 
of Chaucer," MP 72 (1974): 60-70. 
2. Robinson, in Works, p. 790, note to 1. 105, lists parallels between Anelida and the Squire's 
Tale. The list of parallels may be intended to suggest that Chaucer composed the Squire's Tale at 
about the time he was composing Anelida, but Robinson never asserts this. 
3. See Payne, Key of Remembrance, pp. 69-73. 
4. On Chaucer's use of Statius, see B. A. Wise, The Influence of Statius upon Chaucer 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1911); and Paul M. Clogan, "Chaucer and the 
Thebiad Scholia," SP 61 (1964): 599-615. 
5. Robert A. Pratt, "Chaucer's Use of the Teseida," PMLA 62 (1964): 599-614. 
6. Cf. Michael D. Cherniss, "Chaucer's Anelida and Arcite: Some Conjectures," ChauR 5 
(1970): 9-21. 
7. See the argument by James I. Wimsatt, "Anelida and Arcite: A Narrative of Complaint and 
Comfort," ChauR 5 (1970): 1-8. 
8. For a recent argument about the Complaint of Mars and the Complaint of Venus as a single 
poem—the Broche of Thebes—see Rodney Merrill , Chaucer's "Broche of Thebes": The Unity of The 
Complaint of Mars and The Complaint of Venus, Literary monographs, no. 5 (Madison: Univer­
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1972), pp. 1-61. 
9. See Robinson, "Introductory Remarks to Explanatory Notes on Anelida and Arcite," 
Works, p. 789. 
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10. Cf. Robert M. Jordan, "The Narrator of Chaucer's Troi/us," ELH 25 (1958): 237-57. 
11. "Distance and Predestination in Trot/us and Criseyde," PMLA 72 (1957): 14-26; rpt., and 
hereafter quoted from, Essays and Explorations: Studies in Ideas, Language, and Literature (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 200-216. This quotation is from p. 203. 
12. Ibid., p. 206. 
13. Muscatine, French Tradition, pp. 132—33. 
14. E Talbot Donaldson, "Criseide and her Narrator," in Speaking of Chaucer (London: 
Athlone Press, 1970), pp. 68-69. 
15. See Robert A. Durling, The Figure of the Poet in the Renaissance Epic (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1965), esp. pp 44—66. 
16. Bloomfield, "Distance," p. 210. 
17. Aristotle's argument that plot is more significant than character is implicit as a value 
throughout his Poetics, although he confronts the issue explicitly only in chapter 6. I have used the 
translation by Francis Fergusson (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), pp. 61—64. 
18. Muscatine, French Tradition, p. 133. 
19. Cf. Geoffrey Shepherd, "Troilus and Criseyde," in Chaucer and Chaucerians, ed. D. S. 
Brewer (University: University of Alabama Press, 1966), pp. 65-87; see also Michael E. 
Cotton, "The Artistic Integrity of Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde," ChauR 7 (1972): 37—43. 
20. This is also implied by Alfred David, "The Hero of the Troilus," Speculum 37 (1962): 
566-81. 
21. Charles A. Owen, Jr., "The Significance of Chaucer's Revisions of Troilus and Criseyde," 
MP 55 (1957-58): 5. 
22. On the relationship between Troilus and Pandarus, see Alan T. Gaylord, "Friendship in 
Chaucer's Troilus," ChauR 3 (1969): 239-64; and Leah R. Freiwald, "Swych Love of Frendes: 
Pandarus and Troilus," ChauR 6 (1971): 120-29. 
23. For extensive analyses of how the form of Troilus manifests this tension through paradox 
and ambiguity, see Muscatine, French Tradition, pp. 124—65; Ida L. Gordon, The Double Sorrow 
of Troilus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), passim; Patricia M. Kean, Chaucer and the 
Making of English Poetry, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 2:112-78; 
Donald W. Rowe, O Love O Charite! Contraries Harmonized in Chaucer's Troilus (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), passim. 
24. On Chaucer's revisions of Troilus, see Robert Kilburn Root, The Textual Tradition of 
Chaucer's Troilus, Chaucer Society, 1st ser., 99 (1916; rpt. New York: Johnson Reprints, 1967); 
and The Book of Troilus and Criseyde (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1926), pp. 
xii-xiii, lxx-lxxxi. More recently, see Owen, "Revisions," pp. 1-5. 
25. Bloomfield, "Distance," p. 206, describes the several ways in which Chaucer emphasizes 
"the struggle of the artist-narrator against the brutality of the facts to which he cannot give a good 
turn. As a faithful historian, he cannot evade the rigidity of decisive events—the given." 
26. Cf. James I. Wimsatt, "Medieval and Modern in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde," PMLA 
92 (1977): 203-16, which seeks to demonstrate that the concrete universal works in the poem. 
27. "Chaucerian Tragedy," ELH 19 (1952): 1-37; Monica E. MacAlpine, The Genre of 
Troilus and Criseyde (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), which reached me after I 
had written this chapter, interestingly supplies some needed corrections to Robertson's Boethian 
argument. 
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28. On Chaucer's use of this imagery, see Stephen Barney, "Troilus Bound," Speculum 48 
(1972): 445-58. 
29. Among the many essays on the philosophical implications of Troilus, see especially Walter 
Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences (1926; revised and enlarged, New York: Barnes 
and Noble, 1960), pp. 241-98; Howard R. Patch, "Troilus on Determinism," Speculum 6 
(1929): 225-43; Theodore A. Stroud, "Boethius' Influence on Chaucer's Troilus," MP 45 
(1951-52): 1-9; John P. McCall, "Five Book Structure in Chaucer's Troilus, MLQ 23 (1962): 
297-308; Donald R. Howard, The Three Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 79-160. 
30. Cf. Joseph E. Gallagher, "Theology and Intention in Chaucer's Troilus," ChauR 7 (1972): 
44-66. 
31. Few critics of Troilus have been able to avoid discussing the unsettling effects on the poem's 
form of its ending. For specific discussions of the problem, but with varying conclusions, see 
Curry, Medieval Sciences, pp. 294-98; E. Talbot Donaldson, "The Ending of Chaucer's 
Troilus," in Early English and Norse Studies Presented to Hugh Smith, ed. Arthur Brown and Peter 
Foote (London: Methuen, 1963), pp. 26-45, rpt. xnSpeaking, pp. 84-101; Peter Dronke, "The 
Conclusion of Troilus and Criseyde," MAE 33 (1964): 47-52; Anthony E. Farnham, "Chau­
cerian Irony and the ending of the Troilus," ChauR 1 (1967): 207-16; Muscatine, French 
Tradition, pp. 161-65; John M. Steadman, Disembodied Laughter: Troilus and the Apotheosis 
Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), esp. pp. 112-67; David, Strumpet 
Muse, pp. 27-36. See also Alice R. Kaminsky, Chaucer's Troulus & Criseyde and the Critics 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1980). 
32. "What Chaucer Really Did to // Filostrato," in Essays and Studies by Members of the English 
Association 17 (1932): pp. 56-75. 
Chapter Five 
1. The curious position the Legend of Good Women holds in criticism of Chaucer's develop­
ment as a narrative artist may be exemplified by the fact that Muscatine's significant book on the 
development of style and meaning throughout Chaucer's career does not at all deal with the poem 
but moves rather from Troilus to the Canterbury Tales. It may also be exemplified by the 
strikingly honest opening sentence of the preface to Robert Worth Frank, Chaucer and the Legend 
of Good Women (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. vii: "This book is 
designed to fill a gap in Chaucerian Studies, though I might wish it had been done long since by 
another hand." 
2. Increasingly, Chaucer critics are recognizing that the Legend of Good Women, especially its 
prologues, represents a significant, even crucial, turning point in Chaucer's poetic career. See 
Frank, Legend, pp. 1-10; Payne, "Making His Own Myth," ChauR 9 (1975): 197-211; David, 
Strumpet Muse, pp. 36-51. Payne has always been one of the poem's great partisans and support­
ers: see Key of Remembrance, esp. pp. 91—112. 
3. See, for example, Frank, Legend, pp. 52 and 88 ff.; see also Fyler, Ovid and Chaucer, p. 
99. 
4. John Gower, Moral Philosopher and Friend of Chaucer (New York: New York University 
Press, 1964), p. 235. No one, however, knows what the nature of the command was, or if the 
command included a prescription for form, as it seems to have included a prescription for theme. 
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The accusations against the poet in the prologue suggest that the actions and nature of the heroine 
in Troilus may have created a stir to which the poet responded by writing this piece. 
5. Frank, Legend, pp. 176—79. 
6. Ibid., pp. 189-210. 
7. If the Monk's Tale were indeed written earlier in Chaucer's career than the "Canterbury" 
period, its form could be the prototype even for the storial portion of the Legend of Good Women. 
8. The prologue to the Legend of Good Women has come down to us in two versions. The 
F-version has most manuscript support and is assumed to be the earlier; the G-version exists in 
only one manuscript (Cambridge University Gg. 4.27) and is assumed to be later. Bertrand H. 
Bronson, In Search of Chaucer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 52, says that 
"the differences between the two prologues are so important that distinct poems are the result." 
He mentions that in the F-version, the poet "appears to display a continuous and intense personal 
involvement. In G, on the contrary, the tone of everything that is revised or now first introduced 
is invariably soberer, more detached, more suited to advancing years." Although it is fascinating 
to consider the two versions separately and to examine ways in which Chaucer changed his 
prologue for the better or for the worse, the differences between the two versions, despite 
Bronson's asertion about the importance of changes from one to the other, have little relevance for 
my argument. I shall therefore discuss the prologue as if it were one prologue, indicating which 
version after quotations. 
9. Key of Remembrance, pp. 103-4. 
10. Based presumably on the assumption that Chaucer felt the persona's penance to be unjustly 
imposed, it has been argued that most of the legends are not really about good women but about 
bad ones, which makes the poem a kind of oblique satire. See H. C. Goddard, Chaucer's Legend 
of Good Women, JEGP 7 (1908): 87-129, and 8 (1909): 47-111; and Robert M. Lumiansky, 
"Chaucer and the Idea of Unfaithful Men," MLN 62 (1947): 560-62. Cf. Fyler, Chaucer and 
Ovid, pp. 96-123. 
11. Howard, Idea, esp. pp. 159-88. 
12. "The Literary Form of the Prologue," p. 174. 
13. Idea, esp. pp. 1—20 and 25—28, argues that the idea of Canterbury Tales is complete, 
although the work actually exists in fragments. My own argument does not seek to contradict 
Howard's thesis; rather, it wishes to alter the terms. 
14. Cf. James Dean, "The Ending of the Canterbury Tales, 1952—1976," Texas Studies in 
Literature and Language 21 (1979): 17-33. 
15. Cf. Howard, Idea, p. 53: "It is in the nature of amorality to be inconclusive, as it is in the 
nature of 'concluded' works to have, or seem to have, a moral or a 'theme'." 
16. David, Strumpet Muse, p. 91. 
17. Portions of the following discussion have appeared in my "Catalogue Form and Catalogue 
Style in the General Prologue of the Canterbury Tales," Studia Neophilologica 52 (1980): 35-46. 
18. These texts have been conveniently printed and discussed in Edmond Faral, Les Art 
poetiques du XII' et du XIII' siecle: Recherches et documents sur la technique litteraire du Moyen Age 
(Paris: Librairie Honors Champion, 1962). See also James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle 
Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974), pp. 135-93. 
19. Alice M. Colby, The Portrait in Twelfth-Century French Literature (Geneva: Librairie 
Droz, 1965), pp. 23-88. 
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20. Guillaume de Lorris et Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose, 2 vols., ed. Felix Lecoy, Les 
Classiques Frangais du Moyen Age (Paris: Librairie Honore Champion, 1965-66), 11. 525-36; 
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21. See E. Talbot Donaldson, "The Idiom of Popular Poetry in the Miller's Tale," English 
Institute Essays, 1950, ed. A. S. Downer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 
116-40; rpt. Speaking, pp. 13-29. 
22. Works, p. 834, note to 1. 813. 
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"General Prologue" to the Canterbury Tales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
24. Robert P. Miller, "Chaucer's Pardoner, the Scriptural Eunuch, and the Pardoner's Tale," 
Speculum 30 (1955): 180-99; however, cf. Monica E. MacAlpine, "The Pardoner's 
Homosexuality and How It Matters," PMLA 95 (1980): 8-22. 
25. Preface, p. 320. 
26. There have been many excellent analyses of the Prioress's portrait. See especially Robert 
W. Hanning, "From Eva to Ave to Eglentyne and Alisoun: Chaucer's Insight into the Roles 
Women Play," Signs, Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2 (1977): 580-99, esp. 585-91; 
Florence H. Ridley, The Prioress and the Critics, University of California Publications, English 
Studies, No. 30 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 16-21; E. Talbot Donald­
son, Chaucer's Poetry: An Anthology for the Modern Reader (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 
883-85, and "The Masculine Narrator and Four Women of Style," in Speaking, pp. 59-64. 
27. On the distinction between the Pilgrim and the Poet, Donaldson's essay "Chaucer the 
Pilgrim," PMLA 69 (1954), has become the locus classicus. 
28. On the relationship of the Monk to the chivalric world, see Robert E. Kaske, "The 
Knight's Interruption of the Monk's Tale," ELH 24 (1957): 249-68. 
29. "The Canterbury Tales: Style of the Man and Syle of the Work," in Brewer, Chaucerians, p. 
95. 
30. Helge Kokeritz, "Rhetorical Word-Play in Chaucer," PMLA 69 (1954): 937-52; Paull 
F. Baum, "Chaucer's Puns," PMLA 71 (1956): 225-46, and "Chaucer's Puns: A Supplemen­
tary List," PMLA 73 (1958): 167-70; Norman D. Hinton, "More Puns in Chaucer," AN&Q 2 
(1964): 115-16. 
Chapter Six 
1. The complicated thematic nature of Canterbury Tales has been perhaps the most extensively 
discussed issue in Chaucer criticism. Recently it has been most comprehensively discussed by Paul 
Ruggiers, The Art of the Canterbury Tales (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 
passim; Bernard F. Huppe", A Reading of the Canterbury Tales (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1962), passim; Trevor Whittock, A Reading of the Canterbury Tales (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), passim; Howard, Idea, pp. 227-306; David, Strumpet 
Muse, pp. 77-240; Traugott Lawler, The One and the Many in the Canterbury Tales (Hamden, 
Conn.: Shoestring Press, 1980), passim; Judson Boyce Allen and Theresa Anne Moritz, A 
Distinction of Stories: The Medieval Unity of Chaucer's Fair Chain of Narratives for Canterbury 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1981), passim. 
2. See Margaret Schlauch, "The Man of Law's Tale," in Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's 
Canterbury Tales, ed. W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (1941; rpt. New York: Humanities 
Press, 1958), pp. 155-88. 
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5. For a notable exception about the Wife of Bath, see Kemp Malone, Chapters on Chaucer 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), pp. 215-18. 
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7. Cf. D. W. Robertson, Jr., "Some Disputed Chaucerian Terminology," Speculum 52 
(1977): 571-81. 
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Inconclusiveness and Narrative Form in Chaucer's Poetry 
By Larry Sklute 
Chaucer left many of his poems unfinished. The House of 
Fame breaks oft shortly before its end; the Legend of Good 
Women has two prologues and stops just before the narrator 
gives us the conclusion to the Legend of Hypermi\estra. And 
the Canterbury Tales is a work of fragments within which the 
talcs by the Cook, the Squire, the Monk, and the Pilgrim 
Chaucer are all incomplete. 
This incompleteness becomes particularly interesting when 
one considers that Chaucer's completed narratives fascinate 
most by their inconclusiveness. The Book of the Duchess solves 
a problem different from the one posed by its beginning. The 
Parliament of Fowls raises several questions about value that it 
never answers. And Troilus and Cnseyde insists on answers that 
many students of medieval literature agree the body of the 
work neither asks nor requires. The Canterbury Tales, in its 
fragmentary structure, its alternating points of view, and its 
way of presenting debate without closing it, simply refuses to 
be conclusive. 
In his examination of these frequently noted characteristics, 
Larry Sklute suggests some historical reasons for Chaucer's 
inconclusiveness and considers how it both creates and affects 
meaning in his narrative forms. Dr. Sklute reads each work as 
Chaucer's attempt to represent such antinomies as experience 
and authority, belief and proof, freedom and necessity, truth 
and opinion. He finds the inconclusiveness of Chaucer's 
poems an indication that their author was not always satisfied 
with how well the narrative forms he had inherited embodied 
human experience; and he sees the shape of ('haucer's literary 
career as a search for an appropriate form able to accommodate 
the inconclusiveness these antimonies create. The in­
conclusiveness that prevails throughout Chaucer's literary ca­
reer leads him to discover in the Canterbury Tales a kind of 
narrative unique in the Middle Ages—a form that provided an 
early model for modern fiction. 
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